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Introduction
A well-functioning financial cycle is a prerequisite for effective competition and innova-
tion in the real economy. Because of the interconnectedness of financial markets and
the real economy, financial crises lead to serious adverse real effects if the financing of
households, the real economy and governments is impaired. One fundamental reason for
why financial crises arise throughout economic history is that financial risks to the real
economy, contagion risks and default risks of single financial instruments can only be
imperfectly assessed. Hence, information asymmetries between investors and financial
institutions, between investors and non-financial companies - basically between suppliers
and buyers of financial services - are an inevitable part of financial markets.1
The recent financial crisis has caused a growing lack of faith in both effective self-
regulation and competitive forces in financial markets. Public intervention in terms
of competition policy and financial regulation has so far not kept pace with increasing
financial risks and developments of new financial instruments. However, financial risks
need to be monitored because they can have large negative impacts on the functioning
of the EU Single Market and other parts of the global real economy.2
A further question particularly relevant to Europe is whether an aspired financial mar-
ket integration is best served by competition or regulation. While an adequate level of
competition among financial institutions is necessary for a sufficient level of EU financial
market integration, a clear supervisory and regulatory framework is needed to maintain
trust in the well-functioning of financial markets. The European Central Bank and the
1Compare Böheim (2009), Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) and Lüderssen (2011).
2Compare Gros and Alidi (2010) and Beck, Chen, Lin, and Song (2012).
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European Commission continuously observe and analyze market and policy developments
relevant to both EU financial market stability and integration.3
Important to note is that financial regulation is only effective when policy makers know
what determines the demand for financial services and what drives financial institutions
to supply certain kinds of financial instruments. It is hence important to understand
how financial institutions conduct their business and how incentive structures of different
stakeholders in financial markets can be aligned. The goal is to determine a financial
market structure more robust to external shocks and to introduce conduct among finan-
cial institutions which is less prone to adverse selection and moral hazard.
This dissertation is a microeconomic investigation of information problems in financial
markets. Specifically, we analyze what impact information asymmetries have with regard
to the supply of financial services by financial institutions and the demand for financial
services from other firms. In the first chapter, we investigate empirically how financial
innovations affect the stability of financial institutions in the USA. In the second chap-
ter, we investigate the capital structure choice of non-financial companies in an empirical
setup. In the third chapter, we propose an economic analysis of a European Commission
regulation to improve competition and quality in the market for auditing services. The
chapters are self-contained and can be read independently.
In Chapter 1, ’Financial Innovation and Fragility’, we evaluate the impact of innova-
tive activity of financial agents on their stability in a competitive framework. Both
theoretical and empirical literature provide strong evidence for why financial crises exist
and why financial institutions engage in producing financial innovations. A recent strand
of research4 tries to combine both areas and argues that a competitive financial system
and the non-patentability of financial innovations can cause a financial crisis. These pa-
pers analyze the incentives to innovate and the relation to financial distress. Particularly,
this literature predicts that innovative activities negatively affect firm stability. Hence,
3See Zeitler (2008), European Central Bank (2013) and European Commission (2014).
4Starting with Bhattacharyya and Nanda (2000).
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there exist a vast array of concerns about the interconnection of financial innovations,
financial distress of firms and financial crises. Despite the plentiful theoretical work, only
a few empirical studies on that relation exist. This chapter provides insight into the em-
pirical relationship between innovation and stability in financial markets at the firm level.
We follow the innovation-fragility view5 and explore whether more innovative financial
systems are more prone to financial crises. We use a unique data set on financial innova-
tions in the USA between 1990 and 2002. This data set is provided by Lerner (2006) and
counts micro-level financial innovations in newspaper articles, databases and patents. We
augment the data with performance and stability measures. Our analysis relates firm-
level variations in innovative activity to the risk of insolvency, profit volatility and other
stability measures of financial institutions while controlling for firm characteristics and
time trends.
We show that a larger degree of innovation negatively affects firm stability of finan-
cial institutions. A couple of extensions to the initial model show the robustness of our
results. We find that the relationship is stronger firstly, for larger firms but only for inno-
vative activity captured through patenting and secondly, when financial institutions are
more leveraged. We also confirm the robustness of our results against modifications of
the innovation measures and different fragility parameters measuring profitability, cap-
italization, activity risk and risk of insolvency. In addition, we analyze the impact of
pre-crisis innovative activity on profitability in times of financial distress. We find that
more innovative firms face higher losses during a period of crisis. Overall, our analyses
support the innovation-fragility view.
This chapter expands the recent strand of literature on the relationship between incen-
tives to innovate and financial instability. Our contribution is the empirical connection
between financial innovations and instability of financial agents. There exist only few
empirical analyses focusing either on particular innovations6 or on cross-country com-
5See Beck, Chen, Lin, and Song (2012).
6E.g. Henderson and Pearson (2011).
3
Introduction
parisons7 so far. To the best of our knowledge, this chapter is the first quantitative
assessment of the innovation-fragility view at the firm level. We provide insights into
the driving forces behind the supply of financial services and show how information
problems between financial institutions and investors are exploited to reap profits from
misunderstandings, negligence and misperceptions of the risk-return profile of financial
instruments. Although we focus here on the USA, this firm-level analysis offers general
insights into the incentives to innovate and dynamics in a competitive financial system.
In Chapter 2, ’Determinants of Capital Structure in Non-Financial Companies’, we eval-
uate firm-, industry- and country-specific factors determining a firm’s capital structure.8
A recent comprehensive review of structural issues related to corporate finance and eco-
nomic activity for the Euro Area has pointed to the potential impact of capital structure
choices for the financial stability and economic performance of the economy as a whole.9
However, the empirical validity of several capital structure theories has been ambiguous
so far. A stylized fact that further motivates our inquiry is the pronounced cross-country
variation in leverage ratios of non-financial companies. In this context, we find it in-
triguing that among the two major theories that try to explain capital structure choices
of non-financial companies, the pecking order theory seems to better allow for country
heterogeneity along the leverage dimension as compared to the trade-off theory.
In this chapter, we follow similar empirical research in conducting a series of panel
analyses to determine the most important factors that drive leverage ratios. We ap-
pend previous work in drawing on a variety of different parameters and indices on firm-,
industry- and country-level to explain a greater portion of variation in the data. We
use a short panel data set with a very large European cross-section. Then, we build
on Rajan and Zingales (1995) and subsequent empirical studies10. We investigate how
a large group of firm-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic factors affect capital
structure choices over the past decade with an emphasis on Europe.
7E.g. Beck, Chen, Lin, and Song (2012).
8This chapter is based on joint work with Harald W. Stieber, European Commission.
9See European Central Bank (2013).
10Frank and Goyal (2009), Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012), Köksal, Orman, and Oduncu (2013) and
European Central Bank (2013).
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We show that firm size, industry leverage, industry growth and tax shield positively af-
fect leverage ratios, while profitability and liquidity have negative impacts. Furthermore,
tangibility has a positive impact on leverage for those firms that use long-term debt fi-
nancing. In contrast to capital structure theories and most empirical studies, we find a
negative impact of tangibility on total and short-term leverage ratios. We would argue
that this comes from the composition of our data set, namely the large majority of small
firms. In addition, we find a strong impact of international capital flows. Our model is
an improvement over previous empirical capital structure models in terms of explaining
data variation and cross-country differences.
This chapter extends the literature on capital structure choice. Our contribution is
twofold. First, we deal with the sample selection problem by analyzing a data set with
a very large European cross-section, i.e. in the number of firms, of industries and of
countries, with respect to firm size and the inclusion of USA and Japan as comparisons.
Second, we augment the existing capital structure analyses with firm-, industry- and
country-specific variables that can explain more of the variation in the data on capital
structure. In this chapter, we focus on the demand-side of financial markets and ana-
lyze how information problems between investors and non-financial companies influence
capital costs of these firms and as such, have an impact on the capital structure choice.
Our study provides strong indications that corporate taxation needs to be part of macro-
prudential policy for international capital markets in view of the strong effects of national
tax codes on leverage ratios. Furthermore, our very representative estimates can be seen
as an input for future research on the quantification of international intra-group capital
mobility and tax-base shifting.
In Chapter 3, ’Auditing Quality in Regulatory Regimes’, we evaluate the impact of regu-
latory interventions on the quality of auditing services. During the recent financial crisis,
it has become apparent that a positive auditing result of a firm’s financial statements
does not necessarily reflect a financially robust situation for that company. The European
Commission thus plans to create a Single Market for Statutory Audits with standardiza-
tion and voluntary quality certification measures among others. The goal is to introduce
5
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more competition, and to improve the transparency in the market and the reliability of
the signaling of audit results’ quality to potential investors of companies.11
This chapter investigates the impact of the European Commission proposals on social
welfare and the well-functioning of the market for auditing services. We set up a theoret-
ical model based on Stahl and Strausz (2011) that illustrates the relationship between an
auditor, a firm and a regulator. By utilizing a signaling framework we show differences
between standardization and certification. While standardization introduces the possibil-
ity to train and to invest into quality and leads to homogeneous price competition among
auditors, certification segments the market such that a separating equilibrium with prices
equal to productivities is sustained.
We can show that it matters which market side initiates the verification of quality for
firstly, the regulator’s profits and secondly, social welfare. The regulator’s interests and
social efficiency are not aligned, however. The welfare analysis reveals that standardiza-
tion of audit services is optimal if the costs for verifying quality are sufficiently low for
the regulator. On the other hand, voluntary quality certification leads to a separating
equilibrium where only high-quality auditors certify. This regime maximizes social wel-
fare whenever verification costs are large. The results are robust against a number of
extensions introducing renegotiations, quality choice, imperfect verification technologies,
excessive supply and demand, and asymmetric cost structures.
This chapter contributes to the literature by providing an economic analysis of a pro-
posed European Commission regulation concerning auditing services. We focus again on
the supply-side of financial markets and analyze how information problems between firms
and auditors can be resolved. We compare a harmonization of the quality of the service
provided by standardization against supply-side certification. A signaling of the quality
of the audit service provided by the auditor through seller-induced certification can suc-
cessfully dissect the market into different quality segments allowing for a more efficient
allocation of audit mandates according to the buyers’ willingness to pay, the respective
11See European Commission (2010, 2011a,b,c).
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need for a certain quality level and the ability of a respective auditor to provided such
demanded quality. Standardization may allow low-quality audit firms to catch up and
thus, allow the European Commission to raise the average audit quality provided in the
market. The respective regulatory regime which maximizes social welfare depends on the
structure of the verification costs for the regulator.
Taking these three chapters together, this dissertation shows that information problems
are important obstacles to the efficiency of financial markets. While the first two chap-
ters provide positive analyses of the supply and demand of financial services, the third
chapter turns to a normative approach. In particular, we provide insights into how public
intervention can be approached in order to increase the efficiency of financial markets.
We hope to contribute to the ongoing discussion about financial regulation, competition
policy and financial market integration.
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Financial Innovation and Fragility
1.1 Introduction
Numerous researchers have analyzed the causes for distress of financial agents during the
recent financial crisis starting in 2007. Through both theoretical and empirical analyses,
they came up with a variety of reasons. These include panics of bank customers and ma-
jor investors, shocks to money supply, to debt financing and to the real economy, as well
as the interconnectedness of banks and their complexity. A recent strand of literature1
tries to argue, however, that a competitive financial system and the non-patentability of
financial innovations (FI) can cause a financial crisis. These papers analyze the incen-
tives to innovate and the relation to financial distress. Despite the plentiful theoretical
literature, only a few empirical studies on that relation exist. These have provided evi-
dence on the drivers for product development and competition in financial markets. This
work provides additional insight into the empirical relationship between innovation and
stability in financial markets.
In this chapter, we follow the innovation-fragility view2 and explore whether more in-
novative financial systems are more prone to financial crises. To do so, we analyze the
1Starting with Bhattacharyya and Nanda (2000). A more detailed literature review is given in Section
1.2. This also provides the theoretical underpinnings for the empirical analysis in Section 1.4.
2See Beck, Chen, Lin, and Song (2012).
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proposed causal and positive relationship between FI and incidents of financial distress
in an empirical setup with US data on the firm level. The precipitating question is who
innovates in the financial market? Is the degree of innovativeness positively related to an
firm’s profit volatility? Does innovative activity increase the risk of insolvency? In other
words, is competition through innovation negatively related to stability?
We utilize count data and patents to measure FI on a micro level from Lerner (2006) and
relate firm-level variations in innovativeness to profit volatility of financial institutions
while controlling for firm characteristics and time trends. Based on an empirical setup
that corresponds to Hasan, Schmiedel, and Song (2009), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga
(2010), Beck, Chen, Lin, and Song (2012), and Lepetit and Strobel (2012), we investigate
the link between profit volatility and FI in a dynamic panel model. We find a significant
positive relation which implies a negative impact on the stability of the financial sys-
tem. Furthermore, we check the results against a number of different extensions. While
regressions with interactions between firm characteristics and FI provide ambiguous re-
sults, our findings are confirmed with different innovation measures and different fragility
measures. In addition, more innovative firms face higher losses during a period of crisis.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, we discuss previous literature in the area. In
Section 1.3 we introduce the data while in Section 1.4 we present the empirical analysis.
In Section 1.5 we discuss the results and extend our analysis, while Section 1.6 concludes
the chapter.
1.2 Literature Review
This chapter draws on literature from two distinct research areas: (i) micro- and macro-
economic research on the existence of financial crises and (ii) investigations into the
foundations of FI.3
3General surveys about research on financial agents with particular focus on asymmetries of information
and security design are given by Allen and Winton (1995) and Duffie and Rahie (1995).
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1.2.1 Financial Crises
The first field of research pertains to the origins and persistence of financial crises, or more
particularly, the investigation of causes for financial distress of single agents providing
any kind of financial services. In their seminal paper, Allen and Gale (2000) investigate
possible contagion and bubbles in financial networks. They build a model of contagion
with perfectly competitive banking and show that a first-best allocation of risk-sharing is
possible, but fragility still persists. Subsequently, Upper and Worms (2004) confirm Allen
and Gale’s (2000) model by empirically evaluating the risk of contagion and credit risk in
the German interbank lending market.4 Their analysis provides two results: First, credit
risk may trigger a domino effect in that there exists considerable scope for contagion even
with safety mechanisms. Second, more concentrated structures can lower the threshold
for contagion.5
Furthermore, Allen and Gale (2004) analyze the relation between competition and fi-
nancial stability. Here, they find a negative trade-off between both while considering a
variety of different settings such as general equilibrium models, agency models, Schum-
peterian competition and contagion. In a three-period model with risky and standard
assets as well as timing incongruity, they show that greater competition is good for ef-
ficiency, but bad for financial stability. Additionally, Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2009)
provide a thorough review on financial crises. They find that most financial crises arise
from panics, business cycle fluctuations or contagion, and derive from this evidence a
common sequence of events: With surging money supply, asset prices and credit volumes
increase which inevitably lead to a price bubble bound to burst. A banking crisis is then
followed by an exchange-rate crisis and a substantial drop in real output.6
4They use balance sheet data of German banks to estimate bilateral credit relationships.
5Many more papers can be found which empirically analyze the causes for financial crises both at a
micro- and macro-level. Since we want to focus on the distinct relationship between FI and financial
health, an extended overview on that area of literature would be beyond the scope of this chapter.
6Brunnermeier (2009) presents an overview on the development of the recent financial crisis and uses
micro- and macro-level data to suggest reasonable policy interventions.
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1.2.2 Financial Innovations
A second strand of literature looks at the origins and existence of financial innovations.7
The seminal definition of FI is given by Tufano (2003): It is the creation of financial
instruments (both product and process) by invention or diffusion of products, services or
ideas. He states that FI exists because of the incompleteness of markets, for managing
risk, for pooling of funds and because of regulation. Frank and White (2004, 2009) review
the technological changes and innovations in commercial banking over the last 25 years.
They employ the same definition of FI as Tufano (2003) and argue that FI reduce costs
and risks, pool funds and provide a tool to serve demands of investors. In addition, they
survey the literature to illustrate innovation patterns over the investigated period.
From a theoretical perspective, numerous papers provide arguments for the existence
of innovations in financial markets. Most recently, Michalopoulos, Laeven, and Levine
(2011) link FI to the endogeneous growth theory while Carvajal, Rostek, and Weretka
(2012) examine innovations in frictionless financial markets with short selling. They find
incomplete markets even with costless innovation and competition. Ferreira, Manso, and
Silva (2014) argue that the form of equity financing determines FI incentives. In their
model, they suggest to go public for exploiting existing ideas and go private for exploring
new, risky ideas. Song and Thakor (2010) and Shen, Yan, and Zhang (2012) provide argu-
ments for collateral-motivated FI and link possible innovation cycles in financial markets
to government regulation such as Basel III.
Empirical assessments of innovations in financial markets have started with research
in the 1980s and 1990s.8 In his early contribution, Tufano (1989) argues that FI pro-
vide first-mover advantages. He assesses the dynamics of innovations and competition
by analyzing data on 58 publicly offered FI in the years 1974 to 1987 which raised USD
280 billion and providing cross-sectional regressions of the underwriting spread on firm
7Tufano (2003), Frank and White (2004, 2009) as well as Lerner and Tufano (2011) provide overviews
on innovations in financial markets.
8See e.g. Miller (1986, 1992), Merton (1992), Frank and White (2004, 2009).
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characteristics.9 He finds that 20% of new securities being issued in 1987 have not been
in existence in 1974 and that new product ideas diffuse rapidly across competitors so
that banks do not enjoy monopoly pricing with innovations, but rather capture a larger
market share with lower prices than their imitators.
Lerner (2002) looks at financial patents during the period 1971 to 2000 and analyzes the
impact of the State Street decision10 on the degree of innovation observable in the market.
He uses the classification of the US Patent and Trademark Office and the Delphion IP
Network to identify 445 financial patents and finds a surge in patenting filed mostly by
large corporations. In addition, Lerner (2006) investigates the origins of innovations by
developing a new measure for FI. His regressions show that small, less profitable firms are
more innovative with an additional agglomeration effect. More recently, Lerner (2010)
inquires about litigation of patents on FI.11 He analyzes financial patent awards by the
US Patent and Trademark Office between 1976 and 2003 in combination with firm-level
data from public records. He finds that first, patents on FI are litigated more often than
normal patents; second, litigated patents are mostly owned by small firms or individuals
and have more claims and citations than other financial patents; and third, large firms
are more often defendants in litigation.
Finally, Boz and Mendoza (2010) examine the interaction of FI, learning and collat-
eral constraints in a stochastic equilibrium model of household debt and land prices.
They use an experimental setup with switching between high- and low-leverage regimes
according to Bayesian learning and find that innovations in financial markets lead to
boom-bust cycles.
9Tufano (1989) relied on three data sources: first, a literature search using ABI-Inform and Business
Periodical Index; second, interviews with investment bankers; third, company data from SDC and
IDDIS.
10State Street Bank vs. Signature Financial Group was a 1998 decision by the US Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) regarding the patentability of business methods. Herein, the CAFC
rejected the notion of a business method exception and allowed the protection of an invention if it
involved some practical application and some tangible result, which with regards to financial patents
was deemed the pricing. However, the 2008 CAFC decision In re Bilski rejected the tangible result
test as inadequate. The US Supreme Court affirmed this judgement in Bilski vs. Kappos. This leaves
companies with great uncertainty over the patentability of financial innovations.
11This again draws on Lerner (2002).
12
Financial Innovation and Fragility
The financial innovations considered here differ from innovations in product markets in
several important ways. In general, consumers of financial services face opacity about
the portfolio of financial agents and their quality provided in financial services. Also,
research has not yet produced any structural model with which to estimate both supply
and demand of FI. Frank and White (2004) survey empirical studies on FI and point to
the general scarcity in research in that field. Lerner and Tufano (2011) also show some
differences between FI and manufacturing innovations, most notably stressing different
dynamics and agency structures. They point out the problems of assessing FI due to the
rarity of R&D spending by financial agents, the infrequency or non-existence of financial
patents and the opacity of FI by private firms.
1.2.3 Incentives to Innovate and Financial Crises
This chapter makes use of a new strand of literature combining both aforementioned
research fields. Most work focuses on the innovation-fragility view coined by Beck, Chen,
Lin, and Song (2012) that innovations may have adverse effects on competition and sta-
bility. It begins with early theoretical work by Bhattacharyya and Nanda (2000). Their
paper is the first to connect incentives to innovate and the analysis of financial crises in
a theoretical setup. Because client characteristics, market structure and volatility affect
switching costs and costs of delayed adoption, banks with greater market power and more
secure relationships with customers are more likely to innovate. Empirical assessments
of the causal link between innovations and financial instability have been scarce.
Most recently, two lines of argumentation have emerged. The first one focuses on incen-
tive structures and volatility in financial markets. Thakor (2012) analyzes the relation
between incentives to innovate and financial crises. He makes use of Allen and Gale’s
(2004) model with three periods where the distinction is not between standard and risky
assets, but now between standard and innovative assets. Financial agents then face the
trade-off between making profits from innovation and refinancing risks. In his model, the
degree of innovativeness is positively related to the refinancing risk which makes imitation
less likely and drives up profits. Reasons for financial distress are then the competitive
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financial system and the non-patentability of FI because of the correlation of default risks
if FI can be imitated.
Beck, Chen, Lin, and Song (2012) evaluate the respective relationships between FI and
real sector growth, real sector volatility and bank fragility using bank-, industry- and
country-level data from 32 countries during the period 1996 to 2006. Approximating Tu-
fano’s (2003) definition of FI by financial R&D intensity obtained from the OECD, they
analyze the innovation-fragility view. Namely, they relate country-level variation in FI to
bank-level variation in profits and volatility. Their results show that innovativeness leads
to increasing fragility, risk taking, profit volatility and bank losses during crises. Herein,
smaller, fast growing banks are more fragile in countries with more FI while smaller, less
leveraged banks are more effected by agglomeration effects.
A second line of argumentation focuses on investors’ behavior. Shleifer and Vishny (2010)
set up a behavioral finance model where they assume optimism of investors as stimulus
for demand for new securities and pessimism as a shock leading to financial crises. Mis-
pricing occurs because financial agents profit from investors’ misperceptions. Depressed
securities then have adverse welfare effects ex post as they cut off lending to new instru-
ments. Overall, securitization raises the level of investment and cyclicality. Henderson
and Pearson (2011) show that investors can be exploited by innovative financial products.
Their event study proposes that issuers innovate to sell new securities at a risk-adjusted
premium to uninformed investors because innovativeness increases complexity and am-
biguity. Subsequently, issuers exploit investors’ misunderstandings of financial market.
The authors provide reasons for excess demand in overconfidence, framing and loss aver-
sion of investors.
Jeon and Nishihara (2012) extend Shleifer and Vishny’s (2010) model and allow agents
to securitize risky assets with leverage and asymmetric information. They find that risk
retention requirements imposed by governments reduce welfare. Concurrently, Gennaioli,
Shleifer, and Vishny (2012) argue that FI cause crises because of neglected risks. Their
research is also an extension of Shleifer and Vishny’s (2010) paper whereby agents engi-
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neer securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks which leads to excessive
security issuance. They apply a model of belief formation to relate FI, security issuance,
risk perception and financial fragility.
This chapter follows the recent strand of new literature on the relationship between
incentives to innovate and financial instability. The chapter’s contribution is the empir-
ical connection between financial innovations and instability of financial agents. There
exist only a few empirical analyses focusing either on particular innovations (Hender-
son and Pearson (2011)) or on cross-country comparisons (Beck, Chen, Lin, and Song
(2012)) so far. To the best of our knowledge this is the first quantitative assessment of
the innovation-fragility view at the agent level. We employ a data set by Lerner (2006)
and augment it with performance and stability measures so that we can study the effect
of firm-level variation in FI on the stability of financial agents. Although we focus here
on the USA, this firm-level analysis can offer insights into the incentives to innovate and
dynamics in a competitive financial system.
1.3 Data
The data set measures financial innovations in the USA from 1990 until 2002 via a unique
counting mechanism.12 Lerner (2006) investigates the origins of innovations and develops
a new FI measure based on news stories from the Wall Street Journal during the period
1990 to 2002 which he merges with additional information from the SEC, Compustat,
finance journals and the US Patent and Trademark Office to establish a link between
innovative ability, firm characteristics and patenting.13 The sample consists of firms with
either at least one innovation observed by the measure during the time period or being
active in the SIC codes 60 through 64 and 67. These SIC codes include firms operating
in the financial services business such as insurance, banking, financial advisory and so on
except for real estate.
12The data were kindly provided by Josh Lerner, Harvard Business School.
13See also Lerner (2002) for his aforementioned earlier work on financial patents.
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The data set consists of four different groups of variables:14 First, we use firm char-
acteristics to control for firm-specific effects. In accordance with Lerner (2006), we use
the logarithm of total assets to measure firm size. Profitability (Opprof) is defined as
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by
revenues, and leverage is defined as the ratio of the book value of a firm’s long-term
debt to total capitalization. Further control variables include firm age, cash equivalents,
employees, shareholders’ equity, long-term debt, common market value and revenues.
Second, the data set includes performance measures like EBITDA, net income, retained
earnings as well as return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) which are used
to derive the stability measures and provide information about the competitive nature.
Third, we measure stability of financial institutions with the Z-score. The Z-score is
a measure of bank solvency and corresponds to (ROA + CAR)/σ(ROA). It "indicates
the number of standard deviations that a bank’s rate of return on assets can fall in a
single period before it becomes insolvent. A higher Z-score signals a lower probability
of bank insolvency" (Beck, Chen, Lin, and Song (2012)).15 For robustness checks, we
later also use other stability measures such as the capital-asset ratio (CAR), standard
deviations of returns, and the Sharpe ratio which is defined as ROE/σ(ROE).
Fourth, innovation is measured by the count of patent applications, patents issued and
stories on innovations per year and firm. We also include a measure for the agglomeration
effect by counting the number of innovations by other firms within the same two-digit
ZIP code area as a firm.
All financial data is in million 2002 US Dollars. Financial and company data comes
directly from Compustat or is calculated from its pool of variables. The count data on
innovations comes from articles issued in the Wall Street Journal or the Factiva database
14For complete descriptions of the variables used here, see Table A.1 in the Appendix.
15See Lepetit and Strobel (2013) for more information on firm’s insolvency risk and different approaches
to time-varying Z-score measures. They provide a derivation of the Z-score and discuss several ways
to estimate means and standard deviations of the variables used to calculate the measure. We follow
their recommended specification.
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on technological inventions. Patent data comes from the US Patent and Trademark Of-
fice. For a comprehensive explanation of the data set, see Lerner (2006). We clean the
data from coding errors and outliers, and perform some plausibility checks. Any ob-
servations with implausible values for balance sheet items (e.g. negative revenues) are
dropped. We also exclude observations with negative Z-scores. The final sample is an
unbalanced panel of 3,042 firms with 19,895 firm-year observations.
Like any other measure of FI, the count measure used here also has its limitations.
It necessarily excludes private firms not listed in Compustat. Furthermore, the time
period is rather limited and the methodology to source the counts of innovations from
the articles is based on stylized facts of FI. Also, problems in assessing FI exist due to
the rarity of R&D spending by financial institutions, the infrequency of financial patents
and the opacity of FI by private firms as discussed by Tufano (2003), Frank and White
(2004, 2009) and Lerner and Tufano (2011). Therefore, the count measure introduced by
Lerner (2006) and applied here to analyze financial fragility is a promising first start to
assess empirically the connection between financial innovations and instability of financial
agents.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
This section explores the relationship between FI and financial agents’ fragility empiri-
cally. We first provide a description of the data and then present the empirical model
specification.
1.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Properties
Table 1.1 provides an overview of the summary statistics of the variables. It shows that
there exists great heterogeneity among firms in terms of size and profitability. Because we
include all firms active in financial services, leverage ratios are comparably low. Stability
measures are constructed from the firm characteristics to capture a firm’s insolvency risk
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and activity risk. Higher numbers for the Sharpe ratio and the Z-score reflect less fragility.
Moreover, the count data on FI includes a lot of zeros as indicated by the low means.16
Generally, variances of the variables are quite large. For most variables, mean values are
larger than the median because these variables exhibit right-skewed distributions with a
lot of values close to zero.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Age 9.550 6.000 11.971 0 77
Assets 12806.760 604.177 57441.090 0 1097190
Cash Equiv. 1348.839 28.258 8608.241 0 316206
Leverage 0.278 0.213 0.263 0 0.999
Long-term Debt 1698.329 36.057 11639.600 0 468570
Market Value 2939.847 138.685 15583.860 0 535947
Pref. Stock 38.948 0.000 223.152 0 5712
Revenues 2607.716 78.583 11729.980 0 186857
Sh. Equity 1306.896 91.860 5115.215 -515.745 153738
Opprof 0.077 0.291 6.850 -587.544 19.483
Ret. Earnings 776.869 24.195 3527.743 -15801 81210
ROA 0.050 0.011 1.723 -16.444 235.667
ROE 0.835 0.104 49.136 -125.869 4787.999
CAR 0.226 0.127 3.231 -441 3.414
HHI 0.014 0.014 0.002 0.011 0.019
σ(ROA) 0.142 0.008 4.875 0 650.898
σ(ROE) 1.557 0.046 45.011 0 2194.872
Sharpe 3.702 2.211 8.642 -103.399 346.778
Z-score 42.926 22.897 194.269 0 12381.450
Innovations 0.016 0.000 0.165 0 6
Patents 0.033 0.000 0.416 0 15
Applications 0.031 0.000 0.432 0 21
R&D 45.594 0.000 436.137 0 9845
FI by Others 2.442 0.000 3.441 0 12
Notes: N=19,895. The list is ordered according to the four different groups of
variables mentioned above. See Table A.1 in the Appendix for definitions of
the variables. All financial data is in million 2002 US Dollars and comes from
Compustat. Count data on innovations comes from the Wall Street Journal,
the Factiva database or the US Patent and Trademark Office, collected by
Lerner (2006).
16In total, the data set includes only 588 incidents of financial innovation.
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Observations are evenly distributed over the time period and firm characteristics exhibit
a high degree of persistence. About 11% of firms in the sample have observations for
the entire time period. About 26% of firms have 8 or more consecutive observations. On
average, the data set has 6 observations per firm.
Figure 1.1 displays firm characteristics over time. There exists a general increase in the
absolute values of these firm-specific variables. Similar to Figure 1.1, Figure 1.2 presents
the evolution of a firm’s performance and stability measures over the time period. There
is no clear trend in rising or falling profitability of financial institutions. While retained
earnings and the Sharpe ratio increase over time, operational profitability, the capital-
asset ratio and returns on assets and equity decline.
Figure 1.1: Firm Characteristics
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Figure 1.2: Profitability and Stability Measures
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Figure 1.3 presents how the count of FI has developed over time. The notable peak
towards the late 1990s is due to the aforementioned State Street decision. Observations
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for patents lag behind applications because the average time period between applying for
a patent and granting patents is about two to three years. Only applications for patents
granted during the time period are included in the data set. Overall, the number of
observed innovations is rather low in comparison to the overall size of the data set so
that this is one point of caution.
Figure 1.3: Evolution of Innovative Activity
0
50
10
0
15
0
To
ta
l C
ou
nt
 p
er
 Y
ea
r
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Innovation Stories Patents Applications
Figure 1.4 presents a comparison of fragility by grouping firms with measured innovation
and with no count, respectively, and by plotting the evolution of both sets. In accordance
with our hypothesis, linear predictions of Z-scores of firms without innovation are slightly
higher than those with counts of innovation. Additionally, a time trend indicates that
the relation becomes stronger.
Figure 1.4: Evolution of Z-scores
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Following the descriptives, a variety of univariate analyses provide a first glance at the
variables’ behavior and properties. Firm characteristics are correlated with each other
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and over time. This also drives autocorrelation in Z-scores by construction. Includ-
ing lagged dependent variables in the regressions captures most of the autocorrelation.
While the FI measures are significantly correlated with each other, a F-test also shows
joint significance. Also, fragility (Z-scores) and FI measures are significantly positively
(negatively) correlated.17 Mann-Whitney U tests show that the mean and variance of
Z-scores are significantly different with and without innovation. A series of panel-based
unit root tests reject the hypothesis that the Z-scores are first-order integrated (I(1)).18
Control variables are carefully selected to avoid problems of multicollinearity. A robust
version of the Wu-Hausman test by Wooldridge (2002) shows that fixed effects modeling
is preferred over a random effects setup. Furthermore, Breusch-Pagan and White tests
show that error terms are heteroskedastic, while Arellano-Bond and Breusch-Godfrey
tests show that the error terms are correlated with each other.
1.4.2 Empirical Strategy
Based on the micro-level database on FI in the US between 1990 and 2002 presented
above, we relate agent-level variations in innovativeness to profitability and profit volatil-
ity of financial institutions while controlling for firm characteristics and time trends. For
our empirical setup we build on Hasan, Schmiedel, and Song (2009), Demirgüç-Kunt
and Huizinga (2010), Beck, Chen, Lin, and Song (2012), Lepetit and Strobel (2012)
and Bertay, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga (2013). They analyze profits and fragility
of financial institutions with a variety of different setups and also assess the reliability
of the Z-score.19 Because of the data properties presented above, our baseline model
specification is as follows.
Zi,t = ρZi,t−1 + βXi,t + γYi,t + αi + δt + i,t (1.1)
17See Table A.2 in the Appendix.
18We use augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests to analyze cointegration. If Z-scores were
really I(1), then their time series would be a random walk with drift. In fact, the data is trend
stationary and we use a time trend in our regression models to account for that.
19Their work shows that the Z-score is a feasible indicator to measure financial stability of firms and is
commonly used in the literature.
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where indices i, t stand respectively for firm and time. Z is the Z-score per firm and
period.20 Including lagged dependent variables allows us to account for the persistence
of firm characteristics which also reflect in the Z-scores by construction and the general
persistence over time. X is the vector of firm characteristics for which data are available
while Y is the vector of different financial innovation indicators. To account for firm
heterogeneity and skewness, we use ratios of balance sheet items relative to asset size for
the control variables and employ the logarithm of all independent variables that are not
ratios. The regression model also includes αi and δt to account for omitted firm-specific
and time fixed effects, respectively. The Newey-West-type robust error term  is clustered
at firm-level and allowed to be heteroskedastic, autocorrelated and spatially correlated.
1.5 Results
In this section, we discuss the main results and perform a number of robustness checks.
We also extend the model to further investigate the innovation-fragility view in more
detail.
1.5.1 Baseline Model
We compare different versions of the dynamic panel model set up in Section 1.4.2 which
enhances the static linear fixed effects model by including autoregressive coefficients for
fragility. This allows us to capture feedback from current or past shocks to current values
of the dependent variable. This specification is adequate in the presence of autocorrelated
error terms and high persistence in the dependent variable which we have shown earlier.
Table 1.2 provides the overview of the different model specifications. Baseline innovative
capacity in firms is captured by firm size, profitability and leverage which Lerner (2006)
has shown to be important drivers of incentives to innovate. In all regressions, we include
firm characteristics, year fixed effects and a constant but suppress their coefficients in the
20Because the Z-score is highly skewed and to avoid truncation, we use ln(1+Z-score) in the regressions.
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tables.
Column 1 to 4 provides the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator with firm fixed ef-
fects and lagged dependent variables interchangeably. Column 4 depicts the full model
specification presented in Section 1.4.2. Even though firm fixed effects cover average
innovative ability of a firm while lagged dependent variables capture time trends, the γ
coefficients to measure FI remain negative and statistically significant. Once accounting
for firm differences and time trends, patenting becomes sufficiently less important for
firm stability.
Column 5 presents the results for the period 1990 until 1998 only. Remember the State
Street decision by the CAFC in 1998.21 This has provided firms with legal certainty about
what kind of FI can be legally protected. Hence, more technology spillovers should theo-
retically be observed in the pre-1998 period because of the legal uncertainty prior to the
CAFC decision. Given these spillovers from FI, we expect to observe a stronger relation
between firm instability and innovative activity. We split the data sample into pre-State
Street and post-State Street periods. Analyzing the first subsample indeed shows larger
γ coefficients of the FI measures prior to 1998 and hence confirms that spillover effects
of FI further decrease stability.
Moreover, we analyze the impact of competitive pressure on the proposed positive re-
lationship between FI and fragility. We thus include the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) in column 6. Because an increase in the HHI signals rising market power and
weakening competition, the positive regression coefficient for the HHI indicates that com-
petition and stability are negatively correlated which is the same conjecture Allen and
Gale (2004) made. Controlling for competition does not change the γ coefficients of the
FI measures or the agglomeration effect.
21We already mentioned this in the Literature Review (Section 1.2) and it is discussed in Lerner (2002).
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Table 1.2: Variants in the Model Specification
static firm FE only LDV only full specification pre-1998 competition
ln(1+Z-scoret) ln(1+Z-scoret) ln(1+Z-scoret) ln(1+Z-scoret) ln(1+Z-scoret) ln(1+Z-scoret)
ln(1+Z-scoret−1) 0.794*** 0.013 -0.005 0.012
(0.060) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
ln(assets) 0.382*** -0.133*** 0.111*** -0.139*** -0.166*** -0.138***
(0.027) (0.011) (0.032) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
EBITDA/revenues 0.016*** -0.000 0.005*** -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage ratio 0.144 -0.266*** -0.085* -0.257*** -0.246*** -0.254***
(0.162) (0.026) (0.051) (0.020) (0.025) (0.020)
HHI 0.162
(0.435)
FI by others -0.010 0.003*** -0.003* 0.001* 0.000 0.001*
(0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Innovations -0.211*** -0.028** -0.075* -0.029** -0.058* -0.027**
(0.034) (0.012) (0.042) (0.012) (0.031) (0.012)
Patents -0.074*** -0.006 -0.016* -0.004 0.015 -0.004
(0.012) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005)
Applications -0.023** -0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002
(0.012) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE N Y N Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 16,717 16,717 14,770 14,770 7,934 14,770
Number of firms 2,715 2,715 2,660 2,660 2,022 2,660
R-squared 0.293 0.594 0.551 0.633 0.629 0.633
Notes: See Table A.1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables. Count data on innovations comes from the Wall Street Journal,
the Factiva database or the US Patent and Trademark Office, collected by Lerner (2006). All financial data is in million 2002 US Dollars
and comes from Compustat. Column 1 does not include a lagged dependent variable or firm fixed effects. Column 2 includes only firm
fixed effects. Column 3 includes only a lagged dependent variable. Column 4 includes the full model specification presented in Section
1.4.2. Column 5 includes data for 1990 until 1998 only. Column 6 includes data for the full period from 1990 until 2002 with the HHI
controlling for firm-level competition. In all regressions, we include firm characteristics as controls, year fixed effects and a constant but
suppress their coefficients in the tables. Control variables include firm age, cash equivalents, employees, retained earnings, shareholders’
equity, preferred stock and long-term debt (all as ratios relative to assets or logarithms). Driscoll and Kraay (1998) robust standard
errors are clustered at firm-level and presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Overall, results show that indeed there exists a significant positive relation between FI and
fragility (negative relation between FI and Z-scores) albeit small, but patenting seems to
be no factor. The size of the coefficients however corresponds to the correlations from the
univariate analyses in Section 1.4.1. Surprisingly, the agglomeration effect as measured
in FI by others is very weak.
1.5.2 Robustness
We check the robustness of our results. Foremost, the results in Table 1.2 are robust
against including or excluding different firm-specific control variables. We also use data
on revenues and common market value instead of total assets to control for firm size but
the results do not change. If we include a dummy variable for incidences of FI instead of
the three different count measures, the coefficient is negative but not significant.
In order to check whether our results are due to a particular econometric specification, we
run different panel estimators. We compare our baseline model specification to a pooled
feasible GLS estimator with a panel-specific AR(1)-disturbance, a Prais-Winsten regres-
sion to account for autocorrelated error terms, and a Newey-West heteroskedasticity- and
autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) estimator. We find qualitatively similar results. The
advantage of Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors is that they expand Newey-West
HAC estimators to include correlation between panels and that the estimator does not
place restrictions on the limit behavior of the number of panels.
We also run dynamic panel data estimators. We use the Arellano and Bond (1991) esti-
mator by instrumental-variables (IV) estimation of the parameters of the first-difference
model using lags of regressors as instruments.22 Additionally, we use the Blundell and
Bond (1998) estimator because the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator performs poorly
22We have shown earlier that the data is trend stationary. Because the Arellano and Bond (1991)
estimator relies on first differences, it consumes most of the variation between observations for innova-
tion indicators since their within-variation (variation over time) is larger than their variation between
panels. Thus, coefficients for the innovation indicators turn out smaller and not significant in the
regression.
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with large autoregressive disturbances.23 We find qualitatively similar results.
In any estimation of fixed effects models for short panels when lagged dependent vari-
ables are present, coefficients may be downwardly biased. This is called Nickell (1981)
bias whose size is relative to the time period T of the data set. It is given here by
1/T = 1/13 = 0.07. Thus, as T → ∞ the bias disappears.24 That’s why we compare
the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator with the aforementioned dynamic panel data
estimators which are consistent. Two caveats arise from dynamic panel data estimators
in this case, namely that the IV estimation greatly increases the mean squared error and
that errors are assumed to not be serially correlated. On the other hand, the Driscoll and
Kraay (1998) estimator works with great precision although potentially biased. Thus,
a trade-off between correcting biases against decreases in efficiency is inherent. Funda-
mentally, trading a small reduction in the bias for a large decrease in efficiency sounds
questionable. Assuming the Nickell (1981) bias is negligible since T = 13 is a reasonable
time period and given the small coefficient for lagged Z-scores from Table 1.2, we further
pursue the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator with fixed effects and lagged dependent
variables in our analysis.
1.5.3 Extensions
We extend the baseline model with a couple of features. First, we want to explore the
relationship between innovation and fragility across firms with different characteristics.
Thus, we generate interaction terms of the FI measures with assets, profitability and lever-
age.25 Table 1.3 provides the piece-wise inclusion of these interactions into the regression
with the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator assessed above. Column 1 and 4 show the
effect of FI on fragility with heterogeneous firm size. The relationship is stronger for
23The Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator is a system GMM estimation method which enhances the
Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator with additional moment conditions. Both estimators are consis-
tent, but they assume that there exists no autocorrelation in the error terms, that panel-level effects
are uncorrelated with the first differences and that good instruments are available.
24Compare Behr (2003) for a discussion on dynamic panel data estimators and their application to
financial data.
25For the interaction terms, we multiply our FI indicators with assets, profitability and leverage, respec-
tively.
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larger firms but only for innovative activity captured through patenting. Overall, patent-
ing decreases stability significantly. Column 2 and 4 show that the different profitability
levels have no impact on the effect of FI on fragility as expected. Finally, column 3 and
4 display the effect of FI on fragility with different leverage ratios. The relationship is
stronger when firms are more leveraged and the impact of innovation increases with the
leverage ratio. Across all models, the positive (negative) relation between innovation and
fragility (stability) prevails, while the size of the coefficients differs across specifications.
Second, we investigate the robustness of our results from Section 1.5.1 against modifica-
tions of innovation measures as depicted in Table 1.4. Column 1 provides the regression
results with the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator from Table 1.2. Subsequently, col-
umn 2 uses a weighting mechanism to account for sole or collaborative inventions while
column 3 uses only highly innovative activities as classified by a three-part scheme in-
troduced by Lerner (2006). Column 4 provides a combination of 2 and 3 and finally,
column 5 introduces R&D expenditures as a further control.26 Results are confirmed.
The positive relation between innovation and fragility is persistent while patenting has
no effect.
26See Table A.1 in the Appendix for a description of the exact modifications.
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Table 1.3: Interaction with Firm Characteristics
Firm Size Profitability Leverage Compound
Model
ln(1+Z-scoret) ln(1+Z-scoret) ln(1+Z-scoret) ln(1+Z-scoret)
ln(1+Z-scoret−1) 0.013* 0.013* 0.013* 0.013*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
ln(assets) -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.154*** -0.154***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
EBITDA/revenues 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage ratio -0.228*** -0.227*** -0.227*** -0.227***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
FI by others in 2-digit zip code 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Innovations -0.016 -0.010*** -0.103** -0.097***
(0.019) (0.004) (0.043) (0.034)
Patents -0.042*** 0.002 -0.036* -0.035**
(0.012) (0.005) (0.020) (0.017)
Applications -0.016 -0.008* -0.044 -0.060*
(0.012) (0.005) (0.033) (0.035)
Innovations * ln(assets) -0.048 0.191
(0.158) (0.195)
Patents * ln(assets) -0.402*** -0.672***
(0.111) (0.195)
Applications * ln(assets) -0.136 -0.029
(0.091) (0.081)
Innovations * EBITDA/revenues 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Patents * EBITDA/revenues -0.001*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Applications * EBITDA/revenues -0.001 -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000)
Innovations * leverage ratio -0.117** -0.139**
(0.052) (0.054)
Patents * leverage ratio -0.035 0.027
(0.022) (0.020)
Applications * leverage ratio -0.046 -0.055
(0.033) (0.041)
Controls Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y Y
Observations 14,770 14,770 14,770 14,770
Number of firms 2,660 2,660 2,660 2,660
R-squared 0.634 0.634 0.634 0.634
Notes: See Table A.1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables. Count data on innovations comes
from the Wall Street Journal, the Factiva database or the US Patent and Trademark Office, collected by
Lerner (2006). All financial data is in million 2002 US Dollars and comes from Compustat. All columns
incorporate the baseline model from column 4 of Table 1.2. Column 1 includes interaction terms between firm
size and FI measures. Column 2 includes interaction terms between profitability and FI measures. Column 3
includes interaction terms between leverage ratio and FI measures. Finally, column 4 includes all interaction
terms. In all regressions, we include firm characteristics as controls, firm and year fixed effects, and a constant
but suppress their coefficients in the tables. Control variables include firm age, cash equivalents, employees,
retained earnings, shareholders’ equity, preferred stock and long-term debt (all as ratios relative to assets or
logarithms). Driscoll and Kraay (1998) robust standard errors are clustered at firm-level and presented in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.4: Robustness against FI Measures
base weighted major weighted R&D
and major
ln(1+Z-scoret) ln(1+Z-scoret) ln(1+Z-scoret) ln(1+Z-scoret) ln(1+Z-scoret)
ln(1+Z-scoret−1) 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
ln(assets) -0.139*** -0.139*** -0.139*** -0.139*** -0.143***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
EBITDA/revenues -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage ratio -0.257*** -0.257*** -0.258*** -0.258*** -0.248***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018)
FI by others in 2-digit zip code 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Innovation parameters -0.029** -0.046*** -0.028* -0.051* -0.027**
(0.012) (0.017) (0.015) (0.027) (0.012)
Patent parameters -0.004 -0.012 -0.005 -0.014 -0.006
(0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005)
Application parameters -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001
(0.005) (0.015) (0.005) (0.015) (0.005)
R&D/assets -0.489***
(0.144)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 14,770 14,770 14,770 14,770 14,770
Number of firms 2,660 2,660 2,660 2,660 2,660
R-squared 0.633 0.633 0.633 0.633 0.634
Notes: See Table A.1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables. Count data on innovations comes from the Wall Street
Journal, the Factiva database or the US Patent and Trademark Office, collected by Lerner (2006). All financial data is in million
2002 US Dollars and comes from Compustat. Column 1 incorporates the baseline model from column 4 of Table 1.2. Column
2 includes a weighting mechanism to account for sole or collaborative inventions. Column 3 includes only highly innovative
activities as classified by a three-part scheme introduced by Lerner (2006). Column 4 is a combination of 2 and 3. It includes a
weighting mechanism to account for sole or collaborative inventions of only highly innovative activities as classified by Lerner
(2006). Finally, column 5 includes R&D expenditures as a further control. In all regressions, we include firm characteristics
as controls, firm and year fixed effects, and a constant but suppress their coefficients in the tables. Control variables include
firm age, cash equivalents, employees, retained earnings, shareholders’ equity, preferred stock and long-term debt (all as ratios
relative to assets or logarithms). Driscoll and Kraay (1998) robust standard errors are clustered at firm-level and presented in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Third, we further explore the robustness of results by investigating the components of
the Z-score and alternative measures for firm fragility in Table 1.5.27 Thus, we keep the
right-hand side variables the same and compare different left-hand side variables. We
respectively use ROA, ROE and the capital-asset ratio to assess profitability and capi-
talization, the volatility of ROA and volatility of ROE to measure a firm’s activity risk,
and finally, the Sharpe ratio as an alternative measure for the risk of insolvency. Specifi-
cally, the Sharpe ratio describes how well the return compensates the investor for the risk
taken. Column 2 and 3 show that profitability is positively affected by patenting behav-
ior, but surprisingly, the innovation coefficient is significantly negative although small.
Capitalization of firms in column 4 is negatively affected by FI on a small scale, but only
in patenting. Unusually, activity risk is not affected by a firm’s degree of innovation as
depicted in columns 5 and 6. Lastly, innovation continues to positively relate to risk of
insolvency although the coefficient becomes insignificant whereas unexpectedly patenting
positively affects excessive returns as shown in column 7.
Fourth, another investigation looks at the impact of FI on profitability during a financial
crisis. Did FI hurt financial institutions during a period of financial market breakdown?
In a cross-sectional setting where independent variables from 1999 only are used, we
analyze whether firms make larger losses during financial distress when innovating. Ta-
ble 1.6 provides an overview of the summary statistics of the variables for 1999. The
cross-sectional sample has 1,781 observations. For most variables, mean values are larger
than the median indicating a few large firms drive up average values. Values for most
differences in profitability are negative. Variances in general are large.
27Because the different measures are highly skewed and to avoid truncation, we use the logarithm for
the dependent variables in the regressions, except for standard deviations.
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Table 1.5: Robustness against Fragility Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(1+Z-scoret) ln(1+ROAt) ln(1+ROEt) ln(1+CARt) σ(ROA) σ(ROE) ln(1+Sharpet)
ln(1+Z-scoret−1) 0.013
(0.008)
ln(1+ROAt−1) 0.042
(0.022)
ln(1+ROEt−1) 0.024
(0.015)
ln(1+CARt−1) 0.327***
(0.004)
ln(1+Sharpet−1) 0.033***
(0.009)
ln(assets) -0.143*** 0.004 -0.152*** -0.048*** -0.020 -0.083 -0.297***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.022) (0.005) (0.017) (0.066) (0.024)
EBITDA/revenues 0.000 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Leverage ratio -0.248*** 0.005 0.091*** 0.100*** -0.011 -0.158 0.166***
(0.018) (0.013) (0.015) (0.006) (0.014) (0.132) (0.055)
FI by others in 2-digit zip code 0.001* 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.009 0.002 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003)
Innovations -0.027** -0.003** -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.037 -0.026
(0.012) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.042) (0.027)
Patents -0.006 0.003 0.009** -0.003*** -0.002 0.001 0.018**
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009)
Applications -0.001 0.003** 0.007** -0.002** -0.002 0.002 0.018***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
R&D/assets -0.489*** -0.449 -0.498*** 0.073 0.159 0.002 -0.253**
(0.144) (0.504) (0.136) (0.055) (0.152) (0.085) (0.124)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 14,770 14,770 14,754 14,824 14,770 14,505 13,960
Number of firms 2,660 2,660 2,658 2,714 2,660 2,659 2,630
R-squared 0.634 0.103 0.071 0.519 0.004 0.002 0.082
Notes: See Table A.1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables. Count data on innovations comes from the Wall Street Journal, the
Factiva database or the US Patent and Trademark Office, collected by Lerner (2006). All financial data is in million 2002 US Dollars and
comes from Compustat. Lagged dependent variables are included in the regressions except for standard deviations of returns. We keep all
other independent variables the same and only change the dependent variables from column to column. Column 1 incorporates the baseline
model from column 4 of Table 1.2. Column 2 and 3 measure the impact of FI on profitability where returns on assets and equity are
the dependent variables, respectively. Column 4 measures the impact of FI on capitalization of firms. Here, the capital-asset ratio is the
dependent variable. Column 5 and 6 measure the impact of FI on activity risk by including the standard deviations of the returns on assets
and equity, respectively. For these two regressions coefficients are scaled by 1,000. Finally, column 7 includes the Sharpe Ratio as dependent
variable as another stability measure. In all regressions, we include firm characteristics as controls, firm and year fixed effects, and a constant
but suppress their coefficients in the tables. Control variables include firm age, cash equivalents, employees, retained earnings, shareholders’
equity, preferred stock and long-term debt (all as ratios relative to assets or logarithms). Driscoll and Kraay (1998) robust standard errors
are clustered at firm-level and presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.6: Summary Statistics of Cross-Section (1999)
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Age 9.226 5.000 11.699 0 74
Assets 15381.500 614.032 65763.220 0 893649
Cash Equiv. 1503.317 27.252 9642.401 0 205371
Leverage 0.326 0.293 0.276 0 0.997
Long-term Debt 1954.220 51.799 12102.890 0 339221
Market Value 4597.746 116.612 26350.170 0.062 535947
Pref. Stock 33.535 0.000 183.772 0 3375
Revenues 2802.985 79.385 12301.180 0 184589
Sh. Equity 1496.865 87.944 5640.443 -44 83397
∆(Opprof) -0.533 0.014 16.200 -523.908 130.719
∆(ROA) -0.096 -0.001 1.382 -41.827 1.671
∆(ROE) 0.195 -0.004 6.999 -51.006 230.774
Innovations (avg.) 0.012 0.000 0.075 0 1.200
Patents (avg.) 0.024 0.000 0.219 0 5.000
Applications (avg.) 0.040 0.000 0.352 0 7.000
R&D 48.874 0.000 457.900 0 7502.168
FI by others 1.002 0.000 1.713 0 4.000
Notes: N=1,781. See Table A.1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables.
All financial data is in million 2002 US Dollars and comes from Compustat.
Count data on innovations comes from the Wall Street Journal, the Factiva
database or the US Patent and Trademark Office, collected by Lerner (2006).
FI measures are averaged over the period 1990 to 1999.
For the cross-sectional analysis, we use as the dependent variable ∆(Opprof), ∆(ROA)
and ∆(ROE), respectively, where ∆() = ()2002− ()1999.28 We expect that the difference
will be negative for most firms and should be larger for more innovative firms. The model
specification for the three regressions is as follows.
∆()i = βXi + γYi + i (1.2)
where index i stands for the firm and the dependent variable is the performance change
between 2002 and 1999 calculated as the difference in Opprof = EBITDA/revenues,
ROA, ROE, respectively, between the values in the respective years. Again, X is the
vector of firm characteristics in 1999 while Y is the vector of different financial innovation
28The year 1999 has the most observations per year in the data set and the NASDAQ had its ten-year
peak then, while in 2002 the NASDAQ considerably dropped because of the burst of the ICT bubble.
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indicators. We use feasible GLS estimation with heteroskedastic error terms  in the
regressions. FI measures are averaged over the period 1990 to 1999 because this captures
overall innovative activity per firm. Table 1.7 provides the results which suggest that
more innovative firms face higher profitability declines during distress. The significantly
negative sign on γ is consistent with the innovation-fragility view and suggests that firms
with higher pre-crisis FI suffered more during a crisis.
Table 1.7: Comparison of Profitability Changes
(1) (2) (3)
Variables ∆(ROA) ∆(ROE) ∆(Opprof)
ln(assets) 0.044*** -0.329*** -0.279***
(0.002) (0.008) (0.019)
EBITDA/revenues 0.010*** -0.008
(0.003) (0.011)
Leverage ratio -0.152*** 1.190*** 0.675***
(0.004) (0.029) (0.047)
FI by others in 2-digit zip code -0.040*** 0.041*** -0.150***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.016)
Innovations (avg.) -0.087*** -0.315*** -1.634***
(0.006) (0.021) (0.178)
Patents (avg.) -0.511*** 0.366*** -1.696***
(0.028) (0.060) (0.543)
Applications (avg.) 0.249*** -0.223*** 0.751**
(0.018) (0.037) (0.302)
Controls Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y
Observations 1,202 1,201 1,196
Number of firms 1,202 1,201 1,196
R-squared 0.044 0.048 0.023
Notes: See Table A.1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables.
Count data on innovations comes from the Wall Street Journal, the
Factiva database or the US Patent and Trademark Office, collected by
Lerner (2006). FI measures are averaged over the period 1990 to 1999.
All financial data is in million 2002 US Dollars and comes from Com-
pustat. In column 1, we use the change in ROA as dependent variable,
in column 2, we use the change in ROE as dependent variable, and
finally, in column 3, we use the change in operational profitability as
dependent variable. In all regressions, we include firm characteristics
as controls and a constant but suppress their coefficients in the ta-
bles. Control variables include firm age, cash equivalents, employees,
retained earnings, shareholders’ equity, preferred stock and long-term
debt (all as ratios relative to assets or logarithms). Robust standard
errors are clustered at firm-level and presented in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we evaluate the relationship between financial innovations and the fragility
of financial institutions. Theoretical literature provides strong evidence for why financial
crises exist and why firms engage in producing financial innovations. A recent strand of
research tries to combine both areas and analyzes the impact of innovative activity of
financial agents in a competitive framework. Particularly, this mostly theoretical liter-
ature links profit volatility to innovative activities and predicts a positive relationship.
That is, the degree of innovation negatively affects firm stability.
We base our analysis on a unique data set that counts financial innovations in the USA
between 1990 and 2002 provided by Lerner (2006) and augment it by performance and
stability measures. Then, we build on empirical frameworks by Beck, Chen, Lin, and
Song (2012) and others to quantitatively assess the so called innovation-fragility view on
a firm level. We show that a larger degree of innovation positively (negatively) affects
firm fragility (stability) after controlling for the underlying firm characteristics. A cou-
ple of extensions to the initial model show that our results are quite robust. Different
modifications of the innovation measures yield the same outcomes. Furthermore, we use
different fragility parameters measuring profitability, capitalization, activity risk and risk
of insolvency and find that the results support our argumentation. In addition, firms
with higher pre-crisis FI face higher losses during a period of financial crisis. Overall, our
analyses support the innovation-fragility view.
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Chapter 2
Determinants of Capital Structure
in Non-Financial Companies∗
2.1 Introduction
A recent comprehensive review of structural issues related to corporate finance and eco-
nomic activity for the Euro Area has pointed to the potential impact of capital structure
choices for the financial stability and economic performance of the economy as a whole.1
In the present study, using a large set of data, we investigate the determinants of funding
choices of firms in order to create a solid starting point for further research into access
to finance and financial stability questions. In doing so, we take the view that analyz-
ing capital structure choice can inform macro- and micro-prudential policies despite the
fact that empirical evidence supports both main capital structure theories (pecking order
theory and trade-off theory). We find very similar econometric results as in European
Central Bank (2013) as to which firm-specific factors determine (i) the potential use of
external funding by non-financial companies (NFCs) and (ii) its degree (leverage), but
we extend the discussion by analyzing the impact of additional industry- and country-
specific factors.
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Harald W. Stieber, European Commission.
1See European Central Bank (2013).
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A stylized fact that motivates our inquiry is the pronounced cross-country variation in
NFCs’ leverage ratios. Apparently different models of funding structure are compatible
with comparable levels of economic activity and well-being. However, leverage ratios
within an industry sector seem to follow strong path dependence. At the end of the
1980s the bank-financed German and Japanese models were considered the most sus-
tainable, where banks took important stakes in non-financial (manufacturing) industries
and thus had their incentives aligned with the long-term funding needs of R&D-intensive
sectors. During the 1990s the Japanese model became infamous for its "zombie" banks2
while Germany’s costly re-unification created a structural break in the economic data
for a number of years. At present a new mantra of a well-diversified funding structure
is developed in light of the recent financial crisis. However, Germany and some other
European economies have done well with NFCs using mainly financing intermediated by
banks rather than capital markets.3 In this context we find it intriguing that among the
two major theories that try to explain NFCs’ capital structure choices, the pecking order
theory seems to better allow for country heterogeneity along the leverage dimension as
compared to the trade-off theory.
We build on Rajan and Zingales (1995) and subsequent empirical studies. In addition to
the firm-specific factors they have identified, we further investigate which other industry-
specific and institutional factors affect capital structure choices. Based on a short panel
with a very large cross-section, we can show that firm size, industry leverage, industry
growth and tax shield positively affect leverage ratios, while profitability and liquidity
have negative impacts. Furthermore, tangibility has a positive impact on leverage for
those firms that use long-term debt financing. In addition, we find a strong impact of
international capital flows. The results are robust against different panel estimators, de-
compositions and in yearly cross sections.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, we discuss previous literature in the area. In
2A zombie bank is a financial institution with negative net worth. They continue to operate as a result
of government support that allow these banks to meet debt obligations and avoid bankruptcy.
3Accordingly, Aoki and Nikolov (2012) identify this possibility of a stable bank-financed economy and a
possible increase in systemic risk as capital markets expand and diversify.
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Sections 2.3 we introduce the data and variables used in our empirical study. Section
2.4 presents the empirical analysis. In Section 2.5 we discuss the analytical results, while
Section 2.6 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Literature Review
The determinants of differences in capital structures have been the subject of theoretical
as well as empirical research over the past few decades.
2.2.1 Capital Structure Theories
Theoretical underpinnings go back to Modigliani and Miller (1958) who propose that
the capital structure does not affect firm value in a tax-free, full-information, no-agency
world. However, given more realistic assumptions about the market in which firms com-
pete for external financing, theoretical papers in the recent literature on capital structure
suggested a vast number of dynamics and intuitions.4 Two main theories prevail. First,
the trade-off theory by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) assumes that an optimal capital
structure exists for every firm at any point in time. It postulates that firms trade off tax
advantages from debt against refinancing risk where the optimal debt-equity mix depends
on tax and bankruptcy codes.
Second, the pecking order theory by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) is based
on information asymmetries between companies and investors. Here, firms do not have
target leverage ratios but instead consider capital costs and access to finance in order
to determine their leverage. Given increasing costs with rising information asymmetries,
firms first make use of internal funds such as retained earnings before acquiring debt and
4For an overview of capital structure choice theories including trade-off theory, pecking order theory,
market timing theory, cash flow theory and agency theory see Myers (1977, 2001), Goldstein, Ju, and
Leland (2001), or Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010).
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lastly, new equity. Bertomeu, Beyer, and Dye (2011) further show that both a firm’s
present capital structure and its disclosure policy determine its capital costs.5
2.2.2 Empirical Evidence
Empirical assessments of capital structures have started with research into firm charac-
teristics by Rajan and Zingales (1995). In a cross-sectional study of G7 countries they
find four relevant firm level-drivers for leverage - firm size, firm growth opportunities, tan-
gibility and profitability. Moreover, they show that inter-country differences are small.
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Brav (2009) add to that list two other important
factors, firm age and access to finance. The former examine US firms over two decades
and show that access to finance is positively related to leverage while the latter analyzes
UK firms over one decade to find that private firms are more levered and leverage re-
structuring is closer related to firm performance. One intuition is that private equity is
more costly than public equity due to information asymmetries.6
More recently, studies have also included industry drivers of leverage. Almazan and
Molina (2005), MacKay and Phillips (2005), Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Brav
(2009), Frank and Goyal (2009) and Degryse, de Goeij, and Kappert (2012) find that
inter- and intra-industry effects are important determinants of individual leverage ratios
for Dutch, UK and US firms.7 They are able to show that the effects of firm charac-
teristics on capital structures significantly differ across industries. Chen and Yu (2011)
5A series of studies test the aforementioned two main capital structure theories. Shyam-Sunder and
Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) specifically analyze projections from both theories and find
evidence in favor of a dynamic trade-off theory in line with Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) but most
of the statistical tests employed have weak power. De Jong, Verbeek, and Verwijmeren (2011) point
out that the pecking order theory better explains levels of debt while the trade-off theory predicts debt
issuance and repurchase decisions.
6Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu (2009), Brav (2009), Huang and Ritter (2009) and Bharath and Dittmar
(2010) analyze the implications of information asymmetries on capital structure choice and discuss the
decision on security issuance in discrete choice models. For US and UK firms, they find that larger
information asymmetries drive leverage and that macroeconomic conditions, market timing and the
speed of adjustment towards target leverage ratios are important in a firm’s decision to issue securities.
Whited and Wu (2006) build a structural model to construct an index for financial constraints of firms
based on how information asymmetries impact certain firm characteristics.
7Some of these studies make use of a very detailed level of data where they use factors such as CEO
tenure and compensation, and industry-specific risk hedging for which we do not have data.
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investigate multinational corporations and find significant industry-fixed effects, export
intensity, and foreign direct investment which drive capital structure choice. In their
study on small Italian firms, La Rocca, La Rocca, and Cariola (2011) find that capital
structure choice also depends on a firm’s business life cycle and subsequently, on growth
patterns within industries. Including industry-specific factors in the analysis can also
serve as proxy for target leverage ratios and account for correlated but omitted variables.
A third group of studies analyzes the effects of institutional and country factors on capital
structure choices. Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008), Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009),
Frank and Goyal (2009), Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012), Öztekin and Flannery (2012)
and Köksal, Orman, and Oduncu (2013) include a country’s legal and financial traditions,
inflation, GDP and capital flows in their analyses of G5 countries, Southern Europe, 39
developing and developed countries, and Turkey, respectively. They find that differences
in capital structures reflect differences in the economic environment, specifically varying
degrees of exposure to capital markets, tax systems, institutions, macroeconomic con-
ditions and corporate governance practices. Whenever such country-specific factors are
common, firms determine their capital structure in similar ways.
Two caveats arise from previous empirical research with respect to capital structures.
First, a series of papers shows that in order to thoroughly assess time-series patterns in
leverage ratios, a long time dimension (typically a couple decades) in a dynamic panel
model is needed and a common GMM estimator is outperformed by a long-differencing
estimator.8 However, this very much restricts the longitudinal dimension of the data
employed, to few industries or few countries. Second, different results from empirical
analyses have often been attributed to sample selection bias.9 Most studies restrict
themselves to only a handful of countries or only a few industries. To our knowledge,
only recent papers have investigated and compared the impact of industry and country
8Compare Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008), Huang and Ritter (2009), Denis and McKeon (2012),
and Öztekin and Flannery (2012).
9While Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012) and Köksal, Orman, and Oduncu
(2013) support the trade-off theory, Brav (2009), La Rocca, La Rocca, and Cariola (2011) and Degryse,
de Goeij, and Kappert (2012) support the pecking order theory.
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characteristics.10 However, the industry composition within countries as well as institu-
tional factors vary a lot and can explain the different findings.
Our contribution is thus twofold. First, we tackle the sample selection problem by
analyzing a data set with a very large European cross-section, i.e. in the number of
firms, of industries and of countries, with respect to firm size and the inclusion of USA
and Japan as comparisons. Second, we augment the existing panel analyses with firm-,
industry- and country-specific variables that can explain more of the variation in the data
on capital structure. Because we only have a short panel data set, we cannot analyze
the aforementioned dynamic aspect of capital structure choice, but we show that for the
short time period we analyze the data is stationary and our results are robust in yearly
regressions. Our study provides strong indications that corporate taxation needs to be
part of macro-prudential policy for international capital markets in view of the strong
effects of national tax codes on leverage ratios.
2.3 Data
This section explains the (i) data set as well as (ii) definitions and hypotheses to be tested
in our empirical analysis.
2.3.1 Sample
The data set measures capital structures in Europe, Japan and the USA from 2003 until
2012. For firm-level data, we use the ORBIS database11 which contains company infor-
mation for unlisted and listed companies. We include firms with either revenue above
EUR 1 million, assets above EUR 2 million, or more than 15 employees. Macroeconomic
10Compare Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009), Frank and Goyal (2009), Degryse, de Goeij, and Kappert
(2012), Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012) and Köksal, Orman, and Oduncu (2013). They are able
to show that the importance of capital structure determinants goes from firm-specific to country to
industry-specific effects. They show this with (i) the goodness-of-fit of their models and (ii) the size
of coefficients of the regressors in their models.
11The data were kindly provided by the European Commission under a license agreement with Bureau
van Dijk.
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data comes from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. We identify
different industries by using the two-digit industry codes of the European NACE Rev. 2
classification.12
We clean the data from coding errors and outliers, and perform some plausibility checks.
Any observations with missing data or implausible values for variables (e.g. negative
revenues) are dropped. We adjust the data to keep only observations with leverage ratios
in the interval [0,1], profitability within [-1,1], tangibility and liquidity in [0,1].13 Firm
growth is capped at 100%, i.e. a doubling of revenues from year to year. The final sample
is an unbalanced panel of 1,189,708 firms with 6,365,842 firm-year observations. We do
not have 10 years of data for all firms because each year some firms enter or exit the
sample.
2.3.2 Variables and Hypotheses
We use three different measures for the capital structure of firms in our analysis: short-
term, long-term and total debt over total assets, respectively, determined with book
values.14 Rajan and Zingales (1995) demonstrate that ratios of liabilities to assets are an
appropriate measure widely adopted for financial leverage of companies as they serve as
a proxy for what is left for shareholders in case of liquidation.15 On the other hand, the
data set consists of three different groups of independent variables: firm characteristics,
industry-specific parameters and country-specific variables.16
12We exclude firms with missing industry codes and firms operating in agriculture, mining, financial
services, public services, education, health, entertainment and other services which constitute NACE
Rev. 2 classification sections A, B, K, O, P, Q, R, S, T, and U.
13Section 2.3.2 provides definitions and shows why these are reasonable boundaries.
14In accordance with common nomenclature, short-term debt is any debt payable within one year. Long-
term debt is any liability exceeding one year in maturity.
15Subsequent studies have followed this approach while other definitions include market values of equity
or assets in the denominator (e.g. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Welch (2004), Faulkender and
Petersen (2006), Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008), Frank and Goyal (2009)) as a result of the
critic against book measures being backward looking. In addition, some studies have used interest
coverage or debt maturity to measure leverage of firms (Rajan and Zingales (1995), Welch (2004),
Frank and Goyal (2009), Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012)).
16See Table B.1 in the Appendix for complete descriptions of the variables used here. All financial data is
in thousand EUR. Table B.2 provides an overview of the distribution of data along several dimensions.
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2.3.2.1 Firm-specific Factors
Firm Size One of the aforementioned key determinants of leverage is firm size (Rajan
and Zingales (1995)). Larger firms are usually more established in their markets, diver-
sified and less likely to fail. Therefore, it has been argued that size can be seen as an
inverse measure of bankruptcy risk. To avoid problems of multicollinearity we use the
logarithm of revenues to measure firm size since several of the ratios used in our analyses
are in terms of assets. Revenues and total assets are highly correlated.17 The pecking
order theory is ambiguous but the trade-off theory postulates that leverage is positively
affected by firm size as shown in most of the empirical studies.
Firm Growth Future business prospects of a company represent another important
leverage factor (Rajan and Zingales (1995)). How firms react to investment opportunities
determines their profitability and status in their respective markets. In order to mitigate
problems of multicollinearity we use growth rates in revenues to measure firm growth
since several of the ratios used in our analyses are in terms of assets.18 While the peck-
ing order theory predicts a positive relation to leverage, the trade-off theory assumes a
negative relation. Results from previous literature are mixed.19
Profitability More profitable firms usually generate more cash flows and firms gener-
ally prefer to finance projects with internal funds. Since retained earnings increase with
higher profits, the need for debt financing decreases with higher profitability.20 In line
with Frank and Goyal (2009), Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009), and Chen and Yu (2011) we
define profitability as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) over total assets. While
17While Rajan and Zingales (1995), Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009), and Köksal, Orman, and Oduncu
(2013) use revenues as a proxy for size, Frank and Goyal (2009), La Rocca, La Rocca, and Cariola
(2011), Degryse, de Goeij, and Kappert (2012) and Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012) use data on assets.
18Although Brav (2009), La Rocca, La Rocca, and Cariola (2011) and Köksal, Orman, and Oduncu
(2013) use percentage changes in sales, Frank and Goyal (2009), Chen and Yu (2011) and Degryse,
de Goeij, and Kappert (2012) use growth in terms of assets.
19Brav (2009) and Degryse, de Goeij, and Kappert (2012) find a positive coefficient, while Rajan and
Zingales (1995), Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012) find a negative
coefficient in their respective analyses.
20Causality may vary, however, with younger firms or otherwise financially constrained firms being
required to achieve higher profitability in order to access external finance. Still, informational asym-
metries where firms have private knowledge about the true value of their assets and firm growth
opportunities could explain a wide range of cases.
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the trade-off theory is ambiguous, the pecking order theory predicts a negative relation
as is the consensus in the literature.
Tangibility We define tangibility as the share of fixed assets to total assets. The
larger the fraction of fixed assets on a firm’s balance sheet, the more assets it can pledge
as collateral against debt which diminishes the agency costs borne by the investor. Also,
liquidation values ought to be higher and easier to determine. Thus, it should be easier
for a firm with more tangible assets to acquire loans. Both capital structure theories
predict a positive relation between tangibility and leverage.
Liquidity Firms with less liquidity may find it harder to attract debt as costs of
contract enforcement (including during possible insolvency proceedings) increase. Nu-
merous definitions exist. We use cash equivalents over total assets as a proxy for firms’
capacity to demand payments from their debtors while holding off on their creditors.
Both theories are ambiguous about the expected relation to leverage but Brav (2009)
and Köksal, Orman, and Oduncu (2013) have found a negative coefficient.
Nickell Criterion This factor comes from Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) and mea-
sures financial stress of a company in terms of how much of its cash flow is spent to cover
debt expenses. Specifically, this flow measure allows us to capture the impact of interest
rate changes on debt21.
2.3.2.2 Industry-specific Factors
Industry Leverage In accordance with Frank and Goyal (2009), Degryse, de Goeij,
and Kappert (2012) and Köksal, Orman, and Oduncu (2013), we measure industry trends
with median leverage ratios by grouping firms with the same two-digit industry classifica-
tion codes. Early work by Harris and Raviv (1991) already suggests a strong relationship
between industry affiliation and leverage ratios and highlights existing differences across
21While this ratio is potentially interesting from a monetary policy and macro-prudential point of view,
it does not have explanatory power in our model.
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industries but consistency within them. The trade-off theory supposes that inter-industry
effects exist as the optimal leverage ratio may differ across industries. Also, the effects of
aforementioned firm characteristics may vary across industries. The pecking order theory
does not offer a clear prediction. Moreover, intra-industry effects can arise from compe-
tition and agency conflicts within a market. Firms may face higher pressure to assert
to the optimal leverage ratio in more competitive situations while increasing leverage
might deter takeover attempts or signal firm stability. Empirical evidence shows a strong
positive relation between industry and individual firm leverage.
Industry Growth To account for industry-specific demand shifts, we also measure
the development of an industry with median growth rates across groups of firms with
the same two-digit industry classification codes. La Rocca, La Rocca, and Cariola (2011)
find a positive relationship with leverage ratios.
2.3.2.3 Macroeconomic Factors
Taxation We also measure the impact of a country’s fiscal treatment of debt financ-
ing.22 Taxes affect the size of the tax shield for debt financing and they can impact the
amount of retained earnings and the dividend policy of a firm. These impacts tend to
favor higher leverage ratios. Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Degryse, de Goeij, and
Kappert (2012), Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012), Köksal, Orman, and Oduncu (2013)
and Feld, Heckemeyer, and Overesch (2013) have shown that an effective debt interest
tax shield is positively related to leverage. The pecking order theory is ambivalent about
taxation, while the trade-off theory predicts a positive relation between tax shield and
leverage ratios. As a proxy for the tax shield per country we compute the actual tax
savings for firms with long-term debt compared to firms without long-term debt.
Inflation Following Frank and Goyal (2009), Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012) and
Köksal, Orman, and Oduncu (2013) we include changes in consumer prices.23 Rising
22Data on tax payments per firm comes from the ORBIS database.
23Data for this factor and subsequent macroeconomic factors comes from the World Development Indi-
cators, World Bank.
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inflation decreases the relative value of debt. Also, tax deductions from debt financing
are more valuable when inflation is expected to be higher. Frank and Goyal (2009) and
Köksal, Orman, and Oduncu (2013) find a positive relation between inflation and lever-
age which is in line with the trade-off theory.
GDP Growth The business cycle also has a profound impact on capital structures.
During times of economic prosperity collateral values increase and debt financing becomes
easier. Agency problems between firms and investors become more severe in economic
downturns. However, internal funds of firms generally increase in economic expansion so
that according to the pecking order theory firms might make less use of debt financing.
Whited and Wu (2006) find that financially constrained firms’ cost of financing decreases
with the duration of the economic upswing. Thus, leverage could be either pro-cyclical or
counter-cyclical. Frank and Goyal (2009) find a positive relation while Köksal, Orman,
and Oduncu (2013) find a negative one.
Capital Flows Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008), Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012)
and Köksal, Orman, and Oduncu (2013) argue that developments in capital markets are
important to determine firm-level capital structures. Hereby, the size and structure of
national capital markets depends heavily on the international allocation and dispersion
of capital. Thus, we include a measure for capital flows in our analysis. This takes on
positive values whenever money is flowing into a country, effectively representing an in-
crease of foreign ownership of domestic assets. The factor is negative whenever money
is flowing out of the country suggesting that a country increases its ownership of foreign
assets. Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008) and Köksal, Orman, and Oduncu (2013)
find a positive relation between capital flows and leverage.
Unemployment As another business cycle indicator and to account for develop-
ments in labor markets, we include the fraction of work force that is unemployed by
drawing from World Bank accounts.
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Stock Prices We also want to take into consideration how expensive equity for public
firms is. Thus, we include data on Standard & Poor’s Global Equity Indices collected by
the World Bank which measure the performance of various stock exchanges around the
world. Welch (2004), Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008) and Frank and Goyal (2009)
argue that the effect of changing stock prices on capital structure may reflect overall
growth prospects, relative price changes in asset classes or differences in agency costs.
Firms may take advantage of mispricing in stock markets to reduce their capital costs.
Thus, the pecking order theory predicts and empirical analyses confirm that stock price
development and leverage ratios are negatively related.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
This section explores the determinants of capital structures of NFCs empirically. We first
provide (i) a description of the data and then (ii) present the empirical model specifica-
tion.
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Properties
Observations are evenly distributed over the time period investigated here. About two
thirds of the companies in our sample have between five to eight observations while 25%
of firms have eight or more consecutive observations. Some countries like France, Italy
and Spain have a large number of data points while we cautiously also include countries
with few observations in our sample, like Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Montenegro
and Malta. Figure 2.1 shows the three leverage ratios and their behavior over time.
Weak time trends are visible. Long-term leverage seems to increase continuously, while
short-term leverage seems to decrease over our sample period which covers after all a full
business cycle from trough to trough.
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Figure 2.1: Leverage Ratios over Time
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Table 2.1 provides an overview of the summary statistics of the variables introduced in
Section 2.3.2. It shows that there exists great heterogeneity among firms in terms of size,
growth and profitability as well as large differences across industries and countries. Gen-
erally, variances of our variables are quite large. Industry- and country-specific factors
are less volatile. Across the sample, firms hold on average 65% debt in terms of total
assets. Notably, we find that 40% of the firms in our sample do not hold any long-term
debt and subsequently, short-term debt accounts for approximately 84% of total debt.
For most variables, mean and median are close, except for firm-level growth and liquidity
where we have only a few high-growth companies and only a few firms with large cash
reserves.
We can also compare leverage measures, our explanatory variables as well as balance
sheet data and items from the profit-and-loss statement (P&L) across countries. Table
2.2 depicts the differences for eight major countries in our sample. We find substantial
variation in overall capital structure choice, e.g. Italy versus the USA, and in debt ma-
turity, where e.g. Italy and Poland have very small shares of long-term debt to total
debt. For our explanatory variables, differences are substantial across countries. While
large firms are located in Japan and the USA, Southern European firms have the highest
growth rates.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of Variables
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Total LR 0.650 0.696 0.249 0 1
Lt LR 0.105 0.005 0.181 0 1
St LR 0.545 0.561 0.267 0 1
Firm Size 7.824 7.681 1.808 0 20.457
Firm Growth 0.393 0.058 3.048 -1 1
Profitability 0.080 0.056 0.127 -1 1
Tangibility 0.329 0.249 0.282 0 1
Liquidity 0.127 0.059 0.164 0 1
Nickell 0.293 0.059 43.068 -18505 83094
St Ind. LR 0.548 0.579 0.108 0.164 0.745
Lt Ind. LR 0.020 0.006 0.029 0 0.325
Total Ind. LR 0.693 0.694 0.053 0.381 0.821
Ind. Growth 0.058 0.065 0.057 -0.288 0.244
Tax Shield 0.005 0.005 0.005 0 0.063
Inflation 2.807 2.166 2.789 -4.480 25.296
GDP Growth 1.359 1.725 3.089 -17.955 12.233
Capital Flows 0.003 0.001 0.005 -0.020 0.042
Unemployment 8.806 8.400 3.479 2.300 37.300
Stock Prices 9.072 13.076 35.392 -82.190 189.230
Notes: N=6,365,842. See Table B.1 in the Appendix for definitions
of the variables. All variables are ratios, growth rates or logarithms.
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Table 2.2: Cross-country Comparison of Variables
Germany UK France Italy Spain Poland USA Japan
Leverage Measures
Total LR 0.683 0.605 0.638 0.752 0.608 0.538 0.468 0.542
Lt LR 0.241 0.115 0.057 0.077 0.165 0.071 0.142 0.115
St LR 0.441 0.489 0.582 0.675 0.442 0.468 0.325 0.428
Explanatory Variables
Firm Size 9.534 9.621 7.914 7.609 7.478 8.582 11.534 12.209
Firm Growth 0.242 0.191 0.207 0.442 0.485 0.289 0.418 0.078
Profitability 0.099 0.080 0.095 0.057 0.062 0.108 -0.007 0.046
Tangibility 0.337 0.358 0.253 0.297 0.365 0.409 0.471 0.441
Liquidity 0.115 0.123 0.190 0.080 0.124 0.108 0.222 0.179
Nickell 1.123 0.386 0.039 0.467 0.314 0.093 0.129 -0.239
Total Ind. LR 0.680 0.683 0.696 0.693 0.703 0.684 0.639 0.669
Lt Ind. LR 0.018 0.019 0.016 0.024 0.021 0.020 0.012 0.014
St Ind. LR 0.538 0.541 0.572 0.534 0.547 0.542 0.516 0.543
Ind. Growth 0.058 0.061 0.060 0.054 0.059 0.055 0.068 0.066
Tax Shield 0.009 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.009
Inflation 1.583 2.638 1.725 2.093 2.740 2.983 2.508 -0.127
GDP Growth 1.331 1.349 1.124 0.100 1.661 4.504 1.594 0.821
Capital Flows -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.013 0.001 -0.001
Unemployment 8.481 6.093 8.716 7.576 13.158 11.738 6.615 4.523
Stock Prices 12.191 6.399 5.617 -1.458 11.807 11.465 5.969 6.775
Balance Sheet Items
Cash Equivalents 8068.503 11702.990 2047.225 946.198 1256.842 1508.315 218442.600 168741.100
Fixed Assets 60300.030 96672.770 12213.010 8161.040 9431.051 11214.540 1473932.000 875690.600
Total Assets 109880.300 216787.300 21981.900 16159.260 16731.570 18411.120 2179010.000 1543776.000
Short-term Debt 54035.410 126398.900 11882.790 8756.929 6814.443 7626.083 843778.800 681131.500
Long-term Debt 22638.130 35025.690 3285.930 2507.065 4303.499 1741.117 479997.300 301391.200
Shareholders’ Equity 33206.710 55362.690 6813.181 4895.263 5613.629 9043.921 855233.800 561253.500
P&L Items
Revenue 142291.500 145428.500 20566.370 12709.050 12576.800 22002.590 1937623.000 1365154.000
EBITDA 108796.740 14736.450 2014.106 1550.000 1468.947 2270.105 295891.000 146243.300
EBIT 6157.123 9343.033 1233.255 700.344 944.808 1377.137 199215.600 75171.620
Interest 1370.790 6.085 198.418 169.235 131.706 143.710 23221.590 9429.621
Tax Payments 1600.950 2445.634 295.732 258.056 208.171 237.148 56685.990 28232.310
Net Income 3043.198 6891.314 739.105 273.053 605.034 996.280 119308.000 37509.690
Notes: Mean values per country. See Table B.1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables. Factors used in regression
analyses are ratios, growth rates or logarithms. Balance sheet and P&L items are in thousand EUR.
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Profitability is generally low.24 Tangibility and liquidity are highest for US firms while
industry-specific factors are similar. Macroeconomic conditions differ as well, naturally.
The composition of firms’ balance sheets and P&L statements shows that considerable
differences in levels exist. We also find that large firms from Japan and the USA are over-
represented in our sample as country-average levels of balance sheet items vastly exceed
those of European firms. This may also explain the significantly lower leverage ratios for
US and Japanese firms in the data set.
A decomposition of Rajan and Zingales’ (1995) four main firm-level drivers of leverage re-
veals great differences across industries and countries.25 Large firms exist predominantly
in Russia, USA, Japan and Switzerland, while most small firms exist in Southern and
Eastern Europe. Large firms are mainly operating in the industry clusters electricity, gas
and water supply as well as manufacturing. Firms with high growth rates are located
in Eastern Europe and active in electricity, gas and water supply as well as ICT and re-
search. The most profitable firms exist in Northern Europe and respectively, in industry
clusters ICT and research and services. Most firms show low profitability. About 98%
of observations lie within the interval [-0.5,0.5] and about 83% of the data points are
within one standard deviation away from the overall mean (0.080). Finally, firms with
the largest share of fixed assets are located in Switzerland, Cyprus and Denmark and are
active in accommodation and food as well as electricity, gas and water supply.
Notably, the tax shield differs significantly among countries as depicted in Figure 2.2
with Iceland, the Netherlands and Russia providing the highest tax incentives for debt
financing.26 Because we compute both the tax shield and the firm-specific factors relative
to total assets, we can compare level effects of our variables. Remarkably, the level of
most tax shields is much smaller than those of the firm-specific factors. While e.g. prof-
itability, tangibility and liquidity have overall means 0.080, 0.329 and 0.127, respectively,
24For the USA, some firms experience significant losses over our sample period which explains the negative
average profitability, but the median of profitability for US firms in our sample is 0.057.
25For brevity we relegate these Figures B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6, B.7 and B.8 to the Appendix.
26We exclude Malta from this figure because it has only 221 observations and is considered a tax haven
within the EU. Hence, its average tax savings per firm are far above that from other countries. For
Monaco we do not have data on taxation so we cannot compute the tax shield for this country.
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tax shield has a mean value of 0.005 as indicated in Table 2.1. Hence, already small
changes in the tax shield can have big impacts on firms’ funding structure.
Figure 2.2: Tax Shield across Countries
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Data for Malta is excluded.
Following the descriptives, a variety of univariate analyses provide a first glance at the
variables’ behavior and properties. Our explanatory variables are all correlated with the
leverage ratios.27 A F-test confirms joint significance. Furthermore, firm characteristics
are correlated with each other and over time. We have carefully selected and computed
our explanatory indicators with relatively low correlations from the vast group of available
variables in the ORBIS database to avoid problems of multicollinearity. We find weak
time trends given the data is stationary as indicated in unit root tests. Mann-Whitney U
tests and t-tests show that the mean and variance of leverage ratios are significantly dif-
ferent across countries and industries. European firms hold more debt and in particular,
firms located in the Euro Area. Investigating capital structure choice across industries,
especially firms in trade and transportation have significantly different debt holdings from
firms pursuing other economic activities. A robust version of the Wu-Hausman test by
Wooldridge (2002) shows that fixed effects modeling is preferred over a random effects
setup. Furthermore, Breusch-Pagan, Jarque-Bera and Breusch-Godfrey tests respectively
show that the error terms are heteroskedastic, asymptotically normal and correlated with
each other within panels.
27See Tables B.3 and B.4 in the Appendix.
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2.4.2 Empirical Strategy
We regress firms’ leverage ratios on firm characteristics and other controls following the
approach of Rajan and Zingales (1995) who have identified four relevant factors for lever-
age (firm size, firm growth, profitability, tangibility) and that of related empirical studies
such as Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Brav (2009), Frank and Goyal (2009), Psillaki
and Daskalakis (2009), Degryse, de Goeij, and Kappert (2012), Fan, Titman, and Twite
(2012) and Köksal, Orman, and Oduncu (2013). They analyze similar questions and
provide valid frameworks to assess capital structure choices.
Subsequently, we test the predictions of the pecking order vs. trade-off theory with
a series of fixed effects panel regressions. Because of the data properties presented above,
our baseline model specification is as follows.
Li,t = αz + βXi,t−1 + γYs,t−1 + ρZk,t−1 + δt + i,t (2.1)
where indices i, s, k represent firms, industries and countries, respectively, and t stands
for time. L is the leverage ratio per firm and period. We use here three measures that
accordingly reflect short-term, long-term and total debt over total assets. X is the vector
of firm characteristics while Y is the vector of industry-specific factors and Z is the vector
of country factors. To reduce problems with endogeneity and to include all factors in the
information set, we lag our independent variables by one time period. To account for
firm heterogeneity and partial skewness in the data of some factors, we use only ratios or
logarithms of our variables. The regression model also includes αz with z = {i, s, k} and δt
to account for omitted firm-, industry- and country-specific effects and year fixed effects,
respectively. As suggested by Petersen (2009), we employ two-dimensional clustering of
our robust error term  at firm-level and year-level. The asymptotically normal robust
standard errors then account for heteroskedasticity and within-panel serial correlation.
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2.5 Results
In this section we discuss the main results and perform a number of robustness checks.
We also investigate subsamples and different industry and country characteristics.
2.5.1 Full Sample
In a first step, we assess the validity of our model specification to account for the data
properties presented in Section 2.4.1. To do so, we compare the panel model set up in
Section 2.4.2 with the three different leverage ratios. Table 2.3 provides the overview
for that. In all regressions we include firm and year fixed effects as well as a constant
but suppress their coefficients in the tables. In column 1 of Table 2.3 we analyze total
leverage ratios, in column 2 we look at long-term leverage ratios and in column 3 we
apply short-term leverage ratios as the dependent variable.28 In separate analyses we
employ industry and country fixed effects and find that the results do not change. We
also run the regressions with the entire sample and with differences of firm leverage from
industry median leverage as dependent variables and find qualitatively same results.29
For total leverage ratios we discover positive impacts on leverage from firm size, in-
dustry leverage, industry growth and tax shield, while profitability and liquidity have
negative impacts. Industry-specific factors and capital flows turn negative for long-term
leverage ratios. It seems that the business cycle affects long-term capital structure choice
differently. On the other hand, tax shield turns negative for short-term leverage ratios,
but we have had no prediction for that relation here since the tax shield is zero for all
firms with short-term debt only, and it only applies to firms with long-term debt. The
variables firm size, profitability and liquidity provide consistent results across the three
different leverage ratios.
28In column 2 we only include firms that have long-term debt > 0 and in column 3 we only include firms
that have short-term debt > 0.
29For brevity, we relegate these regressions to Tables B.5, B.6 and B.7 in the Appendix.
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Table 2.3: Baseline Results for Three Leverage Ratios
(1) (2) (3)
Total Leverage Long-term Leverage Short-term Leverage
Firm Size 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Growth 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability -0.159*** -0.062*** -0.128***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Tangibility -0.028*** 0.103*** -0.103***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Liquidity -0.080*** -0.003** -0.075***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Nickell 0.000 0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total Ind. LR 0.144***
(0.008)
Lt Ind. LR -0.094***
(0.013)
St Ind. LR 0.158***
(0.007)
Ind. Growth 0.008*** -0.025*** 0.031***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tax Shield 1.097*** 1.504*** -0.421***
(0.020) (0.088) (0.025)
Inflation 0.001*** -0.000 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capital Flows 0.226*** -0.209*** 0.465***
(0.033) (0.044) (0.039)
Unemployment -0.002*** 0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Stock Prices 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y
Observations 3,265,810 1,794,355 3,263,935
Number of firms 887,514 596,868 887,197
R-squared 0.099 0.136 0.204
Notes: See Table B.1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables. Firm-level data and
taxation comes from the ORBIS database. Data for macroeconomic factors comes from
the World Bank. All variables are ratios, growth rates or logarithms. In all regressions,
we include firm and year fixed effects and a constant but suppress their coefficients in
the tables. Following Petersen (2009), we employ two-dimensional clustering of robust
standard errors at firm-level and year-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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In contrast to capital structure theories and most empirical studies, we also find a negative
impact of tangibility on total and short-term leverage ratios. We would argue that this
comes from the composition of our data set, namely the large majority of small firms.30
The dominance of short-term debt in our data may reflect that especially small firms
use only short-term debt instruments and that asset specificity makes it harder for firms
to obtain cash against fixed assets. We hence argue that the trade-off between liquidity
and fixed assets as well as the fact that cash equivalents cover short-term debt financing
more adequately and reliably in the eyes of investors lead to the negative β coefficient for
tangibility for total leverage ratios.31 For long-term leverage ratios, we find the expected
positive coefficient. This is obvious as firms holding long-term debt use fixed assets as
collateral against their long-term external financing.32
Surprisingly, financial stress, individual and country-specific growth potential as well
as stock market developments do not play a role in capital structure choice. The coeffi-
cients for the Nickell criterion are not significant and the coefficients for firm-level and
country-level growth as well as for Standard & Poor’s Global Equity Indices are signifi-
cant but economically not relevant.
In summary, we find that firm size, industry leverage, industry growth and tax shield
positively affect leverage ratios, while profitability and liquidity have negative impacts.
Our results are quite robust. We compare our regression model to different specifica-
tions with an estimator incorporating panel-specific AR(1)-disturbances, the Newey-West
heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) estimator as well as the Driscoll
and Kraay (1998) estimator accounting for heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and spatial
30Remember that about 40% of the firms in our sample do not hold any long-term debt and that short-
term debt constitutes most of total liabilities held by firms. Firms that hold short-term debt only
do not make use of capital markets, but rather employ overdraft and cash facilities for their external
financing. Hence, tangibility is negatively correlated with size, growth, profitability, liquidity and
positive related to country-level factors in our sample.
31As a robustness check, we also run a regression with an interaction term between firm size and tan-
gibility and find the expected positive and significant coeffient. That is, a larger size allows firms to
pledge more fixed assets as collateral against debt financing.
32Köksal, Orman, and Oduncu (2013) find the same dynamics.
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correlation and find similar results in terms of signs of coefficients and significance.33 Our
results also do not change for piecewise exclusion of data from USA, Japan, Norway and
Switzerland.34
Year-by-year regressions show that the size of coefficients changes, but not the signs
or significance, except for industry growth (changing signs) and capital flows for which
the sign of the ρ coefficient turns negative in 2007, more so in 2009 and 2010. This re-
flects the reversal in international capital flows during this period. Tax shield coefficients
become larger over time.35 With our definition of tax shield as a share of total assets, we
also capture valuation effects in balance sheets of firms. Overall, the yearly regressions
indicate that our model is quite robust over time.
We can compare our results to the capital structure theories and previous empirical
studies on that matter. This is depicted in Table 2.4. We find similarities especially
with Frank and Goyal (2009), Psillaki and Daskalakis (2009) and Köksal, Orman, and
Oduncu (2013). Moreover, our model is an improvement over the Rajan and Zingales
(1995) four-factor core model and subsequent specifications from other empirical studies
in terms of explaining data variation.36 We would argue that our findings, which are
based on a much larger cross-section and on a much larger scale in terms of firm char-
acteristics, ought to be more representative of the capital structure choices the average
firm in a developed country makes.
33We also run dynamic panel models and find qualitatively similar results in terms of significance and
signs of coefficients although the goodness-of-fit of theses models is worse given that we have stationary
data and that we work with a short panel with small T and very large N.
34These countries exhibit particular structural differences to the majority of the countries in our sample,
i.e. a large group of MNEs in the US, the Japanese loose monetary policy, a large sovereign wealth
fund owned by the Kingdom of Norway, or the large Swiss financial industry. Our results are not
driven by influences of these particularities.
35This growing tax distortion merits future research in our view given the possible implications for
macro-prudential policies.
36For brevity, we relegate the comparison of the different empirical capital structure models to Table
B.8 in the Appendix. We include in Table B.8 only major changes between model specifications.
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Table 2.4: Comparison of Theories and Empirical Studies regarding Determinants of Total Leverage Ratios
Pecking Trade-off Rajan Faulkender Antoniou, Brav Frank Psillaki Chen La Rocca, Degryse, Fan, Köksal, Our
Order Theory and and Guney and (2009) and and and La Rocca and de Goeij and Titman and Orman and Data
Theory Zingales Petersen Paudyal Goyal Daskalakis Yu Cariola Kappert Twite Oduncu
(1995) (2006) (2008) (2009) (2009) (2011) (2011) (2012) (2012) (2013)
Firm Size ? + + - + + + + - + + + + +
Firm Growth + - - - - + - ? ? + + - ? +
Profitability - ? - - - - - - - - - - - -
Tangibility + + + + + + + - + + + + + -
Liquidity ? ? n.a. - ? - - ? ? - ? ? - -
Nickell n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a. + n.a. n.a. ?
Total Ind. LR ? + n.a. + n.a. n.a. + n.a. n.a. n.a. + n.a. + +
Ind. Growth n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. + n.a. n.a. n.a. +
Tax Shield n.a. + n.a. + + n.a. ? n.a. n.a. n.a. + + + +
Inflation n.a. + n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. + n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. - + +
GDP Growth + n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. + n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. + - +
Capital Flows n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. + n.a. n.a. n.a. + n.a. n.a. + + +
Unemployment n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -
Stock Prices - n.a. n.a. - - n.a. - n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. ?
Notes: +/- = sign of significant coefficients in respective regressions where total leverage ratio is the dependent variable, ? = theories are ambivalent or results are inconclusive (either coefficient is not
significant or switching signs), n.a. = factor was not included in study
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2.5.2 Industry Analysis
Furthermore, we check the robustness of our results for industry dynamics by analyzing
industry sectors separately. In accordance with the European Central Bank (2013), we
cluster the two-digit industry codes of the European NACE Rev. 2 classification by their
respective economic activity to nine different groups.37 We then want to disentangle
different industry dynamics by analyzing capital structure choice according to economic
activity. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show cross-sectional and time-series behavior of capital
structures across industry clusters.
Figure 2.3: Leverage Ratios across Industries
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We find trade and transportation sectors with the highest leverage ratios on average,
while electricity, gas and water supply use the least amount of debt. Over time, there
is strong persistence in the capital structure choice within an industry, except for firms
active in electricity, gas and water supply for which average total leverage ratios sharply
increase over our sample period.
37"Manufacturing" encompasses all firms from NACE Rev. 2 classification section C, "Electricity, gas
and water supply" includes all firms from NACE Rev. 2 classification sections D and E, "Construction
and real estate" groups all firms from NACE Rev. 2 classification sections F and L, "Wholesale trade"
encompasses those firms from NACE Rev. 2 classification section G with two-digit industry codes
45 and 46, "Retail trade" includes those firms from NACE Rev. 2 classification section G with two-
digit industry code 47, "Transportation and storage" groups all firms from NACE Rev. 2 classification
section H, "Accommodation and food" encompasses all firms from NACE Rev. 2 classification section I,
"ICT and research" includes all firms from NACE Rev. 2 classification section J and those from section
M with two-digit industry code 72, and finally, "Professional and administrative services" groups all
firms from NACE Rev. 2 classification sections M and N except those with two-digit industry code 72.
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Figure 2.4: Leverage Ratios across Industries and Time
Table 2.5 provides the results of our model specification presented in Section 2.4.2 with the
sample decomposed into the nine different industry segments. Here, we leave out industry
median leverage in the regressions because this is just a level effect in an inter-industry
analysis. We also run regressions with differences of firm leverage from industry median
leverage as dependent variables and find qualitatively same results.38 The variables firm
size, firm growth, profitability, liquidity, tax shield, inflation and unemployment provide
consistent results across the nine different industry groups. While firm size, firm-level
growth, tax shield and inflation have positive impacts on leverage ratios, profitability,
liquidity and unemployment have negative impacts. Coefficients for capital flows are
positive except for retail trade. Tangibility decreases leverage except for the two sectors
retail trade and transportation. Considerable differences in capital structure choice across
industries then arise from varying demand in markets and from different levels in the
relevant explanatory variables.
38For brevity, we relegate these regressions to Table B.9 in the Appendix.
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Table 2.5: Results for Total Leverage Ratio across Industries
Manufacturing Electricity Construction Wholes. trade Retail trade Transportation Accom. & food ICT & res. PAS
Total Leverage Total Leverage Total Leverage Total Leverage Total Leverage Total Leverage Total Leverage Total Leverage Total Leverage
Firm Size 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.003 0.004*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Firm Growth 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability -0.187*** -0.174*** -0.136*** -0.165*** -0.177*** -0.166*** -0.169*** -0.128*** -0.130***
(0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
Tangibility -0.038*** 0.002 -0.054*** -0.025*** 0.011*** 0.012** -0.004 -0.028*** -0.017***
(0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Liquidity -0.101*** -0.063*** -0.085*** -0.073*** -0.079*** -0.080*** -0.060*** -0.064*** -0.065***
(0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
Nickell 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ind. Growth 0.030*** -0.022** -0.034*** -0.040*** -0.174*** -0.075* -0.084*** 0.052***
(0.003) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.029) (0.043) (0.024) (0.008)
Tax Shield 1.140*** 1.198*** 1.248*** 0.910*** 0.890*** 0.999*** 1.364*** 1.175*** 1.166***
(0.039) (0.162) (0.047) (0.039) (0.063) (0.095) (0.134) (0.127) (0.071)
Inflation 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000 0.000 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capital Flows 0.304*** 1.110*** 0.149* 0.029 -0.055 0.422*** 0.200 0.436** 0.421***
(0.062) (0.240) (0.084) (0.063) (0.107) (0.145) (0.191) (0.201) (0.136)
Unemployment -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.000 -0.001*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Stock Prices 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 778,647 58,756 709,282 719,252 295,702 161,189 115,135 111,451 316,396
Number of firms 199,457 16,231 204,332 187,186 79,622 45,485 32,492 31,499 91,210
R-squared 0.094 0.051 0.125 0.110 0.090 0.062 0.051 0.059 0.081
Notes: See Table B.1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables. Firm-level data and taxation comes from the ORBIS database. Data for macroeconomic factors comes from the World
Bank. All variables are ratios, growth rates or logarithms. In all regressions, we include firm and year fixed effects and a constant but suppress their coefficients in the tables. The nine
industry clusters in the columns are "Manufacturing", "Electricity, gas and water supply", "Construction and real estate", "Wholesale trade", "Retail trade", "Transportation and storage",
"Accommodation and food", "ICT and research" and "Professional and administrative services". Following Petersen (2009), we employ two-dimensional clustering of robust standard errors at
firm-level and year-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.5.3 Geographic Analysis
We also analyze whether location is an important parameter that affects the way our ex-
planatory variables impact capital structure choice and that accounts for any unobserved
effects given geographic characteristics.
2.5.3.1 Regions
First, we investigate broad geo-political aspects. To do so, we compare firms located in
the European Union39 and within the Euro Area40 to a control group. We define this
control group as all EFTA states and the two non-European countries in our sample.
Thus, this group includes Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, Japan and the
USA.
Initially, we find that mean and variance of leverage ratios when clustered into the afore-
mentioned three groups are significantly different. Firms in the Euro Area have on average
higher leverage ratios than firms located in the European Union and more so, than firms
in the control group. Table 2.6 depicts the regression results for the three groups. Higher
leverage ratios in the European Union and Euro Area are driven by taxation effects and
capital flows. Tangibility and unemployment positively affect debt financing of firms in
our control group, while the coefficients remain negative for the other two groups. All
other factors have similar effects on capital structure choice of firms. Differences between
firms located in the European Union and those in the Euro Area are predominately driven
by effects from the internal capital market. Firms outside the Euro Area experience ex-
change rate risks and face tougher lending and reserve requirements, while the common
supranational monetary policy within the Euro Area insures firms against illiquidity and
country-specific risks.
39We only have 27 countries for the European Union instead of 28 because Croatia acquired membership
on July 1, 2013, but our data set ends in 2012.
40We exclude Latvia from the Euro Area because it adopted the currency on January 1, 2014 but our
data set ends in 2012. However, we include Monaco and Montenegro because the former shares a
monetary union with France and the latter is an unilateral adopter of the Euro.
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Table 2.6: Results for Total Leverage Ratio across Regions
Control Group§ EU27† Euro Area‡
Total Leverage Total Leverage Total Leverage
Firm Size 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Growth 0.000** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability -0.096*** -0.173*** -0.179***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Tangiblity 0.026*** -0.026*** -0.032***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
Liquidity -0.059*** -0.081*** -0.083***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Nickell 0.000 0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total Ind. LR 0.159*** 0.091*** 0.066***
(0.021) (0.008) (0.009)
Ind. Growth 0.067*** 0.009*** 0.008***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
Tax Shield 0.693*** 1.098*** 1.066***
(0.065) (0.021) (0.022)
Inflation 0.001 0.001*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth -0.001** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capital Flows -9.900*** 0.126*** 1.151***
(1.117) (0.034) (0.050)
Unemployment 0.012*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Stock Prices 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y
Observations 197,398 2,959,093 2,547,956
Number of firms 46,064 809,574 674,827
R-squared 0.079 0.108 0.113
Notes: See Table B.1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables. Firm-
level data and taxation comes from the ORBIS database. Data for macroe-
conomic factors comes from the World Bank. All variables are ratios, growth
rates or logarithms. In all regressions, we include firm and year fixed ef-
fects and a constant but suppress their coefficients in the tables. § includes
EFTA states (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland), USA and Japan.
† excludes Croatia. ‡ includes Monaco and Montenegro, excludes Latvia.
Following Petersen (2009), we employ two-dimensional clustering of robust
standard errors at firm-level and year-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.5.3.2 Countries
Second, we disclose the importance of macroeconomic conditions by analyzing cross-
country differences in leverage ratios. This heterogeneity is more profound than among
industries. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show cross-sectional and time-series behavior of capital
structures across countries.41
Figure 2.5: Leverage Ratios across Countries
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Figure 2.6: Leverage Ratios across Countries and Time
Among the countries with the highest average leverage ratios, we find Germany, Italy,
Monaco and Norway, while firms with the least amounts of debt per firm are located
41We have firm-level data from 42 different countries. Tables and Figures make use of the ISO 3166-1
two-digit country codes. These are: AT = Austria, BA = Bosnia and Herzegovina, BE = Belgium,
BG = Bulgaria, CH = Switzerland, CY = Cyprus, CZ = Czech Republic, DE = Germany, DK =
Denmark, EE = Estonia, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France, GB = United Kingdom, GR =
Greece, HR = Croatia, HU = Hungary, IE = Ireland, IS = Iceland, IT = Italy, JP = Japan, LI =
Liechtenstein, LT = Lithuania, LU = Luxembourg, LV = Latvia, MC = Monaco, ME = Montenegro,
MK = Macedonia, MT = Malta, NL = Netherlands, NO = Norway, PL = Poland, PT = Portugal, RO
= Romania, RS = Serbia, RU = Russia, SE = Sweden, SI = Slovenia, SK = Slovakia, TR = Turkey,
UA = Ukraine, US = USA.
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in Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Montenegro, Turkey, Ukraine and the USA. Over time,
cross-country differences also vary considerably. While most average leverage ratios per
countries run in a band between 40 to 80%, yearly differences are significant which do
not suggest a strong path dependence.
Table 2.7 then provides an overview of the results from our country-by-country regres-
sions.42 We include the three countries with the highest average leverage ratios, namely,
Germany, Italy and Norway, as well as the three countries with the lowest average lever-
age ratios, being Turkey, Ukraine and the USA. In particular, the results suggest that
cross-country differences are mainly driven by differences in industry structure and com-
position within a country.
Firm size has a significant positive impact on leverage ratios for high-leverage countries
while it has no effect in low-leverage countries. Profitability and liquidity are consistently
negatively related to leverage ratios, while tangibility decreases leverage ratios except in
Germany and Norway. The degree of tangibility affects country-specific capital struc-
tures through the sectoral distribution of economic activity which precisely has such a
large degree. Coefficients for industry median leverage are positive except for firms in
Italy whereas tax shields consistently drive debt financing in all countries. Results for
firm-level and industry growth, GDP growth, the Nickell criterion, unemployment and
stock prices are inconclusive.
We also run regressions for the eight major countries that we previously investigated
in Table 2.2. Profitability and liquidity consistently negatively affect capital structures,
while tax shields regularly drive leverage ratios positively. Coefficients for tangibility
are positive except for Italy, Japan and the USA. Results are inconclusive for firm size
and firm-level growth, the Nickell criterion, industry-specific factors, and business cycle
indicators.
42We exclude Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Monaco and Montenegro from the cross-country study due to
lack of observations.
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Table 2.7: Results for Total Leverage Ratio across Countries
high-leverage Countries low-leverage Countries
Germany Italy Norway Turkey Ukraine USA
Total Leverage Total Leverage Total Leverage Total Leverage Total Leverage Total Leverage
Firm Size 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.008*** -0.017 -0.002 -0.004
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.015) (0.001) (0.003)
Firm Growth 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.005 0.001*** -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.001)
Profitability -0.116*** -0.199*** -0.090*** -0.128 -0.112*** -0.135***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.116) (0.005) (0.012)
Tangibility 0.017** -0.101*** 0.028*** -0.155 -0.095*** -0.044**
(0.008) (0.002) (0.005) (0.113) (0.007) (0.022)
Liquidity -0.056*** -0.087*** -0.051*** -0.311*** -0.072*** -0.193***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.086) (0.008) (0.021)
Nickell 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Total Ind. LR 0.256*** -0.057*** 0.185*** 1.510*** 0.597*** 0.047
(0.026) (0.013) (0.023) (0.551) (0.050) (0.076)
Ind. Growth -0.000 -0.022*** 0.094*** 0.012 -0.010 0.015
(0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.092) (0.014) (0.019)
Tax Shield 0.730*** 0.997*** 0.740*** 1.374 2.504*** 3.721***
(0.111) (0.033) (0.068) (5.925) (0.225) (0.943)
Inflation 0.003*** 0.015*** 0.000 0.000** 0.008
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.006)
GDP Growth -0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002 0.001 0.000*** -0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Unemployment 0.016*** 0.012*** -0.009***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
Stock Prices 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 97,139 840,289 164,352 401 108,735 16,759
Number of firms 33,904 207,442 38,335 193 31,606 3,933
R-squared 0.065 0.168 0.087 0.208 0.176 0.111
Notes: See Table B.1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables. Firm-level data and taxation comes from the ORBIS database.
Data for macroeconomic factors comes from the World Bank. All variables are ratios, growth rates or logarithms. In all regressions,
we include firm and year fixed effects and a constant but suppress their coefficients in the tables. Capital flows are excluded for
collinearity reasons as are inflation and unemployment for some countries. Following Petersen (2009), we employ two-dimensional
clustering of robust standard errors at firm-level and year-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.5.4 Firm Characteristics
Finally, we explore in more detail how different firm characteristics impact the effects of
our explanatory variables on capital structure choice. That is, we make refinements to
our subsampling in order to capture (i) the impact of information asymmetries between
investors and firms through dissecting firms according to their legal status and (ii) how
well our model explains the respective capital structure choices of firms of different size.
This may indicate whether a firm’s position in the life cycle or industry benchmarks
have an effect on capital structure choice because large firms tend to be well-established
industry leaders.
2.5.4.1 Public vs. Private Firms
We investigate information asymmetries by subsampling our data set into two groups,
publicly traded companies and private firms, respectively.43 Private firms should en-
counter greater difficulties in acquiring external financing and in particular, debt, as
potential investors incur higher agency costs and the problem of adverse selection is big-
ger. Not surprisingly, mean and variance of leverage ratios between both groups are
significantly different. We find that private firms have higher leverage ratios on average
than public firms. This may stem from the fact that private firms do not have access
to many equity or equity-like financial instruments that publicly traded companies may
make use of.
The majority of public firms in our sample is located in France, Greece, Italy and Spain,
while Finland, Iceland, Ireland and Spain have the highest share of public companies to
total amount of firms in the sample. Most countries have a large share of private firms.
Table 2.8 provides the overview of our model for the subsamples into public and pri-
vate firms. Results for both groups are the same as in the baseline model in Table 2.3 for
firm-level and macroeconomic factors, except for capital flows which are positively related
43For 162,250 firms with 864,026 firm-year observations, the legal status could not be accurately identified
so they are not included in either group.
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to debt financing for public firms only. Also, public firms experience larger effects from
industry-specific factors on their leverage ratios. This indicates that public firms adhere
more to market pressures in setting leverage targets due to increased transparency and
visibility of their business operations. On the other hand, private firms have financing
models that are less affected in their capital structure choice by changes in international
capital flows. This may arise from the fact that foreign ownership disproportionally
increases in publicly traded companies due to better capital market liquidity.
2.5.4.2 Small vs. Large Firms
Another inquiry with respect to information asymmetries, transactions costs and the
range of available funding instruments analyzes the effect of firm size on capital structure
choice. To do so, we divide our sample in deciles and investigate the lowest and highest
groups, namely, the 10% firms in our data set with the smallest firm size and the 10% with
the largest firm size. Mean and variance of leverage ratios for small firms are significantly
lower than otherwise. On the other hand, average leverage for large firms is close to that
of the overall sample. The smallest firms in our data set are located in Italy, Spain and the
Ukraine, while the largest firms are located in France, Germany and the United Kingdom.
Table 2.9 provides the results for both deciles. For most of the explanatory variables, the
effects on capital structure choice are the same in both deciles and as in Table 2.3. Firm
size obviously affects only large firms. Industry-specific factors drive down debt financing
only for small firms, while it is positively related for large companies. Macroeconomic
factors affect large firms to a lesser degree. Overall, it seems that large firms are bound
by higher market pressure in concentrated segments within their respective economic ac-
tivity and benefit overly from industry trends and demand. On the other hand, small
firms are more affected by changes in foreign ownership of domestic assets than large
firms.
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Table 2.8: Results for Total Leverage Ratio due to Firms’ Legal Status
public firms private firms
Total Leverage Total Leverage
Firm Size 0.009*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.000)
Firm Growth 0.000*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Profitability -0.183*** -0.155***
(0.004) (0.001)
Tangibility -0.045*** -0.025***
(0.003) (0.001)
Liquidity -0.095*** -0.075***
(0.003) (0.001)
Nickell 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Total Ind. LR 0.230*** 0.064***
(0.018) (0.009)
Ind. Growth 0.011*** 0.003
(0.004) (0.002)
Tax Shield 1.771*** 1.009***
(0.057) (0.024)
Inflation 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Capital Flows 0.929*** -0.033
(0.062) (0.042)
Unemployment -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Stock Prices 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Y Y
Firm FE Y Y
Constant Y Y
Observations 533,609 2,280,129
Number of firms 135,724 634,245
R-squared 0.166 0.115
Notes: See Table B.1 in the Appendix for definitions of
the variables. Firm-level data and taxation comes from the
ORBIS database. Data for macroeconomic factors comes
from the World Bank. All variables are ratios, growth rates
or logarithms. In all regressions, we include firm and year
fixed effects and a constant but suppress their coefficients
in the tables. Following Petersen (2009), we employ two-
dimensional clustering of robust standard errors at firm-
level and year-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.9: Results for Total Leverage Ratio according to Firm Size
small firms large firms
Total Leverage Total Leverage
Firm Size -0.001 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001)
Firm Growth 0.000** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Profitability -0.085*** -0.180***
(0.006) (0.004)
Tangibility -0.066*** -0.013***
(0.005) (0.004)
Liquidity -0.069*** -0.067***
(0.007) (0.004)
Nickell 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Total Ind. LR -0.051* 0.277***
(0.029) (0.019)
Ind. Growth -0.067*** -0.004
(0.012) (0.004)
Tax Shield 1.821*** 1.020***
(0.141) (0.061)
Inflation 0.004*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth 0.001*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Capital Flows 2.192*** 0.505***
(0.208) (0.111)
Unemployment 0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Stock Prices 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Y Y
Firm FE Y Y
Constant Y Y
Observations 230,489 358,206
Number of firms 109,319 103,892
R-squared 0.035 0.108
Notes: See Table B.1 in the Appendix for definitions of
the variables. Firm-level data and taxation comes from the
ORBIS database. Data for macroeconomic factors comes
from the World Bank. All variables are ratios, growth rates
or logarithms. In all regressions, we include firm and year
fixed effects and a constant but suppress their coefficients
in the tables. Following Petersen (2009), we employ two-
dimensional clustering of robust standard errors at firm-
level and year-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.6 Conclusion
Capital structure choice is a highly relevant topic for a firm’s prosperity and to deduce
the right economic and competition policies, especially given the economic development
and turmoil over the last decade. Both theoretical and empirical literature has dealt with
a number of mechanisms and factors that firms consider and encounter in their financing
decisions. In this chapter, we follow similar empirical research in conducting a series of
panel analyses to determine the most important factors that drive leverage ratios. We
append previous work in drawing on a variety of different parameters and indices on
firm-, industry- and country-level to explain a greater portion of variation in the data.
We base our analysis on a large cross-sectional data set to mitigate problems of se-
lection and survival biases. Then, we expand empirical frameworks by Frank and Goyal
(2009), Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012), Köksal, Orman, and Oduncu (2013) and the
European Central Bank (2013) to quantitatively assess capital structure choices over the
past decade with an emphasis on Europe. We show that firm size, industry leverage,
industry growth and tax shield positively affect leverage ratios, while profitability and
liquidity have negative impacts. Furthermore, tangibility has a positive impact on lever-
age for those firms that use long-term debt financing. For small firms that mostly make
use of short-term debt only, we find a negative relationship due to the trade-off between
tangibility and liquidity to serve debt obligations to investors. In addition, we find a
strong impact of international capital allocation due to the size of coefficients for our
capital flows variable. The results are robust against different panel estimators, decom-
positions and in yearly cross sections.
Our study makes a deliberate choice in favor of a highly representative sample with
a very large cross-section while a majority of empirical studies has previously used much
smaller samples of larger (listed) firms. Hence, an important contribution of our work is
to provide a check to what extent previous results may have suffered from a small sample
bias, or rather from a selection bias that ignored financial constraints of the vast majority
of NFCs. Indeed, we find that previous studies neglected the different capital structure
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choice of small firms, cross-country differences as well as the effects of the business cycle
and the size of national capital markets on leverage. This explains differences in empirical
results. Second, our study provides strong indications that corporate taxation needs to
be part of macro-prudential policy frameworks in view of the important effects of national
tax codes on leverage ratios. Furthermore, our very representative estimates can be seen
as an input for future research on the quantification of international intra-group capital
mobility and tax-base shifting.
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Chapter 3
Auditing Quality in Regulatory
Regimes
3.1 Introduction
As is well known, the market for audit services is dominated by four large oligopolis-
tic firms.1 A stylized fact that motivates this chapter is that especially large industrial
companies rely on these four auditors and rarely change their mandates with them. The
four oligopolistic audit firms argue that only they are capable of auditing large compa-
nies. Additionally, the financial crisis has shown that a positive auditing result does not
provide clear signaling of financial robustness because financially distressed companies
received positive statements far too often.2 It has hence been argued that insufficiently
low average audit quality exists in the market. However, robust audit is key to investor
confidence as one crucial part in the investors’ decision-making process. This is why
the European Commission (EC) has proposed regulatory interventions to introduce more
competition, and to improve the transparency in the market and the reliability of the
signaling of audit results’ quality to potential investors of companies.
1Since 2002, the wave of subsequent mergers among firms providing auditing services has left four large,
dominant firms in the market: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, KPMG, Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers. The additional small- and medium-sized audit firms can be regarded as the competitive
fringe.
2Examples include Enron and most recently, Lehman Brothers and AIG.
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After the EC introduced the Statutory Audit Directive in 20063, the recent financial cri-
sis has shown immediate need to improve the regulatory framework for audits. Thus,
a Green Paper on Audit Policy was produced in 2010 and discussed with major stake-
holders.4 Subsequently, in November 2011 EC proposals were drafted for an amended
directive and new regulation on mandatory rotation, mandatory tendering, separation
of non-audit services, European supervision, competitive aspects5 and proportionality.6
With these actions, the EC aims at creating a Single Market for Statutory Audits by intro-
ducing a mobility measure (European Passport) to foster cross-border competition among
auditors, a quality measure (voluntary quality certification) to improve the average qual-
ity of the service provided in the market and thirdly, a standard measure (International
Standards of Auditing) to harmonize accounting frameworks and to increase transparency
over the differences in service quality7. The EC argues that its proposals are beneficial
for a variety of reasons. These include the enhanced independence of audit firms, better
quality of audits, improved stability and confidence in the financial market as well as
increased confidence in the robustness of financial statements. This may lead to lower
cost of capital for audited companies and to better access to financing opportunities for
firms (European Commission (2011a)).
However, two caveats arise from the EC’s approach to create a Single Market for Statu-
tory Audits: Firstly, the proposed formal standardization may impose a market entry
barrier, whereas weaker standards or non-mandatory certification may be ineffective. In-
deed, economic theory suggests that both certification and standards actually increase
barriers to market entry. However, the EC proposals are intended to allow small au-
dit firms to compete with the four large oligopolistic audit firms which arguably is not
possible now. Hence, while in particular small auditors are in favor of regulatory inter-
ventions by national authorities or the EC, the Big Four have continuously opposed any
3See European Commission (2006).
4See European Commission (2010).
5The focus of this chapter is solely on this point although the other also deserve attention in economic
analyses. This would be beyond the scope of this work.
6See European Commission (2011b,c).
7That is, the distribution of quality levels provided by the agents within the market.
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additional regulation.8 Secondly, it is unclear how effective formal regulation is - whether
on national or EU level - to improve competition and market conduct against persistent
informal standards applied by e.g. banks in their lending practices.9
In this chapter, we evaluate the impact of regulatory intervention on the quality of
auditing services. Do the EC proposals improve the reliability of the signaling of the
audit reports’ quality? We also investigate the effects of costly signaling. The differ-
ence between certification and standardization lies with who initiates the verification of
quality. If the demand-side does, the less informed party (regulator, buyer) standardizes
quality of the auditing service provided in the market. If the supply-side does, the more
informed party (auditor) may signal their quality to the market by certification. Is it then
more profitable for the regulator to certify the auditor or to standardize? More impor-
tantly, who should initiate verification of quality from a welfare perspective? Based on
a theoretical model of an auditor-firm-regulator-relationship we can show that voluntary
quality certification leads to a separating equilibrium where only high-quality auditors
certify. This is optimal for social welfare whenever verification costs are large. On the
other hand, standardization of audit services is optimal if the costs for verifying quality
are sufficiently low.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, we discuss previous literature in the area. In
section 3.3 we explain the intuition of the proposed EC regulatory changes. In section
3.4 we set up a model to present the differences between standardization and certification
and the respective outcomes from playing a signaling game. Section 3.5 includes the wel-
fare analysis. Section 3.6 summarizes the results which are checked for their robustness
in section 3.7. Section 3.8 concludes the chapter.
8See e.g. the public statements and reactions to the proposed EC regulation in the media (Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung (2011)).
9Compare DeAngelo (1981), European Commission (2011a). Evidence from studies suggests that com-
panies intending to go public switch their auditor to one of the Big Four. Dye (1993) finds that banks
require companies which ask for debt instruments for their corporate financing to first acquire an audit
on their financial statements from one of the Big Four before submitting an application for e.g. a loan.
Subsequently, these discriminatory clauses have been called "Big4-laws".
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3.2 Literature Review
In order to explore the impact of the EC proposals on audit quality through certification
and standardization, this chapter builds on two strands of research.
First, Accounting and Law & Economics literature focuses on pricing and concentration
as well as the incentivization of auditors to provide sufficient quality by legal regimes.
One group of papers focuses on audit quality differences. This starts by DeAngelo (1981)
providing the definition of audit quality as the joint probability that an auditor uncov-
ers financial distress if the firm is indeed financially unhealthy. Empirical work by Deis
and Giroux (1992) finds a number of factors explaining audit quality differences: Audit
quality decreases as auditor tenure increases, and is also negatively related to size and fi-
nancial health of a firm. However, audit quality increases with the number of firms whose
mandates one auditor has. Finally, there exists a strong relationship between effort and
audit quality.
Dye (1993) and Schwartz (2007) also utilize DeAngelo’s definition and examine the effect
of auditor’s liability on the audit quality provided in various legal regimes. Palmrose
(1986), Magee and Tseng (1990), Kanodia and Mukherji (1994), and Lawrence, Minutti-
Meza, and Zhang (2011) find a significant correlation between auditor size and her fees
where the Big Four set distinct higher prices for their services than the competitive
fringe. Moreover, they find that predatory pricing by auditors is persistent even when
all bargaining power lies with the buyer. However, the independence of the auditor in
evaluating the financial situation of a firm might be compromised by less rigid standards.
Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) examine the impact of minimum quality standards in a
vertically differentiated duopoly and find that the standard impairs the stability of price
collusion. Ye and Simunic (2013) analyze the preferences for auditing standards if they
are vague or tough. They find that both firm and auditor prefer strict standards, but if
the toughness of standards is set at a non-optimal level, both prefer vaguer standards.
Second, Industrial Organization literature looks at the respective strategic interactions
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between auditor and investor, auditor and third-party regulator as well as auditor and
audited firm game-theoretically. In this research, the impacts of costly certification and
asymmetric information about the true quality of the audit service provided are ad-
dressed. A rich literature on asymmetric information and in particular, signaling, exists.10
Chaney, Jeter, and Shaw (2003) and Zhang (2007) analyze the effect of aggressive com-
petition on the provision of auditing services and the impact of the public’s expectations
on audit quality. They find that regulators should ensure the independence of auditors
by decreasing the likelihood of cheating by auditors, either through increased scrutiny
or increased fines upon discovery. Causholli, Knechel, Lin, and Sappington (2013) argue
that an incumbent auditor has an informational advantage and thus, may provide under-
auditing and gather substantial rent from its clients. The information asymmetry makes
it also difficult for auditors with superior quality to acquire the auditing mandate.
This chapter introduces certification and standardization of audit quality in a signaling
setup. Work by Fasten and Hofmann (2010) focuses on the asymmetries of information
disclosure when certification is demanded by both seller and buyer. Stahl and Strausz
(2011) examine costly certification via inspection and signaling games but allow both
buyer and seller to determine whether they want to verify the quality of the service pro-
vided. Since a company or investor as potential buyers of the audit service know less
about the true audit quality provided by the auditor with the mandate, they impose too
much regulation on auditors if they are anxious or too little restrictions if they are lenient
in an inspection game (Stahl and Strausz (2011)).
We build on the framework by Stahl and Strausz (2011) but deviate in that we only
allow the seller to decide over certification and otherwise impose a harmonization of the
quality of the service provided by standardization. A signaling of the quality of the au-
dit service provided by the auditor through seller-induced certification can successfully
dissect the market into different quality segments allowing for a more efficient allocation
of audit mandates according to the buyers’ willingness to pay, the respective need for a
certain quality level and the ability of a respective auditor to provided such demanded
10See Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973, 1974), Wilson (1977) and Tirole (1988).
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quality. Standardization may allow low-quality audit firms to catch up and thus, allow
the EC to raise the average audit quality provided in the market. Is it not clear however,
whether the results for different forms of certification shown in earlier research also hold
in comparison to the EC proposed standardization. This is the aspect this work tackles.
3.3 Single Market for Statutory Audits
Among the proposed regulatory changes issued by the European Commission at the end
of 2011, it suggests the creation of a Single Market for statutory (i.e. required by law)
audits by introducing competitive measures to the audit profession. It goes on to state
that it wants to "allow audit firms to provide services across the EU and to require all
statutory auditors and audit firms to comply with international auditing standards when
carrying out statutory audits"11.
Previous legislation on this issue is predominantly based on the Statutory Audit Direc-
tive12 introduced in 2006 (European Commission (2011a)). Since then, the Commission
has recognized the need for improved public intervention to tackle the weaknesses of the
audit market for competitors and consumers alike. Therefore, it initiated research on au-
dit firms prior to implementing any new legislative procedure.13 Based on these insights,
the Commission drafted a green paper14 regarding its audit policy and subsequently, pro-
posed a new EC regulation15 and the amendment of the Statutory Audit Directive16 to
appropriately account for concerns raised by audit firms, investors and further stakehold-
ers as well as for its own goals in the public interest.17
11See European Commission (2011a) and the respective proposals European Commission (2011b) and
European Commission (2011c).
12See European Commission (2006).
13Two main studies have to be noted here: Oxera Consulting (2007) and ESCP Europe (2011).
14See European Commission (2010).
15EC proposal for a Regulation to increase the quality of audits of financial statements of public-interest
entities, COM(2011) 779.
16EC proposal for a Directive to enhance the single market for statuory audits, COM (2011) 778.
17The EC has recognized that it needs more detailed rules for large listed companies of public interest
and hence, drafted a separate proposal for regulation. Thus, the amendment of the Statutory Audit
Directive (COM (2011) 778) shall coexist with new regulation (COM (2011) 779) targeting large listed
entities (European Commission (2011b)).
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Table 3.1 provides a summary of the framework proposed by the EC.18 In this chapter,
we focus on the fifth point under Actions which stresses the importance of competition.
This is about creating a Single Market for Statutory Audits in the EU by means of a Euro-
pean Passport, quality certification, prohibition of discriminatory clauses and introducing
International Standards on Auditing.
Table 3.1: Framework of EC Audit Policy
Objectives
• improve credibility and reliability of financial statements
• facilitate cross-border competition among auditors
• take into account capabilities of small audit firms
• improve supervision
• secure sufficient auditor independence and competition
Actions
• mandatory rotation of audit firms
• mandatory tendering
• separation of non-audit services
• European supervision of auditors
• creation of a Single Market for statutory audits
• proportionality regarding small audit firms
3.3.1 Policy Action 1 - European Passport
First, a possibility to foster effective competition for auditing mandates is the harmoniza-
tion of rules and the creation of a single European market for auditing services through
introducing a European Passport (European Commission (2010)). Hence, the EC pro-
posed such a passport for audit firms. This would lead to mutual recognition of statutory
auditors approved in one EU member state to facilitate cross-border mobility of auditors
which would particularly benefit small audit firms (European Commission (2011a)). In
detail, the EC suggests a change from single-state approval and an aptitude test un-
der the old Statutory Audit Directive to a single European market for auditing services
by harmonization and introduction of this passport for auditors. Hence, a European-
wide registration with common professional qualification requirements would be created
which fosters harmonization on ownership and independence rules (European Commis-
18For a summary, see European Commission (2011a). The proposals include the six different elements
and their respective specifications at length (European Commission (2011b,c)).
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sion (2010)). The proposal for the amended directive allows auditors approved in one
EU member state to also provide statutory audits in another member state. No multiple
approval process would be necessary anymore.19
The EC argues that administrative costs for authorities and auditors would decrease,
but basic requirements on organization and sufficient resources for performing quality
audits would persist (European Commission (2011a,c)). Because many barriers to cross-
border competition among auditors exist, the EC proposal encourages more competition
for auditing mandates and potentially lowers costs in compliance to rules regulating the
provision of auditing services (European Commission (2010)). Especially small audit
firms would benefit from the reduction of entry barriers to the market and from cross-
border opportunities to compete (European Commission (2011a)).
The EC proposal to introduce a European Passport can thus be seen as uncondition-
ally beneficial to improve competition in the market for auditing services. Hence, we do
not include this aspect in the model presented in Section 3.4.
3.3.2 Policy Action 2 - Quality Certification
Second, the Commission wants to foster the selection of auditors by firms based primarily
on audit quality. Since audit quality depends on independence, professional scepticism
and technical competence, the EC proposes European-wide voluntary quality certifica-
tion of audit firms. This certificate would recognize their ability to perform high quality
audits of companies and would work against the argument of the four oligopolistic au-
dit firms that only they have the capabilities to provide high quality in their auditing
services.20 Certificates would be issued by the European Securities and Markets Author-
ity (ESMA)21. Stakeholders, auditors and companies would then benefit from improved
audit quality and restored credibility of financial information (European Commission
19Similar to the one-stop-shop principle applied by the Commission in its merger control under Article
21 of the EC Regulation 139/2004.
20The problem here lies with the fact that in practice, one encounters only positive or rarely failed audit
reports. Thus, there is no quality differentiation with respect to the outcome of such audit report.
21The ESMA was established in 2009 by EC Regulation COM(2009) 503.
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(2011a,c)).
The EC argues that direct costs would affect both auditors and public authorities in
obtaining and administrating the certification. The European quality certification would
provide a mechanism for quality verification in auditing services. To obtain the certifi-
cate, there exist administrative and fee requirements (European Commission (2011c)).
We present a model for this voluntary quality certification in Section 3.4.4.
3.3.3 Policy Action 3 - Prohibition of Discriminatory Clauses
A further aspect is the EC’s proposal for prohibition of "Big Four-laws". Academics, audi-
tors and policy makers have recognized that there exist contractual clauses limiting listed
companies in search of a suitable auditor for their financial statements in their selection.
This practice reflects the problem of asymmetric information regarding the soundness
of financial statements on behalf of investors and creditors. The clauses require audits
of financial statements undertaken by Big Four-firms only.22 In essence, a company will
face higher costs of capital or will not even be able to make use of debt financing if it does
not acquire an auditing mandate from one of the four large auditors. In addition, part
of the market for auditing services is foreclosed to small audit firms who are not able to
provide tenders for auditing mandates to in particular large listed companies (DeAngelo
(1981), Deis and Giroux (1992), European Commission (2011a)). The EC’s proposed
directive and regulation prohibit any contractual clauses requiring audit reports from a
specific audit firm, in particular, any Big Four-firm (European Commission (2011b,c)).
The EC proposal to prohibit discriminatory clauses against small audit firms can thus
be seen as unconditionally beneficial to improve competition in the market for auditing
services. Hence, we do not include this aspect in the model presented in Section 3.4.
22Subsequently, these clauses are termed "Big Four-laws", "Big Four only"-bias, "Big Four is Best"-bias,
etc. and are applied e.g. by banks in their lending processes.
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3.3.4 Policy Action 4 - International Standards on Auditing
The fourth aspect of the creation of the Single Market for statutory audits is the pro-
posed introduction of International Standards of Auditing (ISAs)23 on the EU level to
improve the accountability and reliability of auditing procedures and results (European
Commission (2010)). It requires compliance with the ISAs by all statutory auditors.
Hence, audits would be performed based on a harmonized framework. Applicable rules
for audit reports would be streamlined (European Commission (2011a,b)). Regulators,
standard setters and auditors would then benefit from these harmonized requirements,
legislation and standards. Firms would benefit from lower cost of capital, improvements
to audit quality and potential savings in audit fees. In total, the introduction of ISAs
leads to recurring net benefits in EU estimated at 2bn EUR per year (European Com-
mission (2011a), Köhler (2009)). However, the Commission estimates the increased costs
of applying ISAs roughly at 90t to 150t EUR annually for listed companies with a bal-
ance sheet of 100mn EUR and more and at approximately 10t EUR annually for small
firms. This is equivalent to a 6% to 10% increase in recurring audit costs. Since the
ISAs would be compulsory for all active audit firms, they would face both direct costs
from adaptation and compliance to ISAs and indirect costs from lower fees. In addition,
public authorities have to incur direct costs of establishing guidance and monitoring of
proportional application of the new accounting rules (European Commission (2011a)).
We present a model for this standardization in Section 3.4.3.
3.4 Model
This section looks at the theoretical implications of such EC legislation by assessing
the effects of standardization and certification in a signaling framework. The important
aspect about the market for auditing services is the fact that there exists asymmetric
information about the audit quality.
23ISAs are professional standards for the performance of audits of financial statements. They are issued
by the International Assurance and Auditing Standards Board which operates under the realm of the
International Federation of Accountants.
81
Auditing Quality in Regulatory Regimes
Verification of audit quality can be done in two ways depending on who initiates ver-
ification. If it is the demand-side, the less informed party verifies quality. We model this
by standardization imposed by the EC. If it is the supply-side, the more informed party
verifies quality if it decides to acquire a certificate. Two questions arise from this setting:
First, is it more profitable for the regulator to provide certification or standardization?
Second, who should initiate verification from a welfare point of view? Henceforth, we
follow Stahl and Strausz (2011) to set up two signaling games of costly standardization
and certification alongside a baseline model. We then compare the equilibria with regards
to social welfare.
3.4.1 Agents, Strategies and Payoffs
The model has three agents. In a simple auditor-firm-regulator-relationship, the seller
is the auditor. She offers her auditing services, i.e. an audit report, at price pa with
quality being known to her but unobservable to the buyer. Quality qi can either be high,
qh, with ex ante probability λ or it can be low, ql > 0, with probability 1 − λ where
∆q ≡ qh − ql > 0 and λ is bounded away from 1. A high-quality auditor has production
cost ch > 0, while cl = 0. Furthermore, we assume there exist economic rents from
auditing such that qh − ch > ql − cl = ql > 0. Then, the high-quality auditor receives
Πh = pa − ch when auditing the firm and zero otherwise, while the low-quality auditor
receives Πl = pa − cl when providing audit services and zero otherwise.
The second agent is the buyer of the auditing service, i.e. the firm that is in need of
an audit as a signal of its financial health to investors for future external financing of its
business operations. After observing pa, the buyer’s possible actions are σb ∈ {sn, sb},
where sn = buyer does not buy good, sb = buyer buys good. The quality of the auditing
service is identified with the buyer’s maximum willingness to pay. A risk-neutral buyer
is then willing to pay p ≤ q¯ ≡ E[q] = λqh + (1− λ)ql. His reservation payoff is zero if he
is not buying, Πb(sn|pa) = 0. Otherwise, he receives Πb(sb|pa) = qi − pa.
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The third agent is the regulator. She is the institution verifying the quality of the
auditing service. This could be the ESMA as proposed by the EC. We assume an honest,
single and profit-maximizing regulator because Strausz (2005) shows that bribing hurts
reputation and that honest certification constitutes a natural monopoly.24 The regulator
exists because there exists demand for verifying the audit quality from both sides of the
market.25 A regulator can verify the auditor’s quality at cost cv. She initially decides
whether to certify the auditor (supply-side verification) or standardize (demand-side ver-
ification) and then sets a price pv at which certification or standardization is available.
That is, revealing the quality of the auditing services is costly to the auditor and the
buyer, respectively. The regulator has all bargaining power as she initially sets pv to
retrieve all economic rents from both auditor and firm. Her payoff from verification is
thus Πtr = xt(pv − cv) where the probability of verification is xt, t ∈ {s, c}, with s =
standardization and c = certification. If not verifying quality, the regulator’s reservation
payoff is zero.
3.4.2 Baseline Regime without Verification
Without any regulatory regime present in the market for auditing services, we face the
typical lemon’s problem by Akerlof (1970) because we additionally assume that produc-
tion costs of high-quality audits exceed average quality, ch > q¯. A high-quality auditor
does not offer her auditing services and the market outcome is inefficient. Information
asymmetries lead to the following equilibrium: Suppose the buyer expects average qual-
ity and pays a single price p = q¯ because he cannot differentiate quality levels. He then
receives Πb(sb|p) = ql − q¯ < 0. The low-type auditor sells at p = q¯ and makes profits
Πl = q¯ − cl = q¯ > 0 while the high-type auditor does not sell because p = q¯ < ch and
Πh = q¯− ch < 0. After Bayesian updating, the buyer would pay at most p = ql such that
Πb(sb|p) = 0 and Πl = ql. Thus, auditors of high quality are crowded out of the market.
24In a setting with oligopolistic certification which differs horizontally, sellers with unobservable quality
would self-select according to the strictness of the tests applied. Hence, sellers are segmented across
the distribution of certifiers relative to their quality and stricter tests imply higher fees (Hvide (2004)).
25We will show this in section 3.4.2.
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Given these results from the initial equilibrium, there exists demand for quality veri-
fication from both sides of the market. In a market without information asymmetries,
a high-quality auditor could sell her auditing services for pa = qh > ch. Therefore, she
has demand for some form of verification that allows her to credibly signal her quality to
the buyer. The high-type auditor is willing to pay the regulator at most her maximum
benefit from providing auditing services, i.e. qh − ch. Yet there also exists demand for
quality verification from the demand-side. Whenever a buyer faces an auditor offering
her services at any pa > ql, the buyer may demand some form of quality verification to
identify higher quality of the auditing services offered. Hence, from now on we assume
that a regulator can perfectly verify the auditor’s quality at cost cv ∈ [0, qh − ch] and
makes the results publicly observable.
3.4.3 Standardization
In the first signaling game, the three players buyer, auditor and regulator engage in a
market where quality is standardized by the regulator at q˜.26 because the regulator wants
to raise average audit quality in the market. This means that only one type of audit qual-
ity, i.e. q˜, can be provided by the auditor and is available to the buyer. Audit quality is
hence homogeneous in the market. Note that we refer here to a formal standard driven
by the regulator similar to those formal standards implied by standard-setting organiza-
tions.27
Furthermore, the auditor has the opportunity to invest in order to raise the quality
of her auditing services offered. The idea is that auditors are able to train and reach q˜
by investment, e.g. through a learning process, in particular the low-type auditors. We
assume that quality is additively separable so that the investment allows the auditor to
acquire additional audit quality above her existing level. Hence, the auditor’s investment
is simply a cost component such that ik + c(qi) = c(qˆ) where c(qˆ) is the auditor’s total
26This could be in the form of compulsory certification, mandatory norms or introducing laws regulating
minimum quality standards or compatibility.
27To illustrate this, one can think of e.g. the European Commission proposing a new directive to
standardize mobile phone chargers.
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costs to acquire a quality target qˆ.
The game has the following structure and timing:28
t=1 regulator sets pv as the price for standardizing audit quality in the
market and sets q˜ = qh
t=2 nature selects quality qi, i ∈ {l, h}, of the audit service provided and
the auditor learns her type of quality
t=3 auditor offering audit report of quality qi at cost ci decides about
investment level ia to attain quality threshold: q(ia) + qi = q˜
t=4 auditor sets price pa for her service
t=5 buyer decides whether or not he buys the good (audit report)
In the initial stage, the regulator verifies the quality from demand-side through standard-
ization. She receives Πsr = xs(pv−cv) where verification always takes place so that xs = 1.
Since quality is standardized at q˜ = qh, the auditor’s quality target that she wants
to attain becomes qˆ = q˜ = qh. Then, the auditor sets her investment level according
to ik = c(q˜) − c(qi) where ik ∈ [0, ch]. Also, the auditor chooses her price pa from a
continuous set of prices. Then the strategy profile of an auditor of quality qi is given by
σi : R+ → [0, 1] where each σi incorporates choosing both a price pa and an investment
level ia.
After observing pa, the buyer’s possible actions are: sn = buyer does not buy good, sb =
buyer buys good. To fix ideas, we assume that the standardization costs pv are paid by the
buyer. The respective payoffs for the buyer are: Πb(sn|pa) = 0 and Πb(sb|pa) = qh−pa−pv.
Hence, the maximum price that the auditor can then charge to the buyer and still sell
the good is pa ≤ qh − pv.
28It does not change the outcome of the analysis if the steps in t=3 and t=4 occur sequentially or
simultaneously.
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Lemma 3.1 The analysis of the game does not depend on who pays for the standard-
ization costs. The only difference are the cut-off values for the minimum and maximum
price pa the auditor can charge to the buyer and still sell the service and subsequently,
how the total surplus is distributed among the agents.
Proof See the Appendix. 
With the game’s structure and timing and the agents’ strategies presented, we derive
an equilibrium of the game of standardization in Proposition 3.1. Note that since the
regulator sets pv in t=1, she can extract all rents from both buyer and auditor.
Proposition 3.1 There exists a unique equilibrium outcome where
Auditor’s strategy σ∗i :

p∗a = qh − pv if pv ≤ qh − pa
any pa ≥ c(q˜) if pv > qh − pa
For the qh auditor, i∗h = 0 while the ql auditor needs to invest i∗l = ch.
Buyers’s strategy σ∗b :

sb if pv ≤ qh − pa
sn if pv > qh − pa
Regulator’s strategy σ∗r : p∗v = qh − ch.
Then, p∗a = ch so that Π∗b(sb|pa) = Π∗h = Π∗l = 0 and the regulator’s profit is
Πsr = qh − ch − cv.
Proof See the Appendix. 
The regulator sets pv such that she can extract all rents from both buyer and auditor by
charging a price equal to the economic rent from high-quality auditing, pv = qh − ch.
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3.4.4 Certification
In the second signaling game, the buyer and seller play a game where the seller (auditor)
can ascertain her quality of the audit report by seller-induced quality verification. She
can choose to acquire a costly quality certificate from the regulator. With certification
the auditor’s quality becomes observable. Audit quality is now heterogeneous in the mar-
ket.
In contrast to the standardization game described in section 3.4.3, we now leave the
regulator to set only her price for certification pv and allow the auditor to choose both
her price pa as well as the option to acquire a costly certificate which reveals her audit
quality to the buyer.
The game has the following structure and timing:29
t=1 regulator sets pv as the price for acquiring quality certification
t=2 nature selects quality qi, i ∈ {l, h} of audit service provided and the
auditor learns her type of quality
t=3 auditor offering audit report of quality qi at cost ci decides about
price pa for her service
t=4 auditor decides whether or not to demand certification at price pv
t=5 buyer decides whether or not he buys the good (audit report)
We focus on the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE)30 of the game described above.31
Here, a PBE specifies three components: firstly, the auditor’s pricing strategy; secondly,
29It does not change the outcome of the analysis if the steps in t=3 and t=4 are reversed or occur
simultaneously.
30As described by Kreps and Wilson (1977) as a refinement of Bayesian Nash equilibria and subgame
perfect Nash equilibria.
31These criteria limit the out-of-equilibrium beliefs such that any information set reached off the equi-
lbrium path shall be assigned probability zero if the strategy to reach that node is equilibrium-
dominated. In a two-type model like the one employed here these refinements lead to unique equilibria
in both certification and standardization regimes. If more types or recurrences exist, more stringent re-
finements are needed. One such is presented by Rabin and Sobel (1993) who show which equilibria may
survive repeated interaction because they are frequently deviated to. Another is a more sophisticated
set of contracts offered by the seller of the good Maskin and Tirole (1992).
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the buyer’s belief after observing prices; and thirdly, the buyer’s behavior.
In the initial stage, the regulator verifies audit quality whenever the auditor chooses
to do so and receives Πcr = xc(pv − cv) where the probability of verification is xc.
The auditor chooses her price pa from a continuous set of prices. Also, she decides
whether or not she wants to obtain certification from the regulator at price pv. The
strategy profile of an auditor of quality qi is given by σi : R+ → [0, 1] where each σi
incorporates choosing both a price pa and the decision to buy certification σi(c).
The buyer sets beliefs µb(pa) on what quality the auditor offers where µb : R+ → [0, 1], i.e.
after observing pa and possible certification, the buyer believes that the auditor is of type
qh with probability µb(pa). After observing pa and possessing belief µb, the buyer’s possi-
ble actions are: sn = buyer does not buy good and receives Πb(sn|pa, µb) = 0, sb = buyer
buys good and receives Πb(sb|pa, µb) = µ · qh + (1−µ)ql− pa. Hence, the maximum price
that the auditor can then charge to the buyer and still sell the good is pa ≤ µb(pa)∆q+ql.
Lemma 3.2 Only the high-type auditor acquires certification.
Proof See the Appendix. 
With the game’s structure and timing and the agents’ strategies presented, we derive
an equilibrium of the game of certification in Proposition 3.2. Note that since the regula-
tor sets pv in t=1, she can extract all rents from both the buyer and the certifying auditor.
Proposition 3.2 There exists a unique equilibrium outcome where
Auditor’s strategy σ∗h :

p∗a = qh; σ∗h(c) = 1 if pv ≤ qh − ch
any pa ≥ ch; σ∗h(c) = 0 if pv > qh − ch
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Auditor’s strategy σ∗l :

p∗a = ql; σ∗l (c) = 0 if pv ≤ qh − ch
any pa ≥ cl; σ∗l (c) = 0 if pv > qh − ch
Buyers’s belief µ∗b :

µ∗b = 1 if pa = qh ∧ σ∗i (c) = 1
µ∗b = 0 if pa < qh ∨ σ∗i (c) = 0
Buyers’s strategy σ∗b :

sb if pa ≤ µb(pa)∆q + ql
sn if pa ≥ µb(pa)∆q + ql
Regulator’s strategy σ∗r : p∗v = qh − ch.
Then, p∗a(µ∗b(pa), qh) = qh and p∗a(µ∗b(pa), ql) = ql so that Π∗b(sb|pa, µb) = 0, Π∗h = 0,
Π∗l = ql and the regulator’s profit is Πcr = λ(qh − ch − cv).
Proof See the Appendix. 
3.4.5 Regulator’s Profits
The regulator obtains a higher profit under standardization than with voluntary certifi-
cation: Πsr ≥ Πcr ⇔ qh − ch − cv > λ(qh − ch − cv) since λ < 1 by definition. Therefore,
the regulator will always prefer standardization over certification. We now check whether
these preferences are aligned with social efficiency.
3.5 Welfare
Who should initiate verification of quality from a welfare perspective? A normative an-
swer demands investigation into buyer’s demand and verification costs. Social efficiency
is improved because both types of verification by the regulator allow the qh auditor to
sell her services. From an efficiency perspective, the differences between both regulatory
regimes and the initial environment without verification relate to the different probabil-
ities with which the high-quality audit is provided and sold as well as the frequency at
which costly verification arises.
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3.5.1 Welfare Measurements
As usual, social welfare is defined as the three agents’ surplus. Here this is the economic
rents from auditing for the auditor, firm and regulator. Henceforth, we calculate four
different welfare measures according to the environments presented in the model in sec-
tion 3.4. In the initial setting where verification by a regulator is not possible, welfare
amounts to W = (1− λ)ql because in the inefficient regime where quality verification is
not possible and quality is unobservable, only the low-quality auditor sells her services.
With standardization, the auditing service with ql is never sold. The ql auditor has
to invest il = ch in order to attain quality threshold q˜ = qh. Additionally, expected
verification costs are xs · cv where the probability of verification is xs = 1. Hence, social
welfare under standardization is W s = qh − ch − xs · cv = qh − ch − cv since always and
only high-quality audits are provided and sold, but verification costs also always apply.
With certification, the auditing service with ql is always provided and sold. Furthermore,
expected certification costs are xc · cv where the probability of verification is xc = λ.
Then, social welfare under voluntary certification isW c = λ(qh−ch)+(1−λ)ql−xc ·cv =
λ(qh−ch−cv)+(1−λ)ql. Both types of audits are provided and sold with their respective
a priori probabilities and verification costs apply whenever the qh auditor engages in the
market.
Finally, if - for some reason - there would exist no information asymmetries in the au-
dit market, the audit reports would always be sold at prices equal to productivities
without any regulatory intervention. Hence, social welfare with observable quality is
W = λ(qh − ch) + (1− λ)ql.
3.5.2 Thresholds for cv
As can easily be noted, the ranking of the aforementioned four welfare measurements
depends on the verification costs cv the regulator has to bear if she takes action. Thus,
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we compare the four welfare measures and determine the thresholds of cv for which one
is larger than another. This is provided in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.3 i) With regard to standardization,
W s > W iff cv < (1− λ)(∆q − ch) and
W s > W iff cv < λ(qh − ch) + (1− λ)(∆q − ch).
ii) With regard to certification,
W > W c iff λ · cv > 0 and
W c > W iff cv < qh − ch.
iii) When comparing both regulatory regimes,
W c > W s iff cv > ∆q − ch.
iv) When comparing both non-regulatory regimes with and without information asymme-
tries,
W > W ∀ cv.
Proof See the Appendix. 
The thresholds for cv are necessary for ranking the four different welfare measurements.
Remember that the regulator can verify the auditor’s quality at cost cv ∈ [0, qh − ch].
Each such threshold is an interval of values for cv for which a clear ranking of the differ-
ent welfare measures is possible. Comparing the thresholds for verification costs in the
different scenarios, we derive the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.4 The thresholds for cv can be uniquely ranked:
0 < (1− λ)(∆q − ch) < ∆q − ch < λ(qh − ch) + (1− λ)(∆q − ch) < qh − ch.
Proof See the Appendix. 
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Figure 3.1 is a graphical representation of the four welfare measures as a function of
verification costs cv. Note that both non-regulatory regimes which yield W and W ,
respectively, are independent of cv and hence, are horizontal straight lines. On the other
hand, both regulatory regimes providing W s and W c, respectively, dependent on cv.
Hereby, the slope of the welfare function in the case of standardization is xs = 1 which is
steeper than the slope of the welfare function in the case of certification which is xc = λ.
Note that the cut-off value cv = ∆q − ch derived in Lemma 3.3 determines the intervals
for which W s S W c and reflects the difference in economic benefits from high-quality
and low-quality audits.
Figure 3.1: Welfare Functions
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Furthermore, whenever cv = 0, welfare from certification coincides with welfare from a
situation without information symmetries, i.e. W c = W , and welfare from standardiza-
tion yields the maximum economic rent from auditing, i.e. W s = qh − ch.
If maximum verification costs cv = qh − ch are incurred by the regulator, then welfare
from certification coincides with welfare from the initial scenario with information asym-
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metries which exposes the Lemon’s problem, i.e. W c = W . Welfare from standardization
then is zero, i.e. W s = 0.
3.5.3 Welfare Analysis
By bringing the five cut-off values of cv in order, intervals are established such that the
four aforementioned welfare measures can be ranked. We can graphically show in Figure
3.2 how Lemmata 3.3 and 3.4 lead to a ranking of the four welfare measurements.
Figure 3.2: Ranking of Welfare Measures
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Type of verification
Let ∆W = W c −W s . Then W c >W s iﬀ
λ(qh − ch) + (1− λ)ql − xc · cv > qh − ch − x s · cv
⇔ (λ 1)(qh − ch) + (1− λ)ql + (x s − xc)cv > 0
⇔ (1− λ)(ql + cv ) > (1− λ)( h ch)
⇔ cv > ∆q − ch
Fabian Ku¨hnhausen (IMPRS-CI) December 13, 2012 26 / 34
Audit Quality in Regulatory Regimes Welfare
Welfare Ranking according to verification costs
Social eﬃciency determined by:
W s >W
W s >W c
W s >W
Fabian Ku¨hnhausen (IMPRS-CI) January 9, 2013 28 / 36
Audit Quality in Regulatory Regimes Welfare
Welfare Ranking according t verifi ation costs
Social eﬃciency determined by:
W s >W
W s >W c
W s >W
Fabian Ku¨hnhausen (IMPRS-CI) January 9, 2013 28 / 36
Audit Quality in Regulatory Regimes Welfare
Welfare Ranking according to verification costs
Social eﬃciency determined by:
W s >W
W s >W c
W s >W
Fabian Ku¨hnhausen (IMPRS-CI) January 9, 2013 28 / 36
Hence, regulator’s preferences and social efficiency are not always aligned because the reg-
ulator would always prefer standardizatio to maximize her profits. Normative i plica-
tions can be deduced from this analysis: ∀ 0 < cv < (1−λ)(∆q−ch),W s > W > W c > W
so that standardization yields th social optimum. The low v rification costs make it
worthwhile for the regulator to introduce high-quality audits only through standardiza-
tion. The gains from improving average audit quality in the market through formal
standards (norms, training, etc.) for the share of low-type auditors outweigh the costs of
introducing such regime.
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∀ (1 − λ)(∆q − ch) < cv < ∆q − ch, W > W s > W c > W so that a market with-
out information asymmetries is optimal and standardization is second-best. In this lower
intermediate interval, verification costs already outweigh the benefits from the increased
probability of high-quality audits, i.e. 1 − λ. Yet, verification costs are still not large
enough to induce a credible signal for the high-quality auditor through voluntary certifi-
cation.
∀ ∆q−ch < cv < λ(qh−ch)+(1−λ)(∆q−ch), W > W c > W s > W so that again, a mar-
ket with observable quality is optimal and certification is now second-best. In this upper
intermediate interval, verification costs are large enough so that the high-quality auditor
can credibly signal her audit quality to the buyer through voluntary certification. Hence,
welfare from certification is larger than from standardization. However, these costs from
verifying quality outweigh the benefits from observable quality so that a market without
information asymmetries would be first-best.
∀ λ(qh − ch) + (1 − λ)(∆q − ch) < cv < qh − ch, W > W c > W > W s so that once
more, a market with observable quality is optimal and certification is second-best. Now
verification costs are so large that even the inefficient market equilibrium with unobserv-
able quality, no verification and only low-quality audits sold yields higher welfare than
the standardization regime.
3.6 Results
From a theoretical model based on a simple relationship between an auditor, firm and
a regulator, we are able to draw some clear results which are not, however, obvious at
first. On the one hand, because standardization costs always apply, the regulator’s profit
under standardization is higher than with certification. Also, standardization is optimal
for social welfare if verification costs covered by the regulator are sufficiently low. On
the other hand, certification enables a differentiation in the product space available in
the audit market. In the separating equilibrium, only the qh auditor certifies and sells
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her good at pa = qh while the ql auditor never certifies and sells her good at pa = ql.
Here, the audit report is always sold. Also, certification is optimal for social welfare if
verification costs are sufficiently large.
Thresholds for which W s S W c depend on the cut-off value cv = ∆q − ch derived in
Lemma 3.3 which represents the difference in economic rents from high-quality and low-
quality audits. Hence, the larger the difference in benefits from both types of audit, the
larger the interval for cv for which W s > W c.
In any case, an environment without any information asymmetries yields the social op-
timum whenever cv > (1 − λ)(∆q − ch). That is, the costs for a standardization regime
(cv), which allows auditors to obtain the ability to provide high-quality audits through
investment, outweigh the increased benefits from high-quality audits. This increase is
the difference in economic rents from high-quality audits (qh−ch) over low-quality audits
(ql− cl) whenever nature draws low-type auditors (with probability 1−λ). Note that the
threshold value for cv → 0 as either the share of high-quality auditors increases (λ→ 1)
or the difference in economic benefits decreases (qh − ch− (ql − cl) = ∆q − ch → 0). No
regulatory intervention is never optimal.
3.7 Extensions
We now introduce some additional features to extend the initial model and check the
robustness of our results. We analyze seven different amendments.
First, are the results obtained from the signaling games renegotiation-proof? Suppose
renegotiations are costless. With standardization, all auditors sell their report with qh at
some pa ≤ qh − pv. With certification, prices charged by the respective types of auditors
equal productivities so that pricing is efficient. Thus, renegotiations do not change the
incentives to quote another price p′a 6= pa.
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Second, we previously assumed that the quality provided by an auditor is exogeneously
given by nature in t=2. Now we let the high-type auditor be able to choose between qh
and ql when producing an audit report. Subsequently, the qh auditor can produce qh and
certify (Πh = qh− ch− pv ≥ 0) or she can produce ql and deny verification (Πh = ql > 0).
Hence, her outside option improves from zero to ql and this limits the exploitation by
regulator: Certification occurs iff Πh = qh − ch − pv ≥ ql ⇔ pv ≤ qh − ch − ql = ∆q − ch.
The regulator still extracts all rents from verification but the rents are now smaller:
Πcr = λ(∆q − ch − cv) < λ(qh − ch − cv), whereas Πsr is unchanged.
Third, we investigate the regulator’s imperfection in verification. So far, we assumed
that the regulator perfectly observes quality once called upon for verification. Consider
now a verification technology that reveals the true quality only with 12 < η < 1 and the
wrong quality with 1 − η. Then, in standardization this ambiguity leads to an equilib-
rium where pv = ηqh − ch. Any η > 12 thus reduces the profitability from verification
to Πsr = ηqh − ch − cv. In the case of certification, an equilibrium exists where again
pv = ηqh − ch. Hence, a qh auditor certifies and has pa = qh such that Πh = pa − ch − pv
= (1− η)qh ≥ 0 while a ql auditor never certifies and has pa = ql such that Πl = pa − cl
= ql > 0. The buyer (firm) only buys the good if it is certified as qh and only believes
that the good is qh if it is certified and pa = qh. Therefore, the equilibrium outcome in the
certification regime remains separating and the regulator receives Πcr = λ(ηqh − ch − cv).
A fourth extension is the case of a monopoly. We consider one seller who can sell n
units of the service to n identical buyers. Then both standardization and certification
games are unchanged except that equilibrium outcomes are multiplied by n. Let us as-
sume a capacity constraint such that one seller can sell n− 1 units to n identical buyers.
In standardization, equilibrium outcomes are unchanged since all n−1 units of the audit
service provided are of quality qh and homogenous price competition among buyers leads
to pa = qh − pv. Profits of the auditor and regulator are multiplied by n− 1. One buyer
drops out. With certification, the n − 1 units can either be of qh or of ql. Equilibrium
outcomes are again unchanged. A qh auditor always certifies while a ql auditor never
certifies. Profits of the auditor and regulator are multiplied by n − 1. One buyer drops
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out. Hence the capacity constraint has no bite since all bargaining power lies with the
seller (auditor) anyhow.
A fifth extension looks at the implications of a monopsony. We now consider m audi-
tors competing to sell one good to one buyer. Then competition between sellers reduces
seller’s demand for quality verification. With standardization, auditors compete down to
price equal marginal costs, i.e. pa = ch ∀ i. The m auditors irrespective of the quality
provided make Πi = pa − ch = 0. The buyer gets Πb(sb|pa) = qh − pa − pv ≥ 0 while
the regulator receives Πsr = pv − cv = qh − ch − cv. Again, equilibrium outcomes are
unchanged and all rents are extracted by the regulatory authority. In certification, qh
auditors charge the lowest possible price pa = ch but cannot cover sunk costs pv. Hence,
we arrive at an asymmetric equilibrium where only one qh auditor certifies such that
pa = qh and thus Πh = pa − ch − pv ≥ 0.32 If no other agent certifies, then σh(c) yields
a credible signal for one qh auditor. If y ∈ (1,m] certify, then a recoupment of pv is not
possible and Πh(c) = qh−chy − pv ≤ 0 because pv = qh− ch. Meanwhile, ql auditors charge
their lowest possible price pa = cl = 0 and again never certify so that Πl = pa − cl = 0.
The regulator receives Πcr = λ(qh − ch − cv).
Sixth, we analyze production heterogeneity. We can assume an asymmetric cost structure
in the sense that catching up is more expensive for a ql auditor. Remember that initially,
ik = c(q˜) − c(qi) where ik ∈ [0, ch]. Now let c(q˜) = c(qi) + βik where 0 < β < 1 so that
ik ∈
[
0, ch
β
]
. A qh auditor still has i∗h = 0 so that q˜ = qh is attained. A ql auditor needs to
invest il = c(q˜)−c(ql)β to attain q˜ = qh so that i
∗
l = chβ > ch. If ch ≤ pa ≤ chβ , then we find a
crowding out of ql auditors as they will not invest and hence not attain the quality thresh-
old q˜, and only qh auditors sell the audit service. This result is independent of which
agent pays for standardization costs as shown earlier. However, as long as the bargaining
power lies with the auditors, cost differences do not matter because the price pa asked
for by the auditor always attains the maximum willingness to pay of the buyer, which
is {qh − pv; qh − αpv; qh}, respectively, depending on who pays for standardization costs.
32This is for the case where the auditor is still the price setter and the buyer decides on buying after
observing prices. We refrain from an analysis with bilateral bargaining power.
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Cost differences only matter if we havem agents on the sell-side as in the monopsony case.
Finally, as a seventh extension we consider a multilateral framework with n buyers,
m auditors and an asymmetric cost structure. Like before, each auditor can sell one unit
of the service to one seller. In the standardization game, homogeneous price competition
among auditors leads to λ ·m auditors of type qh offering their services at pa = ch, while
(1 − λ)m auditors of type ql procure their services at pa = chβ . If n < λ · m, then all
demand is satisfied by qh auditors with pa = qh − pv and pv = qh − ch and subsequently,
pa = ch. Hence, we encompass the crowding out of ql auditors as envisioned with pro-
duction heterogeneity and a competitive supply-side earlier. The buyer then receives
Πb(sb|pa) = qh− ch > 0. If n > λ ·m, then λ ·m of the demand is served by qh auditors at
pa = ch whereas n− λ ·m of the demand is satisfied by ql auditors at pa = chβ and so the
supply function is a step function. Whether n−λ ·m S (1−λ) ·m depends on n S m, i.e.
if excess demand or excess supply exists in the market. As before, the receives regulator
receives Πsr = qh − ch − cv.
In the certification game, both qh and ql auditors supply their services at prices equal
to productivities, i.e. pa = {qh; ql}. If we have excess demand with n > m, then qh
auditors certify and receive Πh = qh − ch − pv ≥ 0 while ql auditors never certify and
receive Πl = ql − cl = ql > 0. The buyer receives Πb(sb|pa, µb) = 0. This is the same
outcome as in the initial model of certification. If we have excess supply with n < m,
qh auditors charge the lowest possible price pa = ch but cannot cover sunk costs pv.
Hence, we arrive at an asymmetric equilibrium where only one qh auditor certifies such
that pa = qh and thus Πh = pa − ch − pv ≥ 0. The remaining λ(m − 1) auditors
of type qh do not certify. If no other agent certifies, then σh(c) yields a credible sig-
nal for one qh auditor. If y ∈ (1,m] certify, then a recoupment of pv is not possible
and Πh(c) = qh−chy − pv ≤ 0 because pv = qh − ch. Meanwhile, (1 − λ)m auditors
of type ql charge their lowest possible price pa = cl = 0 and again never certify since
Πl(c) = pa − cl − pv < 0 = pa − cl = Πl(pa). In total, λ(m − 1) + (1 − λ)m = m − λ
auditors do not certify. Then, λ(m − 1) + (1 − λ)m − n = m − λ − n auditors cannot
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sell their service and go empty-handed. This result is similar to the monopsony case.
Moreover, the regulator receives Πcr = λ(qh − ch − cv).
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we evaluate the impact of regulatory interventions on the quality of audit-
ing services. The recent financial crisis has shown that a positive auditing result does not
provide clear signaling of financial robustness because financially distressed companies
received positive statements far too often. The EC thus wants to create a Single Market
for Statutory Audits. Herein, the EC plans to introduce measures aimed at competition,
standardization and certification in order to introduce more competition, and to improve
the transparency in the market and the reliability of the signaling of audit results’ quality
to potential investors of listed companies.
Based on a theoretical analysis of an auditor-firm-regulator-relationship we utilize a
signaling framework to show the differences between standardization and certification.
While standardization leads to homogeneous price competition among auditors where all
rents are collected by the regulator, certification segments the market such that a sepa-
rating equilibrium with prices equal to productivities is sustained. We can show that it
does matter which market side initiates the verification of quality for firstly, the regula-
tor’s profits and secondly, social welfare. The regulator’s interests and social efficiency
are not aligned, however.
In our analysis, we find that voluntary quality certification is obtained only by high-
quality auditors. Important to note is that the cut-off values for verification costs cv
determine the welfare ranking. Hence, certification is optimal for social welfare whenever
verification costs are sufficiently large. Standardization is optimal whenever the costs
for verifying quality are low for the regulator. However, a regime without information
asymmetries would be optimal for welfare in almost all cases.
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A couple of extensions to the initial model show that our results are quite robust.
While renegotiations, quality choice, imperfect verification technologies and a competi-
tive demand-side do not change equilibrium outcomes, a competitive supply-side leads
to firstly, an asymmetric equilibrium with only one qh agent certifying and secondly,
a crowding out of ql auditors in case of an asymmetric cost structure. A multilateral
framework gives the same results.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
Table A.1: Overview of Variables, Definitions and Sources
Variables Definitions Sources1
Financial innovation measures
Applications Patent applications counted per
firm in a year.
US PTO2, collected by
Lerner (2006)
Weighted Applica-
tions
Weighted patent applications
per firm in a year where the sum
of 1 (count) is divided among
the firms mentioned in the arti-
cle about the innovation.
US PTO, collected by
Lerner (2006)
Innovations Count of stories from newspaper
articles and databases on inno-
vations per firm in a year.
WSJ3 and FD4, collected
by Lerner (2006)
Weighted Innova-
tions
Weighted count of innovations
(as above).
WSJ and FD, collected
by Lerner (2006)
Major Innovations Count of only major innovations
where Lerner (2006) applies a
three-part classification scheme
(A,B,C).
WSJ and FD, collected
by Lerner (2006)
Weighted Major In-
novations
Weighted count of major innova-
tions (as above).
WSJ and FD, collected
by Lerner (2006)
1We make use of the data set constructed by Lerner (2006) for which he draws on various data sources.
In addition, we define and compute additional factors, which were previously not used, for our empirical
investigation. All financial data is in million 2002 US Dollars.
2US Patent and Trademark Office
3Wall Street Journal
4Factiva database
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Financial innovation measures (cont’d)
FI by Others Number of financial innovations
in the same year by other firms
with headquarters in the same
two-digit zip code as the firm.
WSJ and FD, collected
by Lerner (2006)
Patents Count of patents granted to a
firm in a year with respect to the
financial services area.
US PTO, collected by
Lerner (2006)
Weighted Patents Weighted count of patents (as
above).
US PTO, collected by
Lerner (2006)
Financial Institution’s performance measures
EBIT Earnings before interest and
taxes per firm and year.
Compustat
EBITDA Earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization
per firm and year.
Compustat
Net Income Net income of a firm in million
2002 USD per year.
Compustat
Opprof Operational profitability con-
structed as EBITDA / revenues
(opprof = EBIT / revenues,
whenever EBITDA is unavail-
able).
computed from
Compustat data
Ret. Earnings Retained earnings in million
2002 USD per firm in a year.
Compustat
ROA Return on assets constructed as
net income / assets.
computed from
Compustat data
ROE Return on equity constructed as
net income / shareholders’ eq-
uity.
computed from
Compustat data
Financial Institution’s stability measures
CAR Capital-asset ratio constructed
as shareholders’ equity / assets.
computed from
Compustat data
∆(Opprof) Difference between operational
profitability in 2002 and 1999.
computed from
Compustat data
∆(ROA) Difference between return on as-
sets in 2002 and 1999.
computed from
Compustat data
∆(ROE) Difference between return on eq-
uity in 2002 and 1999.
computed from
Compustat data
σ(ROA) Standard deviation of ROA for
each agent calculated over the
sample period.
computed from
Compustat data
σ(ROE) Standard deviation of ROE for
each agent calculated over the
sample period.
computed from
Compustat data
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Financial Institution’s stability measures (cont’d)
Sharpe Sharpe ratio constructed as
ROE / σ(ROE). Larger values
imply less excessive risk for a
certain return.
computed from
Compustat data
Z-score Index of bank solvency con-
structed as (ROA+CAR) /
σ(ROA). Higher Z-score implies
lower probability of failure.
computed from
Compustat data
Other agent-level variables
Age Age of firm in relation to its
foundation or IPO.
Compustat
Assets Total assets of each financial in-
stitution in million 2002 USD
per year.
Compustat
Cash equiv. Cash equivalents in million 2002
USD per firm in a year.
Compustat
Emp. Employees per firm and year. Compustat
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
defined as the sum of squared
shares of revenues per firm to to-
tal revenues per year, i.e. HHI =
ΣNi (revenuesi/total revenues)2
per year.
computed from
Compustat data
Leverage Ratio of the book value of a
firm’s long-term debt to to-
tal capitalization (book value
of long-term debt and preferred
stock and the market value of
common stock).
Compustat
Lt. Debt Long-term debt in million 2002
USD per firm in a year.
Compustat
Market Value Common market value in million
2002 USD per firm in a year.
Compustat
Pref. Stock Preferred stock in million 2002
USD per firm in a year.
Compustat
R&D Expenditures per firm for re-
search and development in mil-
lion 2002 USD in a year.
Compustat
Revenues Revenues in million 2002 USD
per firm in a year.
Compustat
Sh. Equity Shareholders’ equity in million
2002 USD per firm in a year.
Compustat
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Table A.2: Spearman Correlation Coefficients of FI measures and Z-scores of firms
Log of Innovations Weighted Only Weighted Patents Weighted Applications Weighted R&D FI by
Z-score counts of major major counts of counts of ratio others
innovations innovations innovations patents applications
Log of —
Z-score
Innovations -0.0417*** —
Weighted count -0.0417*** 1.0000*** —
of innovations
Only major -0.0338*** 0.8397*** 0.8390*** —
innovations
Weighted major -0.0338*** 0.8397*** 0.8390*** 1.0000*** —
innovations
Patents -0.0707*** 0.1459*** 0.1458*** 0.1272*** 0.1272***
Weighted count -0.0707*** 0.1459*** 0.1458*** 0.1272*** 0.1272*** 1.0000*** —
of patents
Applications -0.0561*** 0.1213*** 0.1212*** 0.1087*** 0.1088*** 0.4428*** 0.4428*** —
Weighted count -0.0561*** 0.1213*** 0.1212*** 0.1087*** 0.1088*** 0.4428*** 0.4428*** 1.0000*** —
of applications
R&D ratio -0.2158*** 0.1004*** 0.1003*** 0.0818*** 0.0818*** 0.3431*** 0.3431*** 0.2953*** 0.2953*** —
FI by others -0.0187*** -0.0336*** -0.0337*** -0.0270*** -0.0271*** -0.0168 -0.0168 -0.0083 -0.0083 -0.0208*** —
Notes: *** p<0.01
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B.1 Data Description
Table B.1: Overview of Variables, Definitions and Sources
Variables Definitions Sources1
Leverage Ratios
Total Leverage (long-term debt + short-term
debt) / total assets per firm in a
year.
ORBIS
Long-term Leverage Long-term debt / total assets per
firm in a year.
ORBIS
Short-term Leverage Short-term debt / total assets per
firm in a year.
ORBIS
Firm-specific Factors
Firm Size Logarithm of revenues per firm in
a year.
ORBIS
Firm Growth Percentage change in revenues per
firm in a year.
ORBIS
Profitability Earnings before interest and taxes
(EBIT) / total assets per firm in a
year.
ORBIS
1We define and compute the factors used in the empirical investigation according to common literature.
The data for the individual variables is drawn from the respective sources. All financial data is in
thousand EUR.
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Firm-specific Factors (cont’d)
Tangibility Fixed assets / total assets per firm
in a year.
ORBIS
Liquidity Cash equivalents / total assets per
firm in a year.
ORBIS
Nickell Criterion Interest paid / cash flow per firm
in a year.
computed from
ORBIS data
Industry-specific Factors
Industry Leverage Median of (short-term, long-term,
total) leverage per year and indus-
try.
computed from
ORBIS data
Industry Growth Median percentage change in rev-
enues per year and industry.
computed from
ORBIS data
Macroeconomic Factors
Tax Shield If firms make use of long-term
debt: average (taxation / total as-
sets) per country of firms financed
without long-term debt – average
(taxation / total assets) per coun-
try of firms financed with long-
term debt; zero otherwise.
computed from
ORBIS data
Inflation Annual percentage change in con-
sumer prices per country.
WDI2, World Bank
GDP Growth Annual percentage change in GDP
per country.
WDI, World Bank
Capital Flows Net capital account / GDP per
country in a year.
WDI, World Bank
Unemployment Total unemployment as percentage
of total labor force per country in
a year.
WDI, World Bank
Stock Prices Annual percentage change in Stan-
dard & Poor’s Global Equity In-
dices per country.
WDI, World Bank
2World Development Indicators, World Bank (2013)
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Table B.2: Data along different Dimensions
Dimensions Observations
Full Sample 6,365,842
EU27† 5,744,127
Euro Area‡ 4,859,829
Industries
Manufacturing 1,484,855
Electricity, gas and water supply 117,474
Construction and real estate 1,418,791
Wholesale trade 1,375,798
Retail trade 563,192
Transportation and storage 321,420
Accommodation and food 225,965
ICT and research 219,725
Professional and administrative services 638,622
Countries∗
Germany 298,347
United Kingdom 212,695
France 1,321,317
Italy 1,452,641
Spain 1,018,082
Poland 94,890
USA 29,556
Japan 25,738
Legal Status
public 1,016,853
private 4,484,963
n.a. 864,026
Notes: † excludes Croatia; ‡ includes Monaco and Montene-
gro, excludes Latvia; ∗ includes only eight major countries
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Table B.3: Spearman Correlation Coefficients of Leverage Ratios and Firm- and Industry-level Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
St LR (1) —
Lt LR (2) -0.3514*** —
Total LR (3) 0.7524*** 0.1865*** —
Firm Size (4) 0.1264*** 0.0064*** 0.0479*** —
Firm Growth (5) 0.1075*** -0.0209*** 0.1047*** 0.0519*** —
Profitability (6) -0.0626*** -0.1176*** -0.1825*** 0.1036*** 0.2342*** —
Tangibility (7) -0.3925*** 0.3526*** -0.1774*** -0.1354*** -0.0428*** -0.1728*** —
Liquidity (8) -0.0845*** -0.1931*** -0.2413*** -0.0001 0.0548*** 0.3110*** -0.2553*** —
Nickell (9) 0.1533*** 0.2190*** 0.3056*** 0.0256*** 0.0482*** 0.0585*** 0.0480*** -0.2444*** —
St Ind. LR (10) 0.2468*** — — 0.1101*** 0.0750*** 0.1513*** -0.3510*** 0.1482*** 0.0049*** —
Lt Ind. LR (11) — 0.2120*** — -0.1481*** -0.0683*** -0.1469*** 0.2829*** -0.1503*** 0.0373*** -0.6944*** —
Total Ind. LR (12) — — 0.1563*** -0.0140*** 0.0529*** 0.0591*** -0.2182*** 0.0626*** 0.0274*** 0.7019*** -0.2094*** —
Ind. Growth (13) 0.0964*** -0.0785*** 0.0334*** 0.0653*** 0.2275*** 0.1225*** -0.0923*** 0.0704*** -0.0130*** 0.3578*** -0.3454*** 0.1901*** —
Notes: *** p<0.01
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Table B.4: Spearman Correlation Coefficients of Leverage Ratios and Macroeconomic Variables
(1) (2) (3) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
St LR (1) —
Lt LR (2) -0.3514*** —
Total LR (3) 0.7524*** 0.1865*** —
Tax Shield (14) -0.1911*** 0.8211*** 0.1489*** —
Inflation (15) -0.0665*** -0.0141*** -0.0524*** 0.0010 —
GDP Growth (16) -0.0337*** -0.0375*** -0.0566*** -0.0975*** 0.2783*** —
Capital Flows (17) -0.1125*** 0.0493*** -0.0903*** -0.0217*** 0.2577*** 0.0792*** —
Unemployment (18) -0.2190*** 0.1208*** -0.1988*** 0.0006 -0.0711*** 0.0503*** 0.3835*** —
Stock Prices (19) 0.0045*** -0.0483*** -0.0081*** -0.0614*** -0.3096*** 0.2462*** -0.0569*** 0.0242*** —
Notes: *** p<0.01
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B.2 Supplementary Regressions
Table B.5: Model Specification with different Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total Leverage Total Leverage Total Leverage Long-term Leverage Long-term Leverage Long-term Leverage Short-term Leverage Short-term Leverage Short-term Leverage
Firm Size 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.009***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Growth 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability -0.159*** -0.184*** -0.182*** -0.062*** -0.056*** -0.052*** -0.128*** -0.164*** -0.165***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tangibility -0.028*** -0.103*** -0.095*** 0.103*** 0.118*** 0.120*** -0.103*** -0.238*** -0.215***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Liquidity -0.080*** -0.152*** -0.139*** -0.003** -0.026*** -0.035*** -0.075*** -0.157*** -0.133***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Nickell 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total Ind. LR 0.144*** 0.136*** 0.467***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.004)
Lt Ind. LR -0.094*** -0.005 0.513***
(0.013) (0.008) (0.006)
St Ind. LR 0.158*** 0.150*** 0.424***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002)
Ind. Growth 0.008*** 0.008*** -0.011*** -0.025*** -0.017*** -0.032*** 0.031*** 0.027*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tax Shield 1.097*** 1.827*** 1.810*** 1.504*** 1.881*** 1.919*** -0.421*** -0.372*** -0.343***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.088) (0.045) (0.055) (0.025) (0.066) (0.066)
Inflation 0.001*** -0.003*** 0.001*** -0.000 -0.002*** -0.000*** 0.002*** -0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.002*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capital Flows 0.226*** -1.276*** 0.250*** -0.209*** 0.229*** -0.093*** 0.465*** -1.756*** 0.496***
(0.033) (0.029) (0.033) (0.044) (0.024) (0.031) (0.039) (0.032) (0.039)
Unemployment -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.000*** -0.002*** -0.007*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Stock Prices 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y N N Y N N Y N N
Industry FE N Y N N Y N N Y N
Country FE N N Y N N Y N N Y
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,265,810 3,265,810 3,265,810 1,794,355 1,794,355 1,794,355 3,263,935 3,263,935 3,263,935
Number of firms 887,514 887,514 887,514 596,868 596,868 596,868 887,197 887,197 887,197
R-squared 0.099 0.174 0.208 0.136 0.252 0.272 0.204 0.259 0.305
Notes: See Table B.1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables. Firm-level data and taxation comes from the ORBIS database. Data for macroeconomic factors comes from the World Bank. All variables are ratios, growth
rates or logarithms. In all regressions, we include year fixed effects and a constant but suppress their coefficients in the tables. All columns incorporate the baseline model specification introduced in Section 2.4.2. Columns 1, 4
and 7 include the same regressions as in Table 2.3 with firm fixed effects. Columns 2, 5 and 8 include industry fixed effects in regressions for total, long-term and short-term leverage, respectively. Columns 3, 6 and 9 include
country fixed effects in regressions for total, long-term and short-term leverage, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.6: Sample Selection for Long-term and Short-term Leverage Ratios
full sample long-term debt > 0 full sample short-term debt > 0
Long-term Leverage Long-term Leverage Short-term Leverage Short-term Leverage
Firm Size 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Growth 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability -0.031*** -0.062*** -0.128*** -0.128***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Tangibility 0.075*** 0.103*** -0.103*** -0.103***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Liquidity -0.005*** -0.003** -0.075*** -0.075***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Nickell 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lt Ind. LR -0.023*** -0.094***
(0.008) (0.013)
St Ind. LR 0.158*** 0.158***
(0.007) (0.007)
Ind. Growth -0.023*** -0.025*** 0.031*** 0.031***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tax Shield 1.532*** 1.504*** -0.423*** -0.421***
(0.021) (0.088) (0.025) (0.025)
Inflation -0.000*** -0.000 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capital Flows -0.258*** -0.209*** 0.482*** 0.465***
(0.031) (0.044) (0.039) (0.039)
Unemployment -0.002*** 0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Stock Prices 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,265,810 1,794,355 3,265,810 3,263,935
Number of firms 887,514 596,868 887,514 887,197
R-squared 0.211 0.136 0.203 0.204
Notes: See Table B.1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables. Firm-level data and taxation comes from the
ORBIS database. Data for macroeconomic factors comes from the World Bank. All variables are ratios, growth rates or
logarithms. In all regressions, we include firm and year fixed effects and a constant but suppress their coefficients in the
tables. All columns incorporate the baseline model specification introduced in Section 2.4.2. Columns 2 and 4 include
the same regressions as in Table 2.3 for long-term and short-term leverage ratios, respectively. Columns 1 and 3 include
regressions for long-term and short-term leverage ratios, respectively, with the full sample. Following Petersen (2009),
we employ two-dimensional clustering of robust standard errors at firm-level and year-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table B.7: Baseline Results for Leverage Differences
(1) (2) (3)
Total Difference Long-term Difference Short-term Difference
Firm Size 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Growth 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability -0.158*** -0.064*** -0.158***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Tangibility -0.026*** 0.103*** -0.026***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Liquidity -0.080*** -0.002 -0.080***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Nickell 0.000 0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ind. Growth 0.002 -0.031*** -0.021***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tax Shield 1.082*** 1.674*** 1.098***
(0.020) (0.088) (0.020)
Inflation 0.001*** -0.000* 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capital Flows 0.147*** -0.210*** 0.129***
(0.033) (0.044) (0.033)
Unemployment -0.002*** 0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Stock Prices 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y
Observations 3,265,810 1,794,355 3,263,935
Number of firms 887,514 596,868 887,197
R-squared 0.097 0.102 0.182
Notes: See Table B.1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables. Firm-level data and
taxation comes from the ORBIS database. Data for macroeconomic factors comes from
the World Bank. All variables are ratios, growth rates or logarithms. In all regressions,
we include firm and year fixed effects and a constant but suppress their coefficients in the
tables. All columns incorporate the baseline model specification introduced in Section 2.4.2.
The dependent variables are differences of firms’ total leverage from total industry median
leverage in column 1, differences of firms’ long-term leverage from long-term industry median
leverage in column 2, and differences of firms’ short-term leverage from short-term industry
median leverage. Following Petersen (2009), we employ two-dimensional clustering of robust
standard errors at firm-level and year-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.8: Comparison of Empirical Capital Structure Models
our model Rajan and Faulkender and Frank and Köksal, Orman
Zingales (1995) Petersen (2006) Goyal (2009) and Oduncu (2013)
Total Leverage Total Leverage Total Leverage Total Leverage Total Leverage
Firm Size 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.0008*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm Growth 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability -0.159*** -0.179*** -0.165*** -0.166*** -0.157***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Tangibility -0.028*** -0.006*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Liquidity -0.080*** -0.087*** -0.088*** -0.078***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Nickell 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Total Ind. LR 0.144*** 0.190*** 0.188*** 0.159***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Ind. Growth 0.008***
(0.002)
Tax Shield 1.097*** 1.140*** 1.169*** 1.083***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Inflation 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capital Flows 0.226*** 0.476***
(0.000) (0.032)
Unemployment -0.002***
(0.000)
Stock Prices 0.000*** -0.000* 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,265,810 3,265,810 3,265,810 3,265,810 3,265,810
Number of firms 887,514 887,514 887,514 887,514 887,514
R-squared 0.099 0.072 0.082 0.084 0.087
Notes: See Table B.1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables. Firm-level data and taxation comes from the
ORBIS database. Data for macroeconomic factors comes from the World Bank. All variables are ratios, growth rates
or logarithms. In all regressions, we include firm and year fixed effects and a constant but suppress their coefficients in
the tables. Column 1 incorporates the baseline model specification introduced in Section 2.4.2 for total leverage ratios.
Columns 2 includes Rajan and Zingales’ (1995) model. Originally, they run a cross-sectional study on G7 countries in
1991. Column 3 includes Faulkender and Petersen’s (2006) model. In their study, they analyze US firms from 1986 to
2000. Column 4 includes Frank and Goyal’s (2009) model specification based on an analysis of public US firms from 1950
to 2003. Column 5 includes the model by Köksal, Orman and Oduncu (2013). They originally analyze Turkish firms from
1996 to 2009. In order to compare the different model specifications, we use the same sample for all regressions based
on our model specification from Section 2.4.2 and the data set explained in Section 2.3. Following Petersen (2009), we
employ two-dimensional clustering of robust standard errors at firm-level and year-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.9: Results for Leverage Differences across Industries
Manufacturing Electricity Construction Wholes. trade Retail trade Transportation Accom. & food ICT & res. PAS
Total Difference Total Difference Total Difference Total Difference Total Difference Total Difference Total Difference Total Difference Total Difference
Firm Size 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.002 0.004*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Firm Growth 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Profitability -0.186*** -0.195*** -0.137*** -0.165*** -0.178*** -0.165*** -0.169*** -0.127*** -0.130***
(0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
Tangibility -0.036*** 0.003 -0.054*** -0.025*** 0.011*** 0.013** -0.002 -0.027*** -0.017***
(0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
Liquidity -0.099*** -0.056*** -0.086*** -0.073*** -0.079*** -0.080*** -0.060*** -0.064*** -0.065***
(0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
Nickell 0.000*** 0.000** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ind. Growth 0.017*** 0.040*** 0.046*** 0.050*** -0.043 -0.086** 0.016 0.060***
(0.003) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.029) (0.043) (0.024) (0.008)
Tax Shield 1.133*** 1.484*** 1.258*** 0.895*** 0.890*** 0.997*** 1.364*** 1.170*** 1.140***
(0.039) (0.163) (0.047) (0.039) (0.063) (0.095) (0.134) (0.127) (0.071)
Inflation 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth 0.000*** -0.001** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000 0.000 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Capital Flows 0.285*** 0.592*** -0.011 0.024 -0.053 0.417*** 0.195 0.438** 0.387***
(0.062) (0.246) (0.084) (0.063) (0.107) (0.145) (0.192) (0.202) (0.136)
Unemployment -0.001*** -0.006*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.000 -0.001*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Stock Prices 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 778,647 58,756 709,282 719,252 295,702 161,189 115,135 111,451 316,396
Number of firms 199,457 16,231 204,332 187,186 79,622 45,485 32,492 31,499 91,210
R-squared 0.104 0.049 0.128 0.129 0.066 0.038 0.026 0.076 0.084
Notes: See Table B.1 in the Appendix for definitions of the variables. Firm-level data and taxation comes from the ORBIS database. Data for macroeconomic factors comes from the World Bank. The
dependent variables are differences of firms’ total leverage from respective total industry median leverage. All variables are ratios, growth rates or logarithms. In all regressions, we include firm and year
fixed effects and a constant but suppress their coefficients in the tables. All columns incorporate the baseline model specification introduced in Section 2.4.2. The nine industry clusters in the columns are
"Manufacturing", "Electricity, gas and water supply", "Construction and real estate", "Wholesale trade", "Retail trade", "Transportation and storage", "Accommodation and food", "ICT and research" and
"Professional and administrative services". Following Petersen (2009), we employ two-dimensional clustering of robust standard errors at firm-level and year-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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B.3 Illustrations
Figure B.1: Firm Size across Countries
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Figure B.2: Firm Size across Industries
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Figure B.3: Growth Rates across Countries
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Figure B.4: Growth Rates across Industries
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Figure B.5: Profitability across Countries
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Figure B.6: Profitability across Industries
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Figure B.7: Tangibility across Countries
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Figure B.8: Tangibility across Industries
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Proof of Lemma 3.1
Verification of quality by introducing standardization is costly. We can distinguish three
cases. Initially, We assume that the buyer pays the standardization costs solely. However,
they can also be borne by the seller or shared among both agents without changing the
equilibrium outcome of the game. We illustrate this in the following.
Case I The buyer pays for standardization. This is explained in the text.
Case II The auditor pays for standardization. The respective payoffs for the buyer
are then: Πb(sn|pa) = 0 and Πb(sb|pa) = qh − pa. Hence, the maximum price that the
auditor can then charge to the buyer and still sell the good is pa ≤ qh.
The equilibrium depends on the range of pv: For any pv ≤ pa − ch ≤ qh − ch, buyer
acquires the good with qh at ch + pv ≤ pa ≤ qh. He then receives Πb(sb|pa) = qh− pa ≥ 0.
The qh auditor will not invest (ih = 0) and have Πh = pa− ch− ih− pv = qh− ch− pv ≥ 0
while the ql auditor will invest (il = ch) and also have Πl = pa−cl−il−pv = qh−ch−pv ≥ 0.
For any pv > qh − ch > pa − ch, the buyer cannot buy the good irrespective of the
quality because it is not supplied. The qh auditor and ql auditor would make losses
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Πh = Πl = pa − ch − pv ≤ qh − ch − pv < 0.
Case III Both agents pay for standardization. Let 0 < α < 1 denote the share
of standardization costs covered by the buyer and 1− α the respective share covered by
the auditor. Then payoffs for the buyer are: Πb(sn|pa) = 0 and Πb(sb|pa) = qh−pa−αpv.
Hence, the maximum price that the auditor can then charge to the buyer and still sell
the good is pa ≤ qh − αpv.
Again, the equilibrium depends on the range of pv: For any pv ≤ pa−ch1−α , the buyer
acquires the good with qh at ch + (1 − α)pv ≤ pa ≤ qh − αpv. He then receives
Πb(sb|pa, ) = qh − pa − αpv ≥ 0. Inserting pv leads to Πb(sb|pa) = qh − pa − α
(
pa−ch
1−α
)
=
(1−α)qh−(1−α)pa−αpa+αch
(1−α) =
(1−α)qh−pa+αch
(1−α) ≥ 0. This holds iff (1 − α)qh + αch ≥ pa. Be-
cause the regulator charges pv ≤ pa−ch1−α , the condition simplifies to pv ≤ (1−α)qh+αch−ch1−α =
(1−α)(qh−ch)
1−α ⇔ pv ≤ qh− ch. This is always fulfilled since qh− ch is the full economic rent
from auditing. The qh auditor will not invest (ih = 0) and have Πh = pa−ch−ih−(1−α)pv
= qh−αpv−ch− ih− (1−α)pv = qh−ch−pv ≥ 0 while the ql auditor will invest (il = ch)
and also have Πl = pa−cl−il−(1−α)pv = qh−αpv−cl−il−(1−α)pv = qh−ch−pv ≥ 0.
For any pv > pa−ch1−α , the buyer cannot buy the good irrespective of the quality because
the service is not provided. The qh auditor and ql auditor make losses Πh = Πl =
pa − ch − (1− α)pv < pa − ch − (1−α)(pa−ch)1−α = 0.
From the three cases illustrated above, we derive the price ranges the auditor can make
use of because of her respective bargaining power against the buyer:
• case I - ch ≤ pa ≤ qh − pv ⇒ qh − ch ≥ pv
• case II - ch + pv ≤ pa ≤ qh ⇒ qh − ch ≥ pv
• case III - ch + (1− α)pv ≤ pa ≤ qh − αpv ⇒ qh − ch ≥ pv
Hence, the equilibrium strategy of the regulator σ∗r is unaffected by the shifting in pa
which determines the equilibrium outcome of the game of standardization independent
of who pays the standardization costs. Q.e.d.
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Proof of Proposition 3.1
The game is solved by backward induction. In t=5, the buyer buys the auditing service
iff Πb(sb|pa) ≥ 0:
σ∗b :

sb if Πb(sb|pa) ≥ 0⇔ q˜ − pa − pv ≥ 0⇔ pa ≤ q˜ − pv = qh − pv
sn if Πb(sb|pa) < 0⇔ q˜ − pa − pv < 0⇔ pa > q˜ − pv = qh − pv
In t=4, the maximum price the auditor can charge to the buyer and still sell the auditing
service is pa ≤ q˜ − pv since q˜ − pa − pv
!≥ 0 in order to have Πb(sb|pa) ≥ 0. The auditor
solves
max
pa
Πi = pa − ci − ik
s.t. 1) c(q˜) ≤ pa ≤ q˜ − pv
2) Πi ≥ 0
Then,
∂Πi
∂pa
= 1
Πi|pa=0 = 0− ci − ik < 0
Πi|pa=q˜−pv = qh − pv − ci − ik ≥ 0
Hence,
Auditor’s strategy σ∗i :

p∗a = q˜ − pv if pv ≤ qh − ci − ik
any pa ≥ c(q˜) if pv > qh − ci − ik
In t=3, the auditor chooses her investment level to attain the quality threshold set by
the regulator in standardization. Since quality is standardized at q˜ = qh, the auditor’s
quality target that she wants to attain becomes qˆ = q˜ = qh. Then, the auditor sets her
investment level according to ik = c(q˜)− c(qi) where ik ∈ [0, ch]. For the qh auditor, any
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ik ≥ 0 attains q˜ = qh so that i∗h = 0.1 The ql auditor needs to invest il = c(q˜) − c(ql) to
attain q˜ = qh. Since c(ql) = cl = 0, I find il = c(q˜) and since c(q˜) = ch, I find i∗l = ch.2
In t=2, nature moves and allocates audit quality qi.
In t=1, given the auditor’s and buyer’s strategies, the regulator sets q˜ = qh and solves
max
pv
Πsr = xs(pv − cv)
s.t. 1) i∗h = 0, i∗l = ch
2) p∗a = qh − pv
3) pv ≤ qh − ch
4) cv ∈ [0, qh − ch]
5) Πsr ≥ 0
6) xs = 1
Then,
∂Πsr
∂pv
= 1
p∗v = qh − ch
p∗a = ch
Hence, Π∗b(sb|pa) = q˜− pa− pv = qh− ch− (qh− ch) = 0, Π∗h = pa− ch− ih = ch− ch = 0,
Π∗l = pa− cl− il = ch− ch = 0 and the regulator’s profit is Πsr = xs(pv− cv) = qh− ch− cv
because the probability of verifying quality in standardization is xs = 1 by assumption.
Q.e.d.
1Any ih > 0 only increases costs but not profits.
2Any il > ch only increases costs but not the quality, by definition. Any il < ch does not attain q˜.
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Proof of Lemma 3.2
Note that certification yields the auditors Πh(c) = qh − ch and Πl(c) = ql, respectively.
For any pv ≤ qh−ch, certifying will get the qh auditor a payoff of Πh(c) = qh−ch−pv ≥ 0
so that σh(c) = 1 while the ql auditor makes Πl(c) = ql − pv < ql so that σl(c) = 0.
For any pv > qh − ch, certification would give the qh auditor a negative payoff: Πh(c) =
qh−ch−pv < 0 and yield the ql auditor a payoff of Πl(c) = ql−pv < ql which is guaranteed
if no certification occurs. Q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
The game is solved by backward induction. In t=5, the buyer buys the auditing service
iff Πb(sb|pa, µb) = µ · qh + (1− µ)ql − pa ≥ 0:
σ∗b :

sb if Πb(sb|pa, µb) ≥ 0⇔ pa ≤ µb(pa)∆q + ql
sn if Πb(sb|pa, µb) ≤ 0⇔ pa ≥ µb(pa)∆q + ql
He buys the good (σb = sb) if µb(pa)∆q + ql ≥ pa. Then µb ≥ pa−qlqh−ql so that µb = 1 iff
pa = qh and µb = 0 iff pa = ql. The buyer believes that the good is qh if it is certified and
pa = qh. Hence,
µ∗b :

µ∗b = 1 if pa = qh ∧ σ∗i (c) = 1
µ∗b = 0 if pa < qh ∨ σ∗i (c) = 0
In t=4, the auditor decides whether or not she wants to obtain certification of her quality.
From Lemma 3.2, we know that
σ∗h :

σ∗h(c) = 1 if pv ≤ qh − ch
σ∗h(c) = 0 if pv > qh − ch
σ∗l (c) = 0 ∀ pv
For pv ≤ qh − ch, the qh auditor always certifies while the ql auditor never certifies. For
pv > qh − ch, any equilibrium involves no certification.
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In t=3, the maximum price the auditor can charge to the buyer and still sell the auditing
service is pa ≤ µb(pa)∆q + ql since µb(pa)∆q + ql
!≥ pa in order to have Πb(sb|pa, µb) ≥ 0.
If µb = 1, the maximum price that the auditor can then charge to the buyer and still sell
the good becomes pa ≤ µb(pa)∆q + ql ⇔ pa ≤ qh, whereas if µb = 0, then pa ≤ ql. The
high-type auditor solves
max
pa
Πh = pa − ch − pv
s.t. 1) c(qh) ≤ pa ≤ µb(pa)∆q + ql
2) σ∗h(c)
3) µ∗b
4) Πh ≥ 0
Then,
∂Πh
∂pa
= 1
p∗a = qh
The low-type auditor solves
max
pa
Πl = pa − cl
s.t. 1) c(ql) ≤ pa ≤ µb(pa)∆q + ql
2) σ∗l (c)
3) µ∗b
4) Πl ≥ 0
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Then,
∂Πl
∂pa
= 1
p∗a = ql
In any separating equilibrium, prices equal productivities, i.e. p∗a(µ∗b(pa), qh) = qh and
p∗a(µ∗b(pa), ql) = ql.3 Hence,
Auditor’s strategy σ∗h :

p∗a = qh; σ∗h(c) = 1 if pv ≤ qh − ch
any pa ≥ ch; σ∗h(c) = 0 if pv > qh − ch
Auditor’s strategy σ∗l :

p∗a = ql; σ∗l (c) = 0 if pv ≤ qh − ch
any pa ≥ cl; σ∗l (c) = 0 if pv > qh − ch
In t=2, nature moves and allocates audit quality qi.
In t=1, given the auditor’s and buyer’s strategies, the regulator solves
max
pv
Πcr = xc(pv − cv)
s.t. 1) σ∗h(c), σ∗l (c)
2) p∗a(µ∗b(pa), qh) = qh and p∗a(µ∗b(pa), ql) = ql
3) pv ≤ qh − ch
4) cv ∈ [0, qh − ch]
5) Πcr ≥ 0
6) xc = λ
3If pa > qi, the buyer makes losses from contracting the auditor. If pa < qi, then another buyer can offer
p′a ≡ pa +  < qi and contract the auditor profitably for any  > 0.
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Then,
∂Πcr
∂pv
= λ
p∗v = qh − ch
Hence, Π∗b(sb|pa, µb) = µ∗b(pa)∆q+ql−pa = 0, Π∗h = pa−ch−pv = qh−ch −(qh−ch) = 0,
Π∗l = pa − cl = ql and the regulator’s profit is Πcr = xc(pv − cv) = λ(qh − ch − cv) because
the probability of verifying quality in certification is xc = λ. Certification cannot yield
any higher payoff than λ(qh − ch − cv) because this would require either pv > qh − ch or
that the low-quality auditor certifies with strictly positive probability (σl(c) > 0). The
regulator can only acquire λ (qh − ch − cv) with pv = qh − ch and σh(c) = 1. Q.e.d.
Proof of Lemma 3.3
The comparisons of the four different welfare measurements are calculated in the follow-
ing.
Standardization In comparison to welfare with observable quality, W s > W iff
qh − ch − xs · cv > λ(qh − ch) + (1− λ)ql
⇔ (1− λ)(qh − ch)− (1− λ)ql − cv > 0
⇔ cv < (1− λ)(∆q − ch).
In comparison to welfare without verification of quality, W s > W iff
qh − ch − xs · cv > (1− λ)ql
⇔ qh − ch − (1− λ)ql > cv
⇔ cv < λ(qh − ch) + (1− λ)(∆q − ch).
Certification In comparison to welfare with observable quality, W > W c iff
λ(qh − ch) + (1− λ)ql > λ(qh − ch) + (1− λ)ql − xc · cv
⇔ λ · cv > 0
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which is always given since 0 < λ < 1 and cv ∈ [0, qh − ch].
In comparison to welfare without verification of quality, W c > W iff
λ(qh − ch) + (1− λ)ql − xc · cv > (1− λ)ql
⇔ λ(qh − ch) > λ · cv
⇔ cv < qh − ch
which is always given since cv ∈ [0, qh − ch].
Comparison between regulatory regimes When comparing both regulatory regimes,
W c > W s iff
λ(qh − ch) + (1− λ)ql − xc · cv > qh − ch − xs · cv
⇔ (λ− 1)(qh − ch) + (1− λ)ql + (xs − xc)cv > 0
⇔ (1− λ)(ql + cv) > (1− λ)(qh − ch)
⇔ cv > ∆q − ch.
Comparison between non-regulatory regimes When comparing both non-regulatory
regimes with and without information asymmetries, W > W ∀ cv because
λ(qh − ch) + (1− λ)ql > (1− λ)ql
⇔ λ(qh − ch) > 0
which is always given since 0 < λ < 1 by definition and qh− ch > 0 by assumption.Q.e.d.
Proof of Lemma 3.4
The thresholds for cv are necessary for ranking the four different welfare measurements.
Remember that the regulator can verify the auditor’s quality at cost cv ∈ [0, qh −
ch]. Each such threshold is an interval of values for cv for which a clear ranking of
the different welfare measures is possible. The intervals are established by bringing
the five cut-off values of cv in order such that 0︸︷︷︸
min
< (1− λ)(∆q − ch)︸ ︷︷ ︸
T 1
< ∆q − ch︸ ︷︷ ︸
T 2
<
λ(qh − ch) + (1− λ)(∆q − ch)︸ ︷︷ ︸
T 3
< qh − ch︸ ︷︷ ︸
max
.
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First, 0 < T 1 since (1− λ) > 0 and ∆q > ch by assumption.
Second, T 1 < T 2 since 0 < λ < 1 by definition.
Third, T 2 < T 3 since T 2 = ∆q − ch ⇔ λ(∆q − ch) + (1 − λ)(∆q − ch) so that T 2 <
T 3 ⇔ λ(∆q − ch) < λ(qh − ch) which obviously holds by ∆q = qh − ql < qh.
Finally, T 3 < qh− ch since λ(qh− ch) + (1− λ)(∆q− ch) < qh− ch ⇔ (1− λ)(∆q− ch) <
(1− λ)(qh − ch) which obviously holds by ∆q = qh − ql < qh.
Q.e.d.
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